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THE AMERICAN BOOKS 

A LIBRARY OF GOOD CITIZENSHIP 

" The American Books" are designed as a 
series of authoritative manuals, discussing 
problems of interest in America to-day. 



THE AMERICAN BOOKS 

THE AMERICAN COLLEGE BY ISAAC SHARPLESS 

THE INDIAN TO-DAY BY CHARLES A. EASTMAN 

COST OF LIVING BY FABIAN FRANKLIN 

THE AMERICAN NAVY BY REAR-ADMIRAL FRENCH 

E. CHADWICK, U. S. N. 

MUNICIPAL FREEDOM BY OSWALD RYAN 

AMERICAN LITERATURE BY LEON KELLNER 

(translated from THB GERMAN BY JULIA FRANKLIN) 

SOCIALISM IN AMERICA BY JOHN MACY 

AMERICAN IDEALS BY CLAYTON S. COOPER 

THE UNIVERSITY MOVEMENT BY IRA REMSEN 

THE AMERICAN SCHOOL BY WALTER S. HINCHMAN 

THE FEDERAL RESERVE BY H. PARKER WILLIS 

{For more extended notice of the series, see the last pages 
of this book.) 



The American Books 

The 
American Navy 

By 

Rear-Admiral French E. Chadwick 

(U. S. N., Retired) 




GARDEN CITY NEW YORK 

DOUBLEDAY, PAGE & COMPANY 
191S 






Copyright, 1915, by 
DOUBLEDAY, PaGE & CoMPANY 

All rights reserved, including that of 

translation into foreign languages, 

inxluding the Scandinavian 




m 21 1915 

'CI, A 401 J 38 



TO 

MY COMRADES OF THE NAVY 

PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE 



BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE 

Rear-Admiral French Ensor Chadwick was 
born at Morgantown, W. Va., February 29, 
1844. He was appointed to the U. S. Naval 
Academy from West Virginia (then part of 
Virginia) in 1861, and graduated in November, 
1864. In the summer of 1864 he was attached 
to the Marblehead in pursuit of the Confederate 
steamers Florida and Tallahassee. After the 
Civil War he served successively in a number 
of vessels, and was promoted to the rank of 
Lieutenant-Commander in 1869; was instruc- 
tor at the Naval Academy; on sea-service, and 
on lighthouse duty (i 870-1 882); Naval Attache 
at the American Embassy in London (1882- 
1889); commanded the Yorktown (1889-1891); 
was Chief Intelligence Officer (1892-1893); and 
Chief of the Bureau of Equipment (1893-1897). 

During the war with Spain he was Admiral 
Sampson's Chief of Staff, and also commanded 
the flagship New York. He participated in all 
the more important engagements in the Atlan- 
tic during the war; was advanced five numbers 
in rank for conspicuous conduct in battle, and 
was presented with a sword of honor by citizens 
of his native state. 



viii Biographical Note 

From 1900 to 1903 he was President of the 
Naval War College at Newport; was promoted 
Rear-Admiral October 11, 1903, and in 1904 
became commander-in-chief of the South At- 
lantic squadron. He retired February 28, 1906. 

Rear-Admiral Chadwick is one of the most 
influential friends of the United States navy; he 
has written extensively on diplomatic and naval 
topics, and is the author of " Causes of the 
Civil War" in the "American Nation Series." 
He is also much interested in problems of 
municipal government, is a member of the 
Newport Representative Council, a member of 
the National Institute of Arts and Letters, cor- 
responding member of the Massachusetts His- 
torical Society, member of the American 
Historical Association, etc. 



I 



INTRODUCTION 

The navy in all countries has ever been, and, 
as far as we can now judge, ever will be, a 
preeminent instrument of government. It was 
through her navy that Greece destroyed the 
power of Persia; Rome that of Carthage; the 
allies at Lepanto that of the Turks; England 
that of Holland and later that of France in 
America; the navy of France, in turn, caused the 
relinquishment of Great Britain's sovereignty 
over the thirteen colonies which formed the 
United States, and a generation later it was the 
British navy which made the efforts of the 
great Napoleon the "baseless fabric of a vi- 
sion. 

Coming to days within the ken of many still 
Hving, the navy was the power which made 
possible the preservation of the Union in our 
great Civil War by the cutting off of the South- 
ern Confederacy from its means of support by 
sea and reducing its forces thereby to practical 
inanition. For had the Confederacy had free 



X Introduction 

access to the sea and control of the Mississippi 
River, no armies of the North could have con- 
quered well-supplied armies of the South. So, 
too, the control of the sea decided the outcome 
of the Spanish War, When Sampson's fleet 
destroyed Spain's only battle squadron off 
Santiago de Cuba, Spain could no longer rein- 
force her army in Cuba, and surrender was a 
necessity. Even as this is written Germany's 
every sea outlet is closed by the British fleet, 
so superior in number to the German, and Ger- 
man commerce on the sea is for the time en- 
tirely swept away, leaving Great Britain for 
the moment navally and commercially supreme 
upon the ocean. As one attempts to look into 
the future the vastness of the possible changes 
startles the imagination, but in it all is ever 
present the power that goes with the ubiquitous 
warship, from whose threat no port of the world 
is free. Military power fades to insignificance, 
through its narrow Hmits of mobility, when com- 
pared with the meaning of a great fleet. The 
present sketch of history is to show what the 
warship has done for us. 



THE AMERICAN NAVY 



CHAPTER I 

When Great Britain attempted to reduce to 
obedience the rebellious colonies which were to 
form the United States of America she was deal- 
ing with a people who in the North at least had 
long been conversant with the building and sail- 
ing of ships. A New England built ship en- 
tered the Thames in 1638, only eighteen years 
after the landing of the Pilgrims at Plymouth, 
Massachusetts. The New England men, with a 
sterile coast, with limitless fishing grounds and 
unsurpassed harbors, turned as naturally to the 
sea for Hvelihood as did the South, more kindly 
treated by nature, to agriculture. In 1670 it 
was estimated that tv/o thirds of the British 
shipping was employed in the American trade. 
The Dutch, who had been great carriers on the 
sea, were excluded from this trade by the navi- 
gation laws of the period. Scotland was not 
admitted to the trade of the American planta- 
tions until her union with England in 1707, and 
Ireland not until 1780, while in 1670 nothing 

3 



4 The American Navy 

could be imported into the American colonies 
but what was laden in England in English-built 
ships. But while none of their products could 
be carried anywhere (except to other of the 
plantations) till they were first landed in Eng- 
land, the ships built in America were reckoned 
as English, and this fact gave great impetus 
to American shipbuilding. American shipping 
prospered amazingly. But while thus prosper- 
ing, it was the attempted repression of our 
commerce afloat and ashore (which included 
such things as forbidding the exportation of 
hats, restricting the manufacture of iron, and 
forbidding commerce with the foreign-owned 
islands of the West Indies) which did much 
more to develop the idea of independence than 
did the Stamp Act. But the net result of con- 
ditions was to foster shipping, and our compe- 
tition had so increased by 1725 that in that year 
"the shipwrights of the river Thames came up 
to Whitehall with a complaint that their busi- 
ness had declined and their workmen emigrated 
because the plantations furnished England with 
ships," 

On the register of the underwriters at Lloyd's 
for 1775, comprehending the shipping of the 
three preceding years, there were 3,908 British- 



The American Navy 5 

built vessels of 605,545 tons, and 2,311 of 
American build with a tonnage of 373,618 tons. 
The average size of the ship of the time was 
about 400 tons displacement. One 100 feet in 
length and 26 to 28 feet broad was a good-sized 
ship. They were but cockle boats in compari- 
son with the vast ships of to-day, many of which 
are full a hundred times 400 tons displace- 
ment. 

The foregoing will show that when there came 
a time to dispute the sea with Great Britain * 
there was no difficulty in supplying the ships, 
and the many ironworks which had been estab- 
lished, particularly in Massachusetts and Penn- 
sylvania, despite Great Britain's restrictions, 
could furnish guns in the manufacture of which 
our foundries were adepts before the war. 

The larger men-of-war of the period were 
greater in size than the largest merchantmen. 
The greater ships-of-t he-line (by which expres- 
sion is meant those which could take their 
place in the line of battle, the formation of which 
was in a single extended column) varied from 
4,000 to 3,000 tons displacement. The larger 
of these, which carried guns on three main decks 
and some light guns on the upper deck, to the 
number altogether of 100, or even 120, were 180 



6 The American Navy 

to 190 feet on the gun deck, with about 53 feet 
beam. The most usual size, however, was the 
"74," carrying nominally that number of guns, 
but usually six or eight more, on two main decks 
(and thus known as a two-decker). This class 
was about 168 feet long on the gun deck and 47 
feet broad. Below this class there were many 
ships of sixty, fifty, or even forty-four guns, with 
two gun decks. Such, for a long period, formed 
part of the line of battle. 

The frigates had but one covered gun deck. 
They varied in length from 115 to 130 feet on 
the gun deck, and were from 32 to 36 feet beam, 
roughly a fourth of their length. They formed 
no part of a line of battle, their duty when ac- 
companying a fleet being to remain clear of the 
line and repeat the admiral's signals. There 
was also a small class of ship called a sloop-of- 
war, which carried guns on only the upper, or 
spar, deck as it came to be called. These vessels 
were ship-rigged; that is, they had three masts 
with square sails on each. They were usually 
about 100 feet long and about 27 feet beam. 

The three-deckers, or lOO-gun ships, carried 
about 900 men; the 74's about 600; the frigates 
about 160. The guns of the period were of 
course all smooth-bores and muzzle-loaders. 



The American Navy 7 

In the large ships, the heavier guns, usually 32- 
pounders, were carried on the lower gun decks 
to give stability to the ship; i8's or 24's were 
carried on the middle deck, 9's and 12's on the 
upper, 9's and 6's on the quarter deck, which 
was the part of the upper deck aft of the main- 
mast, and on the forecastle, which was the part 
of the upper deck forward of the foremast; the 
space between the two was called the waist. 
The larger frigates usually carried i8's on the 
gun deck; the smaller, 12's or 9's. The sloops 
carried 9's or 6's. The greatest range of even 
the heavier guns was but Httle over 2,000 yards, 
as the ports rarely allowed more than 8° or 9° 
elevation. Such guns were but toys compared 
with modern ordnance, but they were common 
alike to all nations, and all were thus on the 
same footing. 

An immense difference between that day and 
this was in the motive power which then and 
for two and a half generations later consisted of 
lofty wooden masts, reaching skyward in the 
greater ships about 200 feet, crossed by "yards," 
the larger of which were about 100 feet long, the 
former supported by a great mass of rigging 
known as shrouds and stays, the latter moved 
by "braces" and the sails worked by a maze of 



8 The American Navy- 

running rigging. All this, of course, was sub- 
ject to being shot away, and ships were thus 
frequently completely dismasted or disabled 
in action. The same result was often, too, pro- 
duced by a gale of wind, it being no uncommon 
thing for a fleet to be thus completely inca- 
pacitated for the continuance of a voyage. 

Weeks or fortnights were spent in a voyage 
now done in days. Of certainty as to time of » 
reaching port, there was none. And amid all 
there was the danger from enemies, legal or 
piratical, for the world was only slowly ridding 
itself of the latter; and from the inherent dan- 
gers of the sea itself to the clumsy ships which 
slowly worked their way across it. How great 
these last were, through the ignorance at that 
time of the law of storms, may be known by the 
fate of a great fleet which in 1782 left the West 
Indies under Admiral Graves, with ten line- 
of-battle ships convoying nearly a hundred 
merchantmen. Among the former were six of 
the prizes taken in Rodney's great naval battle 
of April 12, 1782. Caught in a fierce gale 
southeast of Nova Scotia, five of the battleships 
foundered with nearly all on board. One of 
those which went down with every soul was the 
Fille de Paris, which had been the flagship of 



The American Navy 9 

the unfortunate Count de Grasse. The total 
loss of men was estimated at 3,500. 

Such was the setting of the period which saw 
the birth of the first American navy, which was 
to have an existence of but eight short years, to 
be succeeded, however, nine years after (1794) 
by the modest beginnings which have grown into 
the great fleet of to-day, and whose history is 
one of uninterrupted success and honor. 



CHAPTER II 

In September, 1744, there met at Philadelphia, 
then our foremost city, representatives of each 
of the thirteen colonies, called together on ac- 
count of the increasing difficulties which had 
arisen with the mother country. These diffi- 
culties arose mainly from the tendency of par- 
liament to govern the colonies as it would, say, 
any county of England. This right the Amer- 
icans denied. They were good subjects of the 
King, but they objected to parliamentary rule. 
The underlying idea which governed the action 
of the Americans was thus that of a federal- 
ism which only in these latter days has laid 
hold in any considerable degree of the minds of 
the English, who now debate the possibility 
of England, Scotland, Wales, Ireland, Canada, 
Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa be- 
coming states of a federation somewhat akin to 
our own. But at the time of the outbreak of 
our Revolution there was no widespread idea of 
separation. It was, however, in the air, and by 



The American Navy II 

some openly advocated. Had there been a com- 
plete renouncement of the right of parliament 
to make laws governing the colonies there would, 
for the time at least, have been a reconcihation. 
It was upon this principle we divided. Thus 
the war began. 

There was at this time on our coast a British 
naval force of four ships of from seventy to 
fifty guns (these at Boston), and twenty from 
twenty to six guns distributed from New 
Hampshire to Florida. The whole was a very 
moderate force considering the long-standing 
discontent and the difficulties of the existing 
situation. The British navy, in which, as in 
the administration of every other department 
of the British public service of the period, in- 
efficiency and dishonesty reigned to an almost 
unbelievable degree, had been allowed to run 
down sadly after the Seven Years' War which 
ended in 1763. The total number of ships was 
but 270 and the number of seamen but 18,000. 
Before the war closed the ships were to number 
468, of which 174 were ships-of-the-line (carry- 
ing from sixty to one hundred guns), and the 
seamen were to number 110,000. 

The situation of the United States was much 
akin to that of the Southern Confederacy. 



12 The American Navy 

Its resources were too meagre to carry on a war 
without the importation of much that was neces- 
sary to keep an army in efficiency. Thus the 
true plan of England was a strict blockade and 
the reduction to inanition of our forces, such as 
we ourselves carried on against the South in our 
Civil War. This action was advocated strongly 
by Viscount Barrington, the Secretary for War, 
who urged that the navy only should be em- 
ployed, and that the ships should take posses- 
sion of all our ports and establish a complete 
blockade. Fortunately for the revolutionists, 
his advice was not heeded. 

On April 19, 1775, at Concord and Lexington, 
the long-prepared fagots of revolution were 
lighted into flame. Two months later, June 
17th, came Bunker Hill and the immediate 
assembling near Boston (where lay almost the 
whole of the British force in America) of a multi- 
tude of country people ill-provided with every- 
thing that goes to make the efficiency of an army 
but high determination and spirit. By a stroke of 
prescience which would seem a providence, Wash- 
ington was appointed the commander-in-chief. 

There had been fights afloat between the 
Americans and the British some years before 



The American Navy 13 

the actual outbreak of the Revolution. In 
1769 the sloop Liberty, employed in revenue 
protection, had been seized and burned by the 
people of Newport, Rhode Island; in 1772 a 
schooner, the Gaspee, used for similar service 
in Narragansett Bay and which had grounded 
while in chase of a suspected vessel near Provi- 
dence, was boarded by a party of men who 
burned her, and but a month after the first 
fights ashore occurred there were attacks with 
some loss of Hfe upon an armed schooner and 
barges which attempted the seizure of livestock 
on the islands of Boston Bay. The lively fights 
at Machias in June, 1775, in which the inhabi- 
tants had captured the sloop Unity and another 
which had been sent to Machias for lumber and 
which were under the escort of an armed tender, 
the Margaretta, were, however, the first of the 
actual War of the Revolution. They are proud 
recollections of local history and have caused 
the name of the town to appear on the navy list 
as that of a small cruiser of to-day. On August 
9, 1775, the Falcon, sloop-of-war under Cap- 
tain Linzee, pursued into Gloucester harbor 
two schooners bound from the West Indies; 
one he seized, and the other succeeding in get- 
ting into the harbor was attacked by boats from 



14 The American Navy 

the Falcon. The mihtia and inhabitants gath- 
ered, and the action which came on and which 
lasted several hours resulted in the capture of 
thirty-five of the Falcon s men who had come 
into the harbor in the captured schooner and in 
their own boats, both schooners remaining in 
the hands of the Americans. 

To Washington himself was due the first 
organized force of the Americans in the Revolu- 
tion upon the sea. Throughout his career he 
recognized the importance of its control, and 
immediately on his arrival at Cambridge to take 
the command of the American army then col- 
lected before Boston, he began to look into the 
question of a naval force, with a view to cap- 
turing the enemy's supplies. Such capture 
would not only be a deprivation to the British 
forces, but a much needed aid to the Americans 
who needed everything which goes to support 
an army, excepting food, which the surrounding 
country supplied for the moment plentifully 
enough. But arms, both small and great, 
clothing, ammunition, and tentage were im- 
peratively needed. Such in quantities were on 
the ocean on their way to America for the 
British army, and the first need was to bring 
them into American hands. Washington thus 



The American Navy 15 

established a Httle navy of his own, with a prize 
court necessary to pass upon the propriety of the 
capture and commissioners to take charge of 
captured material. He continued such eflForts 
even after the transfer of the army to New York, 
and did not cease from them until the Continen- 
tal Congress took the subject in hand. 

The beginning of Washington's fleet was the 
schooner Hannah, which sailed under Captain 
Nicholas Broughton from Beverly, Massachu- 
setts, on September 5, 1775, and returned two 
days later with a prize. Naturally many of 
the improvised army assembled at Cambridge, 
which was mainly made up of New Englanders, 
were men of the sea, and thus soon there 
were eight small vessels, officered and manned 
from the army in service. The administration 
of this improvised navy was not an easy task. 
Washington, writing to the President of the 
Congress on December 4, 1775, says: "The 
plague, trouble, and vexation I have had with 
the crews of all the armed vessels is inexpres- 
sible. I do not believe there is on earth a 
more disorderly set." Successes came, how- 
ever, and with these greater contentment 
among the crews. Captain John Manley was 
particularly successful, especially in the capture 



i6 The American Navy 

of the brigantine Nancy ^ which carried ordnance 
stores of the highest value to our poorly equipped 
army. The inventory of her cargo gives, among 
other things, 2,000 muskets, thirty-one tons of 
musket shot, 3,000 round shot, a considerable 
quantity of powder, and a thirteen-inch mortar, 
which was promptly mounted in Cambridge 
and called the *' Congress." 

The British evacuated Boston through want 
of food, on March 17, 1776, going first to Hali- 
fax and thence to New York. Washington had 
already transferred his army thither and con- 
tinued his navy, such as it was, until he himself 
retreated from New York as the result of the 
unfortunate battle of Long Island. 

Rhode Island had, however, taken action 
toward a sea force several months before Wash- 
ington had formed his little fleet. The Rhode 
Island Assembly had, on June 15, 1775, two 
days before the battle of Bunker Hill, ordered 
the chartering of two sloops and had appointed 
Abraham Whipple to the chief command. 
Whipple was prompt to act, for on the same day 
he captured the tender to the frigate Rose^ the 
first prize of the war. His evident courage and 
vigor caused his appointment later as captain 
in the regular navy which was soon to come. 



The American Navy 17 

Rhode Island has also the honor of being the 
first state to take action toward the establish- 
ment of a national navy. Her delegates were 
instructed on August 26, 1775, to bring the 
question of a fleet before Congress. This was 
done on October 3d. The subject received an 
almost immediate impetus through the arrival 
of information of two brigs which had left 
England for Quebec with arms, powder, and 
stores. A committee of three was proposed to 
prepare a plan to intercept these, but the idea 
met with strong opposition as being initiatory 
to a Continental navy, as in fact it was. It was 
declared by some opposed to be the "most 
wild, visionary, mad project that had ever been 
imagined. It was an infant taking a mad bull 
by the horns, ... it would ruin the char- 
acter and morals of our seamen; it would make 
them selfish, piratical, mercenary, bent wholly 
upon plunder." Much of such criticism of the 
project might have been spared. Our seamen 
had been living through an age of privateering, 
and one in which the latter often recked but too 
little of legal capture, and they had too long 
been accustomed to the general system of illicit 
commerce with the islands of the West Indies 
belonging to France and Spain to have their 



1 8 The American Navy 

morals upset by fighting for their country. The 
better sense prevailed and the three men who 
had urged most strongly the proposed action 
were, on October 5, 1775, appointed a committee 
to report a scheme of action. These were 
John Adams of Massachusetts, John Langdon 
of New Hampshire, and Silas Deane of Con- 
necticut. 

The immediate advice of the committee 
which was to instruct Washington to procure 
two cruisers in Massachusetts, one to carry ten, 
and the other fourteen, guns, for the purpose of 
intercepting the two brigs mentioned, was soon 
changed in a report of October 30, 1775, ad- 
vising to add two more vessels, one to mount 
not more than twenty, the other not more than 
thirty-six, guns, to be employed "for the pro- 
tection and defence of the United Colonies." 
The question of the capture of special ships had 
been dropped; the subject had become national. 

On December 14, 1775, the "Naval Com- 
mittee" was replaced by a committee of thir- 
teen chosen by ballot. The membership was 
remarkably like that of some naval committees 
of later times. Scarcely any on it were really 
conversant with matters of the sea, but it held 
one man, Robert Morris of Pennsylvania, whose 



The American Navy 19 

energy, resource, and ability caused Congress 
to put in his sole control, before the war ended, 
all the affairs of the navy. Agents were em- 
ployed to superintend construction, and prize 
agents were appointed. On November 6, 1776, 
Paul Jones wrote in his usual vigorous way 
to Robert Morris, declaring the necessity of a 
Board of Admiralty, and on October 28, 1779, 
one was estabhshed. Two of the members 
were to be members of Congress; the other 
three, called commissioners, were to be men 
possessing knowledge of naval matters. The 
Marine Committee then came to an end, but 
the navy boards at Philadelphia and Boston, 
each of "three persons well-skilled in maritime 
affairs," appointed by Congress "to execute the 
business of the navy under the direction of the 
Marine Committee," in what became known 
as the Middle and Eastern districts, and the 
navy agents were retained under this reorgan- 
ization. The Board of Admiralty, however, 
never materialized. On February 7, 1781, 
Congress resolved that naval affairs should be 
under a single person, to be called the Secretary 
of Marine. The office was never filled. Naval 
matters had, as just said, gradually drifted into 
the efficient hands of the Superintendent of 



20 The American Navy 

Finance, Robert Morris, and there they re- 
mained until the navy of the Revolution dis- 
appeared ill the sale of the last ship, the Alliancey 
in August, 1785. The fact is that naval affairs 
in the Revolution suffered equally with those 
of the army through the ineptitude and in- 
efficiency of a Congress which was rather a 
board of advice than a government, even when 
the Articles of Confederation were adopted, 
which was not finally done until March 2, 
1781. 

On November 2, 1775, $100,000 was voted 
for ships, and the committee was authorized to 
select officers and seamen. On November loth 
were authorized two battalions of marines. The 
first intention was to take them from the army, 
but Washington objecting to such weakening of 
his force, they were to be raised independently 
and, with a curious misunderstanding of their 
use, it was provided that they should be "such 
as are good seamen." Rules for the govern- 
ment of the navy were passed November 28th, 
and the offices of Captain, Lieutenant, Master, 
Master's Mate, Surgeon, Chaplain, and War- 
rant Officer established. The monthly pay of 
captain was $32; of able seaman $6.67, later 
raised to $8. A prize court was established. 



The American Navy 21 

The rules, naturally, were taken from those of 
the British service, and throughout the whole 
existence of our navy there has run a strong 
similarity, until of late years when there have 
been many changes in the nomenclature of the 
ratings of the enlisted men. Both services had 
the "Banyan day," when no meat was served,* 
though in the American navy this soon ceased 
to be an actuahty. Such phrases as "Chips" 
(the carpenter) and "Jimmy Legs" (the 
master-at-arms) were among the many common 
to both services; but one, "Jack-of-the-Dust" 
(an adjunct of the paymaster's department), 
which is to-day a rating in the American navy, 
is no longer a part of British ratings. 

On December 13, 1775, Congress authorized 
the building of thirteen frigates, and next day, 
December 14th, a committee of thirteen was 
chosen by ballot to superintend their construc- 
tion and equipment; five of these were to be of 
32 guns; five of 28; and three of 24. The 
Raleigh, of 32 guns, was built at Portsmouth, 
New Hampshire; the Hancock, 32, and Boston, 
24, at Salisbury and Newburyport, Massachu- 
setts; the Warren, 32, and Providence, 28, at 



*This phrase had its origin in the advocacy, by a Dr. Banyan, 
of a purely vegetable diet. 



22 The American Navy 

Providence, Rhode Island; the Trumhull, 28, 
at Chatham, on the Connecticut River; the 
Montgomery, 24, and Congress, 28, at Pough- 
keepsie, New York; the Randolph, 32, Wash- 
ington, 32, Effingham, 28, and Delaware, 24, at 
Philadelphia; the Virginia, 28, at Ba'ltimore. 
Six of these — the Montgomery, Congress, Wash- 
ington, Effingham, Delaware, and Virginia — 
never got to sea, all being destroyed to prevent 
capture except the Virginia which, having 
grounded and lost her rudder in the Chesapeake, 
was taken by a British force in the bay. 

These ships were to cost on the average but 
^66,666, and the whole were expected to be 
ready by March, 1776. They varied from 121 
to 132 feet in length on the gun deck, with a 
breadth of from 32.6 to 34.5^. Their arma- 
ment was that of the frigates of the day: 12- 
pounders on the main deck and 6-pounders on 
the quarter deck and forecastle. All should have 
been ready by the time named, for the Raleigh 
was launched at Portsmouth but two months 
after her keel was laid. But ill-luck pursued 
them throughout, and particularly in that the 
free life and greater gains of the privateersman 
made it almost impossible to get crews. 

Thus the four ships the purchase of which 



The American Navy 23 

was authorized on October 30, 1775, were the 
first of our navy. These were the Alfred^ of 
24 guns; Columbus, 20; Andrew Doria, 14, and 
the Cabot, 16. 

Such was the beginning of the Continental 
navy which was to have a Hfe of but ten years. 
A few words will complete our story of naval 
construction. On November 20, 1776, Con- 
gress resolved to build "immediately" a 74 in 
New Hampshire; a 74 and a 36 in Massachu- 
setts; a 74, a brig, 18, and a packet boat in 
Pennsylvania; two frigates, 36 each, in Vir- 
ginia; and two frigates, 36 each, in Maryland. 
But in July, 1777, on account of the high cost 
of wages and material, Congress authorized 
stopping work on such as the committee might 
judge proper, and the final result was the com- 
pletion and getting to sea of but three: the 
Alliance, 36, the General Gates, 18, both built 
in Massachusetts, and the Saratoga, 16, in 
Pennsylvania. Only one 74 was built. This 
was the America, at Portsmouth, New Hamp- 
shire, and she was not launched until the war 
had practically ended. 

During the early part of 1776 there were built 
on Lake Champlain, under the direction of 
Benedict Arnold, two schooners with eight 6 



24 The American Navy 

and 4 pounders; a sloop with ten guns of Hke 
cahbre; a cutter with one 12, one 9, and two 6; 
one galley with two i8-pounders and eight 12, 
and two others of nearly equal armament; 
eight gondolas with three 8 and 9 pounders, and 
two other small craft. These, as will be seen 
later, were to fight a memorable action. 



CHAPTER III 

The ships put afloat by Congress and which may 
be taken as the regular navy of the Revolution 
were, however, strongly supplemented by the 
navies of the states (except New Jersey and Del- 
aware), and by the multitude of privateers 
which cruised under both state and Continental 
commissions. Massachusetts led in the num- 
ber of state ships; but South Carolina in size 
and importance. Massachusetts had sixteen 
vessels, the only one of any size being the Pro- 
tector, a ship carrying 26 light guns. All the 
others carried but from ten to twenty. This 
"navy" made about seventy captures during 
the war. But the state made one most unfor- 
tunate venture, the Penobscot Expedition, to 
be mentioned later. New Hampshire had one 
small ship, the Hampden, of 22 guns; Georgia, 
four galleys (vessels propelled by both sails and 
oars). Connecticut had a navy of ten vessels, 
the largest of which were the Oliver Cromwell, of 
18 guns, and the Defence, of 14. All had dis- 

25 



26 The American Navy 

appeared by loss or capture by July, 1779, after 
having made some thirty captures. There 
was, however, throughout the war great activ- 
ity in Long Island Sound where there was a 
warfare of boats against the illicit traffic carried 
on to supply the British at New York. As al- 
ways, greed frequently overcame patriotism, 
and smugghng in both directions was rife 
throughout the war. 

The situation of New York, with its one port 
in possession of the enemy, precluded anything 
of a patriot naval force except a few galleys on 
the Hudson. Pennsylvania, however, had in 
1777 a total of fifty-one vessels on the Dela- 
ware, the only important one in size being the 
small purchased ship Montgomery; all the 1 
others were but armed boats of the type known 
as galleys. In 1777 there were in the state 
naval service (which was administered by a 
board of six, later of ten) a total of about 700 
officers and men. The activities of this force 
were confined to the Delaware River and Bay, i i 
and when the British army was transferred to 
Philadelphia in 1777 these activities were very 
active indeed, including the burning of a British 
line-of-battle ship, the Augusta, 64, and the 
sloop-of-war Merlin, 18, which had grounded. 



The American Navy 27 

All these vessels were finally driven up the Del- 
aware by an overpowering force, except the 
Montgomery and several smaller craft, which had 
to be burned to escape capture. What re- 
mained after the British evacuation of Phil- 
adelphia in 1778, when the French fleet had 
appeared on our coast under the alliance just 
made with France, were sold in December of 
that year. This remainder consisted of ten 
galleys, nine armed boats, the brig Conve7itio7iy 
the sloops Speedwell, Sally, Industry, and Black 
Duck, and the schooner Lydia* 

Maryland in 1776 invested in a ship called the 
Defence carrying twenty-two 6-pounders, the 
largest vessel of her coming small navy; two 
schooners and seven row galleys formed the re- 
mainder. All except two galleys and a schooner 
were sold in 1779, but British success in the 
South renewed depredations in the Chesapeake, 
and four large barges to carry twenty-five men 
each and 9 and 18 pounders and a schooner to 
carry ten 4-pounders were ordered. In 1782, 
depredations continuing, a ship and four addi- 
tional barges were ordered, and in November 
of that year such vessels fought a severe and 



"Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, XI, quoted by PauUin, 389. 



28 The American Navy 

most gallant action with an overpowering 
British force of the same character, the Pro- 
tector, which bore the brunt of the action on the 
American side, losing fifty-four killed and 
wounded out of her crew of sixty-five. "Ex- 
cept when used for commercial purposes, Mary- 
land's vessels rarely passed outside the capes 
at the mouth of the Chesapeake." Virginia 
entered upon the question of a navy with en- 
thusiasm and a number of vessels were author- 
ized; the two frigates voted were, however, 
never built. Actual construction was confined 
to galleys and schooners; the number first and 
last, though very considerable, is indefinite. 
The state established a navy yard on the Chick- 
ahominy, operated a ropewalk, and established 
naval magazines. The whole force practically 
disappeared during the raid by Phillips and 
Arnold when on April 27, 1780, a few miles below 
Richmond, six ships, eight brigs, five sloops, 
two schooners, and several smaller vessels and 
the ropewalk at Warwick were destroyed; 
twelve were captured which had escaped de- 
struction, and but one vessel remained in the 
Virginia navy, the armed boat Liberty. A 
small force later, in 1782, was gathered which 
operated in the Chesapeake (within which the 



The American Navy 29 

Virginia force remained almost entirely during 
the war) until peace in 1783. 

Almost foremost in naval activity and ex- 
penditure was South Carolina. The state 
owned in all some fifteen vessels, of which the 
most important was the Bricole, purchased in 
France, and mounting forty-four 24's and i8's, 
though pierced for sixty. She, with nearly all 
the other ships of the state, was sunk as an ob- 
stacle to the British in the siege ending in the 
surrender of May 11, 1780. She was the largest 
American ship of the Revolution in actual ser- 
vice. There survived the Indian, ** rented" by 
Alexander Gillon, who had been commissioned 
as commodore and sent abroad to raise some 
£71,000 with which to build three frigates. 
The only result was the renting of the hidian, 
which had been built by Congress in Holland, 
but which, to prevent international complica- 
tions, had been sold to the King of France and 
by him given to the Chevalier Luxembourg. 
The Indian was renamed the South Carolina 
and given an armament of twenty-eight 32's 
and twelve 12's, an unusually heavy battery. 
It was not until August, 1781, that she got to 
sea, cruised for a time in the North Sea, but 
arrived at Havana on January 12, 1782, with 



30 The American Navy 

five valuable prizes. She formed one of a com- 
bined American and Spanish expedition in May 
to the Bahamas, which was successful. On 
May 28th she arrived at Philadelphia, where an 
agent of Luxembourg caused the removal of 
Gillon and the appointment of a Captain Joy- 
ner; she refitted and left for sea in December. 
Scarcely outside the Capes of the Delaware, she 
was chased by a British squadron and taken 
after a two hours' fight. Luxembourg de- 
manded under the contract an indemnity of 
300,000 livres (francs). This Gillon denied, 
claiming his removal to be a breach of contract. 
The claims were unsettled until December, 
1874, when the state of South Carolina paid 
^28,894 ^o t^^ heirs of Luxembourg as a final 
settlement. South Carolina is still prosecuting 
her claims against the United States for a 
reimbursement of her expenditures for this 
ship.* 

The efforts at a state navy of North Carolina, 
Georgia, and Rhode Island were of too moder- 
ate a character to need much comment. That 
of the first consisted of three brigantines in 
1778 and the addition of a small ship, the Cas- 
well, in 1778. By June, 1779, all had disap- 

*See PauUin, "The Navy of the American Revolution," 



The American Navy 31 

peared by sale or (in the case of the Caswell) by 
sinking at Ocracoke. Georgia had but four 
galleys. But two sloops and two galleys were 
the extent of Rhode Island's navy, though it was 
this state, as mentioned, which took the first 
steps toward naval defence. 

Of vastly greater importance than the state 
navies were the privateers, a service congenial 
to the New England seamen from every point 
of view. There was "more money in it"; there 
was the absence of a strict and irksome disci- 
pline, and the cruises were short. The great 
number of privateers fitting out made it a mat- 
ter of extreme difficulty to find men for the 
ships of the regular service, which thus not in- 
frequently had to lie idle and unemployed. 
Had a tithe of the effort expended upon priva- 
teers been expended upon the building and 
equipment of a navy, it is not unfair to say that 
the general results would probably have been 
much better. But privateering had already 
been a much-indulged-in occupation. The 
Seven Years' War had ended only in 1763, and 
during this period many American privateers 
were afloat. The slave trade also was a favorite 
New England occupation, and piracy itself at 
the period was not altogether disreputable if 



32 The American Navy- 

applied only to those "natural enemies," the 
French and Spanish. Nearly all the officers of 
the new Continental navy had their first war 
training in privateers, and very frequently 
during the Revolution officers took a hand at 
privateering in the moments of enforced leisure 
when there was no naval ship to which they 
could be assigned. 

Congress authorized privateering on March 
23, 1776, and a list printed by the Library of 
Congress shows the number and kind of vessels 
furnished with letters of marque by the Con- 
tinental Congress. This gives a total of such 
of 1,697. Of these there were ships 301; brigs 
and brigantines, 541; schooners and sloops, 751; 
boats and galleys, 104. These are accredited to 
the several states as follows: New Hampshire, 
43; Massachusetts, 626; Rhode Island, 15; 
Connecticut, 218; New York, i; New Jersey, 4; 
Pennsylvania, 500; Maryland, 225; Virginia, 
64; South CaroHna, i. Distributed by years 
there were afloat in 1776, 34; 1777, 69; 1778, 
129; 1779, 209; 1780, 301; 1781, 550; 1783, 
22. These altogether carried 14,872 guns and 
58,400 men. It is, of course, almost a cer- 
tainty that many of these vessels were dupli- 
cated in this list, but such duplication is more 



The American Navy 33 

than offset by the issuance of letters of marque 
by the several states and in France and the 
West Indies which, according to an excellent 
authority, would carry the number to over 
2,000, with 18,000 guns and 70,000 men. 
"Judging from the scanty information at hand 
concerning British privateering, it is probable 
that their vessels engaged in this form of war- 
fare were considerably less numerous but de- 
cidedly superior in force to the Americans; the 
latter seem to have carried on an average be- 
tween eight and nine guns and less than thirty- 
five men; the British about seventeen guns and 
seventy-five or more men."* 

The value of the captures of the privateers 
was about $18,000,000; that of the captures of 
the navy, which had thirty-one ships afloat in 
1776, thirty-four in 1777, and but seven in 
1782, was, proportioned to the number of ships 
employed, much greater, being some $6,000,000. 
Altogether (i. e., by both services) some 800 ves- 
sels were captured. Our own losses were also very 
great, but not nearly so great as those of Britain. 
About 16,000 prisoners were taken afloat, only 
6,000 less than those taken by the army. 

By July, 1776, the British fleet in the vicinity 

*Allen, I, 47. 



34 The American Navy 

of New York, where the attack was about to 
take place on the American army assembled on 
Long Island near Brooklyn, which resulted in 
our defeat and the occupancy of New York for 
the remainder of the war, consisted of nine ships 
of from 50 to 64 guns; three of 44; twenty-seven 
of from 28 to 32; fourteen of 20; eleven of 14 to 
18; sixteen of from 8 to 10 — a total of eighty 
ships of war. This fleet was under the com- 
mand of Richard Viscount Howe, whose brother. 
General Howe, was commander-in-chief of the 
army of 34,614 men, of whom 13,167 were of 
the 29,867 Hessians hired for the war by Great 
Britain. These two brothers were for some two 
years to conduct the British main operations in 
America. One, the admiral, was an officer of 
great ability and rose to high distinction; the 
General was handicapped by a slothful and un- 
enterprising disposition with a character marred 
by an extreme looseness in moral conduct. His 
want of enterprise may have been due in part 
to the attitude of the Whig party in England, 
to which he was attached, and which was op- 
posed in general to the use of force against 
America. In any case, his qualities were such 
that they went a long way toward the estab- 
lishment of American independence. 



The American Navy 35 

In addition to Howe's fleet there were, under 
Commodore Sir Peter Parker, two 50-gun ships, 
four of 28, two of 20, and three of 8 guns. These 
were to be employed against Charleston, South 
Carolina. 

On Lake Champlain the British were to have 
during 1776 a ship of eighteen 12-pounders, a 
schooner of fourteen 6-pounders; another of 12; 
three "Radeaux" (flat-bottomed craft), one 
carrying six 24-pounders, one six 12-pounders, 
and one two howitzers. There were also a 
gondola (with oars) carrying seven 9-pounders, 
and twenty gunboats, each with a brass field 
piece of from 24 to 9 pounds. 

The naval force here mentioned was at times 
reinforced by accessions of line-of-battle ships, 
as many as twenty-one being at times available. 
The British, however, with an unwise concep- 
tion of the true strategy of the situation, were 
constantly diverting these to the West Indies, 
which, during our Revolution, after war was 
declared by France and Spain, was the great 
field of naval action. It is within bounds to 
say that they lost the United States for the sake 
of the West India Islands. 



CHAPTER IV 

It was not until February, 1776, that what may 
be termed a strictly naval event took form in 
the sailing of the Httle fleet in command of 
Commodore Esek Hopkins, under orders which 
were sufl&ciently explicit in primary meaning, 
viz.: to proceed to Chesapeake Bay and destroy 
the powerful flotilla which the royal governor 
of Virginia had gathered together and with 
which he was harassing the Chesapeake shores. 
Hopkins was then to proceed to the Carolinas 
and act in like manner against the enemy's 
forces, after which he was to go to Rhode Island. 
A final phrase, however, left a loophole for 
other action: "if bad winds or stormy weather" 
or any other accident should prevent, he was to 
use his own judgment. 

Hopkins flew his broad-pennant in the Alfred, 
in which also was then hoisted by the hands of 
Lieutenant John Paul Jones a Continental flag 
which bore a rattlesnake and a motto, ''Don't 
tread on me," on a yellow ground. The exact 

36 



The American Navy 37 

date of this incident is unknown. The other 
vessels of the squadron were the ship Columbus, 
20; the brig Andrew Doria, 14; brig Cabot, 14; 
brig Providence, 12; sloop Horyiet, 10; schooner 
Wasp, 8; schooner Fly, 8. The number of 
men was about 880. 

Hopkins, instead of going to the Chesapeake, 
directed his course, on the plea of bad weather, 
to New Providence in the Bahamas, where 
there were considerable stores of powder and 
cannon of which the newly formed Continental 
army was in utmost need. Though blamed 
later by enemies, Hopkins took the wiser course. 
His advent there on March 3d was a complete 
surprise: 250 men were landed and possession 
taken of the little town and forts without re- 
sistance. Two weeks was spent in getting 
aboard the guns, of which there were seventy- 
one, from 9 to 32 pounders. There were also 
fifteen brass mortars and twenty-four barrels of 
powder. The governor, unfortunately, had 
succeeded in sending away 150 of the latter. 
The guns, however, were an extremely impor- 
tant prize, and to carry these and other public 
property seized, a sloop was impressed. Hop- 
kins sailed north on March 17th, carrying the 
governor, lieutenant-governor, and another offi- 



38 The American Navy 

cial. By this time Newport, Rhode Island, 
was occupied by a British force, and New Lon- 
don was selected instead as a port of return. 
When off Block Island the British man-of-war 
Glasgozv, of 20 guns and 150 men, was sighted, 
and a running action took place, in which the 
Glasgow^ though much injured, escaped into 
Newport. The explanation of the American 
commander was that the firing must bring aid 
from Newport to the Glasgow's rescue, and in 
fact two vessels in the harbor did get underway 
to go out. The force in Newport, however, 
which was only the small frigate Rose, of 20 
guns, the Nautilus and Swan, of 16 each, and 
several tenders, was no more than an equal 
match for our own. As far as one can read into 
this event, there was not the energy shown by 
our people which should have been. Giving 
up the action, the American squadron reached 
New London with all its prize intact. The 
Commodore's practical disobedience of orders 
was fully condoned by Congress, and he re- 
ceived a letter of congratulation from President 
John Hancock. 

The British squadron, suffering a good deal 
from fire from batteries on shore, had left New- 
port on April 5th, and Hopkins entered Nar- 



The American Navy 39 

ragansett Bay, going to Providence on April 
25th. So many of his men had sickened on the 
cruise from the poor food, bad water, and want 
of general hygiene aboard ship at that period, 
that he had landed 200 at New London. He 
now found it impossible to get men. Some sol- 
diers who had been temporarily lent from the 
army were demanded back by Washington, 
and there ensued a painful period for the un- 
happy Commodore. Great complaints of ill- 
treatment went to Congress. Hopkins' man- 
ners to his officers were severely criticised, and 
the whole ended in an official inquiry which in- 
cluded his disobedience of orders, his allowing 
the Glasgow to escape, and his inactivity since 
his return. He was not entirely cleared on the 
first two charges, but the prevalent sickness 
among his men and the impossibility of getting 
new crews on account of the active fitting out 
of privateers were certainly sufficient to exon- 
erate him from the third. Notwithstanding, 
and although he was energetically defended 
by John Adams, he received a formal censure 
from Congress, but was allowed for the moment 
to retain his command. In regard to the ques- 
tion of roughness toward his subordinates which 
was involved in the charges, it must be consid- 



40 The American Navy 

ered that all officers of the period had entered 
the Continental service from the rough life of 
the merchantman of the time; many had 
served in privateers; the officers of the British 
navy itself were themselves not altogether 
lamblike, if we are to believe Smollet, who had 
personal experience as a surgeon's mate. It 
was in many ways a rough age afloat and ashore 
and in every society, and such charges as were 
brought against Hopkins cannot justly be 
judged from our present standpoint. Certainly 
John Paul Jones, his first lieutenant, wrote 
him at this time a kindly and sympathetic 
letter regarding this trial. Though Hopkins 
remained yet some time in the service, it was 
not for long. His enemies, and apparently they 
were not few, again brought charges against 
him. As a result. Congress on March 26, 1777, 
resolved that he be suspended from his com- 
mand, and on January 2, 1778, he was dismissed 
from the service. That the service suff"ered 
thereby can hardly be said, as he was now sixty 
years old, an old age for that period, and was 
scarcely equal to the exercise of vigorous com- 
mand, but the fact remains that he met unduly 
harsh treatment. 

Hopkins's squadron was now broken up, 



The American Navy 41 

though the several ships had remained under 
his general orders until his dismissal. They 
cruised chiefly "down East" off New England 
and Nova Scotia, making a number of prizes, 
one of which, the Mellish, taken by the Alfred, 
now commanded by Jones, carried a cargo of 
soldiers' clothing for Burgoyne's army of 13,000 
men now in Canada, intended to proceed by 
Lake Champlain to New York and thus occupy 
a line which would separate New England en- 
tirely from the rest of the country. 

A considerable fleet chiefly of gunboats had, 
as mentioned, been built by the British for 
service on Lake Champlain. The offset to this, 
by the building of a flotilla under Arnold, has 
also already been noted. The building of this 
little fleet was to change history. 

The British naval preparations were so de- 
layed that it was not until October, 1776 (on 
the nth and 13th), that the two forces came to- 
gether, with the result, after a most gallant 
contest, of a defeat to the Americans, who re- 
treated up the lake, destroying all their vessels 
but one galley, a sloop, and two small schooners, 
and the galley Washington, which last was cap- 
tured. The gallantry of the American force 
is all the more to be commended as it was one 



42 The American Navy 

gathered from raw material, most of which was 
unaccustomed to work of the kind it was called 
upon to do; the British, on the other hand, were 
all men-of-war's men "detached from his Maj- 
esty's ships and vessels in the river St. Lawrence 
to serve on Lake Champlain," to the number of 
670. 

As the Americans were about 700, the forces 
were almost equal in numbers. It was far 
otherwise in strength, the British in numbers of 
vessels, in size, and in armament far outclassing 
the Americans. They were in numbers 29 to 
15, and the ship Inflexible alone, which carried 
eighteen 12-pounders, was able to look after 
a large proportion of the American squadron. 
The American loss was over eighty; that of the 
British did not exceed forty. The former had 
lost all, but to good purpose, for this little fleet 
had delayed the advance southward of Bur- 
goyne's army another year, thus giving time 
to prepare resistance, and what perhaps was 
equally to the purpose, so far as the fortunes of 
America were concerned, affording time to 
General Howe to carry out, in July, 1777, his 
views as to the necessity of occupying Phila- 
delphia; for had Burgoyne, as proposed, started 
from Canada in the summer of 1776, Howe, 



The American Navy 43 

with his whole large army would have been at 
New York within easy support of this movement 
of so vital moment to the British. As it was, 
in 1777, the forces were widely separated, and 
Burgoyne, 4nstead of being aided as he had ex- 
pected, went to his destruction. Thus "Never," 
says Clowes in the great history of "The Royal 
Navy," speaking of this action, "had any force, 
big or small, lived to better purpose or died more 
gloriously." "That the war spread from Amer- 
ica to Europe, from the EngHsh Channel to 
the Baltic, from the Bay of Biscay to the Med- 
iterranean, from the West Indies to the Miss- 
issippi, and ultimately involved the remote 
waters of Hindostan, is traceable, through Sar- 
atoga, to the rude flotilla which in 1776 antici- 
pated its enemy in the possession of Lake 
Champlain." 

It was as just mentioned when Burgoyne 
most needed support in his advance south the 
next year (1777) that, Sir William Howe (the 
British commander-in-chief in America) em- 
barked 14,000 men, and escorted by the fleet 
under command of his brother. Lord Howe, 
sailed from Sandy Hook, the expedition num- 
bering 280 ships, including the transports and 
men-of-war. Eight thousand men were left 



44 The American Navy 

at New York under Sir Henry Clinton. Howe's 
objective was Philadelphia. His first intention 
was to go up the Delaware, but obstructions 
in the river being reported by one of the naval 
captains, he changed to the very roundabout 
way of the Chesapeake Bay. He was not able 
to land his troops at the head of the bay until 
August 25th. He defeated Washington at the 
battleof the Brandywine on September i ith, and 
on the 26th occupied Philadelphia. 

The General's brother. Lord Howe, in com- 
mand of the fleet, was a good month returning 
from the head of the Chesapeake round to and 
up the Delaware as far as Chester, where he 
arrived on October 6th, so slow and uncertain 
were the movements of sailing ships in those 
days. A small squadron had been sent in 
advance to clear the channel. This move on 
the part of the British to occupy the river was 
necessary to keep up the supplies of their army. 
In this fleet there were eleven vessels, two of 
which were 64's, one 50, and three frigates of 
28 to 44 guns. The total of their armament was 
364 guns, 74 of which were 24-pounders, with 
somewhat over 2,000 men. To resist this 
powerful force there were in the river the new 
Continental frigate Delaware, of twenty-four 



The American Navy 45 

i2-pounders; the brig Andrew Doria, of fourteen 
6-pounders; and the sloop Hornet, with twelve 
9-pounders; besides six smaller vessels carrying 
from four to ten 9-pounders, and twelve galleys 
with one gun each, of 18, 24, or 32 pounds. 
These were assisted by the whole of the Penn- 
sylvania navy, which consisted of the ship Mont- 
gomery, o( (ourteen 14-pounders, and thirty-eight 
small craft carrying fifty-one guns varying 
from 4 to 18 pounders. The total armament 
was 175 guns. The combined Continental and 
state fleets were under the command of Com- 
modore John Hazelwood of the latter. To 
support these there were Fort Mifflin on an 
island, with also two small batteries on the main- 
land, just below the mouth of the Schuylkill 
and two miles from League Island on the Penn- 
sylvania side, and opposite, on the New Jersey 
shore, at Red Bank, Fort Mercer; a battery op- 
posite Hog Island, and three and a half miles 
below this, another. Obstructions of heavy 
timbers, shod at their points with iron, were 
placed opposite this last battery and in the 
channel near Fort Mifflin. 

The Delaware River has a somewhat tor- 
tuous, and in places a narrow, channel. Its de- 
fensive advantages are thus very strong, and 



46 The American Navy 

the Americans had a fair chance of success. 
The most powerful of the naval defence was 
lost in the beginning by the grounding of the 
Delaware near a British battery on the city 
front. 

Notwithstanding, the Americans made a fine 
defence of more than six weeks. It was not 
until November loth that the British succeeded 
in clearing the river to Philadelphia and then 
with heavy loss in men and in ships, two of 
which, a ship-of-the-line and a sloop-of-war, 
were burned. Later, in May, 1778, they in- 
vaded the river above Philadelphia. The frig- 
ates Washington and Effingham, nearly ready 
for sea, had to be burned, and besides these a 
ship of 18 guns, and brigs, schooners, and small 
craft, some fifty-four in all, destroyed; a sad 
ending to a long and gallant struggle. 

It was in the Delaware that in December, 
1777, David Bushnell made a second trial of his 
torpedoes (the first having been in the Hud- 
son). He used kegs of powder fitted with a 
detonating fuse, which should have succeeded. 
No damage was done through, as Bushnell 
claims, bad management. The British fleet 
was alarmed enough, however, to justify Fran- 
cis Hopkinson, one of the signers of American 



The American Navy 47 

Independence, in producing the well-known 
poem of the "Battle of the Kegs," once a 
favorite with our fathers. 

The Randolph^ Hancock, Raleigh, and Boston 
were the only frigates at sea in this year. The 
Hancock, Captain Manley, was captured July 
7th, on this her first cruise, by a British forty- 
four; the Raleigh, under Captain John Barry, 
during an action with two British ships, one of 
which was of 50 guns, ran on a rocky islet near 
Penobscot Bay, September 27, 1778. Her crew 
escaped ashore, but the ship, though an effort 
had been made to burn her, was hauled off by 
the British. Both the captured ships were 
taken into the British service. The Randolph, 
which had been one of the earliest of the new 
frigates to get to sea, had, in the period of her 
sea service, been actively cruising in our south- 
ern waters under the command of Captain 
Biddle, and was ordered to France in October, 
1777. She remained there but a short time 
owing to the protests of the British ambassador 
against our ships remaining in French ports, and 
returned to Charleston, whence she had sailed. 
Here a squadron was organized with four other 
small vessels of the South Carolina navy, which 
went, to sea February 12, 1778, and cruised in 



48 The American Navy 

the vicinity of the Windward Islands. On 
March 7th was met the Yarmouth, 64. Biddle 
gallantly engaged the ship twice his force, but 
the Randolph after an action of about fifteen 
minutes blew up. Only four men were saved, 
and these were picked up five days after the ex- 
plosion, on a piece of wreckage, by the Yar- 
mouth, which meanwhile had been actively 
cruising. The incident is certainly among the 
most extraordinary of happenings even on the 
sea, so prolific in adventures. Three hundred 
and eleven men were lost besides officers. The 
loss of Captain Biddle, one of the most promis- 
ing of our sea officers, was specially deplored. 



CHAPTER V 

Silas Deane had been the first American agent 
abroad, reaching Europe in July, 1776. Frank- 
Hn and Arthur Lee arrived in France in Decem- 
ber of that year, the former in the brig Reprisal, 
which was the first American man-of-war to 
visit the eastern hemisphere. Seldom has there 
been a ship whose safety meant so much; for 
upon FrankHn's great social and poHtical in- 
fluence was to depend the aid of France, and 
upon this aid, American independence. The 
Reprisal had taken several prizes which she had 
carried into Nantes, and the reception of these 
and the many to come later into French and 
Spanish ports caused strong protests from Eng- 
land to which these governments had to give 
heed. The commissioners were to purchase or 
hire eight line-of-battle ships as well as a frigate 
and two cutters, but their endeavors fell far 
short of such a program. Nevertheless, all 
things considered, aid in money, and particu- 
larly in much needed army stores, was forth- 

49 



50 The American Navy 

coming to a surprising degree, and the name of 
Beaumarchais in France and that of Gardoqui 
in Spain, who acted at Bilbao as Beaumarchais's 
agent, deserve lasting remembrance by Amer- 
icans. In 1778 Deane was replaced by John 
Adams, who, accompanied by his son, John 
Quincy, then eleven years old, sailed from Bos- 
ton on February 15th in the frigate Boston^ and 
reached Bordeaux on April 1st. Naval inter- 
ests, after Deane's recall, were taken over 
chiefly by Franklin. 

The war had lasted three years, but now in 
this year of 1778 it was to take a new develop- 
ment. The immediate cause was the surrender 
of Burgoyne at Saratoga on October 17, 1777. 
The chain of causes was, as already mentioned, 
the resistance oflFered on Lake Champlain the 
previous year (1776) by the flotilla under Ar- 
nold, the transfer of the main part of the British 
force from New York to Philadelphia when it 
should have been employed to support Bur- 
goyne, and the too leisurely movement of Clin- 
ton up the Hudson with a large portion of the 
8,000 men left at New York. CHnton cap- 
tured the forts at the Highlands, but he was too 
late to save Burgoyne, who surrendered the day 
after the British army burned Kingston. The 



The American Navy 51 

surrender was a fitting nemesis for such an act. 
A greater strategic failure than was this cam- 
paign on the part of the British is not recorded 
in history, nor has there ever been one with 
more momentous consequences. It convinced 
the French Government, smarting under its 
loss of Canada in the treaty of 1763, that there 
was now a fair chance of American success, and 
on February 6, 1778, was signed the treaty of 
alliance which brought the ships the aid of 
which was so vital to our success. Two months 
later, April 13, 1778, Vice-Admiral Charles 
Henri Theodat d'Estaing du Saillans, gener- 
ally known to us as the Count d'Estaing, sailed 
from Toulon with twelve battleships and five 
frigates. Two of these ships were of 80 guns, 
six of 74, three of 64, and one of 50. The naval 
story of our Revolution, though its greatest 
exploits in the cruise of Paul Jones and the cap- 
ture of the Serapis were yet to come, must, 
henceforward, be largely of French ships. 

The French commander had one of the great- 
est chances in history. The British fleet was 
in the Delaware awaiting the preparation of the 
British army to return to New York from Phila- 
delphia. Howe had but six 64's, three 50's, 
and six frigates. They had been a sure prey to 



52 The American Navy 

the French had there been in command a man 
of greater energy. But d'Estaing had been 
transferred at the mature age of thirty-five 
from the army to the navy, the profession of all 
others which requires a lifelong familiarity, 
and where the rigidity and formality of the 
army school of the period were wholly out of 
place. There have been rare exceptions to the 
general rule, Blake being a notable example, but 
d'Estaing was not one of these. He was, says a 
French writer, "detested from the first — the 
word is not too strong — by mostof his officers."* 

Whether through bad luck or want of energy, 
he was more than a month (thirty-three days) 
in even reaching the Straits of Gibraltar, 700 
miles from Toulon, thus making an average of 
but twenty-one miles a day. 

A British frigate was noted by the French in 
passing Gibraltar, which "tranquilly and com- 
fortably watched the French fleet defile by in 
three columns." But this same ship followed 
for ninety leagues into the Atlantic, to make 
sure of the French course, and then hastened to 
England. It arrived there on June 5th, fifty- 
three days after d'Estaing had left Toulon and 

*Lacour-Gayet, "La Marine Militaire de la France sous le 
Regne de Louis XVI," 142. 



The American Navy 53 

twenty after he had passed the Straits. This 
knowledge, however, was not necessary to 
British action. A force equal to d'Estaing's 
and to be commanded by Vice-Admiral Byron 
had already been in preparation, though it had 
been hampered as much by poor dockyard ad- 
ministration and want of men as was d'Estaing 
by his own want of push. 

It was not until July 7, 1778, that the French 
fleet anchored at the Capes of the Delaware. 
But the quarry had gotten away. The British 
army had left Philadelphia on June i8th on its 
march to Sandy Hook. The scores of trans- 
ports carrying the army baggage and stores had 
started down the Delaware next day. They did 
not get clear of the Capes until June 28th, and, 
convoyed by the men-of-war, reached inside of 
Sandy Hook on June 30th. Never was greater 
opportunity lost. A little earlier and with 
Howe's fleet captured, the fall of New York, 
practically undefended, was a certainty. But 
for d'Estaing's want of push the war would 
have ended in 1778 instead of five years later. 

Howe had heard of d'Estaing's approach. 
He made admirable preparations to resist the 
entry of New York Bay. D'Estaing arrived 
off Sandy Hook, but though offering the large 



54 The American Navy 

sum of 150,000 francs, pilots were unobtainable, 
probably by reason of fearing the vengeance of 
the British if they should be taken. On July 
22d there was a fresh northeast wind and a 
spring (a highest) tide. There was ample 
water for any ship of his fleet, but d'Estaing 
and his oflficers were unacquainted with the 
region and did not dare to venture. "At eight 
o'clock," wrote an eyewitness in the British fleet, 
** d'Estaing, with all his squadron, appeared 
under way. He kept working to windward as 
if to gain a proper position for crossing the bar 
by the time the tide should serve. The wind 
blew from the exact point from which 
he could attack us to the greatest advantage. 
The spring tides were at the highest. . . 
We consequently expected the hottest fray that 
had been fought between the two nations. On 
our side all was at stake. Had the men-of-war 
been defeated, the fleet of transports and vict- 
ualers must have been destroyed, and the 
army of course fallen with us. D'Estaing, 
however, had not spirit equal to the risk; at 
three o'clock we saw him bear off" to the south- 
ward, and in a few hours he was out of sight."* 
Naturally Washington's disappointment over 

*Clowes, "The Royal Navy," III, 401. 



The American Navy 55 

d'Estaing's failure was great. The great prize 
had been lost. He had, however, arranged with 
d'Estaing that should the latter not attack 
New York, he would go to Newport, Rhode Is- 
land, and assist General John Sullivan in at- 
tacking the British force of some 6,000, which, 
supported by six ships-of-war, held Newport. 

D'Estaing anchored off Newport (outside the 
bay) on July 29, 1778. The next day Suffren, 
with two ships-of-the-line, went into the channel 
west of Conanicut Island, and two frigates and 
a sloop-of-war entered Sakonnet; whereupon 
the British burned the Kingfisher^ of 16 guns, 
and some galleys stationed there. The British 
general. Sir Robert Pigot, withdrew. 1,500 Hes- 
sians from Conanicut and concentrated his 
forces about the town. Goat Island, where is 
now the United States Torpedo Station and 
where for many years was a fort, was also occu- 
pied, as this commanded the main channel and 
the entrances to the inner harbor. On August 
5th Suffren with his two ships went into the 
main channel near the north end of Conanicut, 
two others taking his former place. Captain 
John Brisbane, the senior British naval officer, 
now destroyed four frigates, the Flora, Juno, 
Lark, and Orpheus, of 32 guns each, and the 



56 The American Navy 

corvette Falcon, of 16 guns, two being sunk at 
the south end of Goat Island. Five transports 
were sunk between Goat and Coasters' Harbor 
Island, thus closing both entrances to the inner 
harbor. The guns, ammunition, and the thou- 
sand or so men of their crews went to strengthen 
the forces of the batteries. 

It was not until August 8th that d'Estaing 
with the eight remaining ships-of-the-line ran 
the batteries and anchored between Coasters' 
Harbor Island and Conanicut. He was now 
joined by the others except one which remained 
as a lookout in the West Channel. The long de- 
lay of ten days from the time of arrival had 
been at Sullivan's request, who was not yet 
ready. Two thousand men had been sent by 
Washington under Lafayette, but the expected 
militia were slow to come in. Things now 
looked very black for the British, but the delay 
had been fatal. 

D'Estaing on August 9th landed on Conani- 
cut such of his thousand soldiers in the fleet as 
were fit for duty and some two thousand sea- 
men, in readiness for the morrow's attack as 
arranged. Scarcely were these landed when 
the lifting of the fog revealed the English fleet 
at anchor off" Point Judith, seven miles south- 



The American Navy 57 

west of Narragansett Bay. Though there were 
some thirty ships, there were but one 74, six 
64's, and five 50's, a force wholly inadequate 
to meet d'Estaing's. Howe, thus inferior, 
could not have ventured into the bay, but his 
presence caused d'Estaing to lose his judgment. 
The latter had begun to get his ships into posi- 
tion for defence, in the prevailing calm, but 
next morning when the wind came out from the 
northeast, fair for leaving port, but making it 
impossible for Howe to come in even had his 
force allowed, d'Estaing in over haste cut his 
hemp cables and went to sea. Howe, unable to 
meet him, did the same, and now the day and 
part of the next were spent in maneuvering for 
position in face of a rising storm. The wind 
had gradually increased and finally blew with 
such force as to make action impossible. Next 
day (August 12th) it developed into an "August 
storm," a West India hurricane, which had 
taken its usual course up our coast, scattering 
both fleets and inflicting heavy damage, par- 
ticularly upon the French, whose flagship, the 
LanguedoCy completely dismasted and with 
tiller broken, came near being taken on the 
13th by a much weaker but wholly manage- 
able British 50-gun ship, the Renown. Only 



58 The American Navy 

night saved her. D'Estaing, with several ships 
under jury masts, anchored east of Cape May 
and gradually collected his damaged fleet. He 
was seen here by Howe, who had now but two 
of his ships in company. By August 20th 
d'Estaing was again off Newport, but only to 
hold a council of war at which were present 
Sullivan and Lafayette. D'Estaing was will- 
ing to remain two days if the American officers 
would guarantee the surrender of Newport in 
that time. This they could not do, and the 
fleet left for Boston, which was mentioned in the 
admiral's orders as the place in which he was to 
refit in case of need. It is of no use to dwell 
upon the bitter feeling aroused among the 
Americans, who felt that the British army at 
Newport was, with the aid of the fleet, in their 
power. In all fairness, however, the failure was 
really due to Sullivan's own delay, which 
changed completely naval conditions. The 
siege was raised; the great efi^ort had gone for 
nothing but the destruction of a few unimpor- 
tant British ships. The British fleet, now heavily 
reinforced by the thirteen powerful ships under 
Byron which had left England in June, had 
command of the sea. 

D'Estaing spent two months refitting at 



The American Navy 59 

Boston, and then following the letter of his 
orders, left on November 4, 1778, for the West 
Indies, where he was much more fortunate, but 
where we cannot follow him. His departure left 
our coast open to invasion at every point, and 
thus Savannah was occupied in December by a 
strong British force; it was the beginning of the 
Southern invasion which was to cost us dear. 

Pressed by our people, d'Estaing in the 
summer of 1779, though he had received orders 
to return with his own particular squadron to 
France, determined to attempt to dislodge the 
British at Savannah. He thus left Santo 
Domingo with twenty ships-of-the-line and 
seven frigates, and anchored, on August 31, 
1779, off Tybee at the mouth of the Savannah 
River, on which, eighteen miles from the sea, is 
Savannah, then but a small village. Troops 
were landed by the French, an attack made, and 
an expedition, expected to be completed in 
eight days, extended to two months. It ended 
in disaster; gale after gale crippled the French 
fleet here on an unprotected coast, until on 
October 28th it was wholly dispersed. The 
flagship was driven to sea with the loss of both 
her only remaining anchors, and it was not until 
well into December that the main portions came 



6o The American Navy- 

together again in the West Indies, D'Estaing 
himself, however, was driven so far to sea that 
he determined to return alone to France. This 
he did, fortunately meeting the Provence which 
gave him an anchor, and reached Brest on 
December 7, 1779. 

He returned, having accomplished nothing in 
aid of the United States itself, however fortu- 
nate in the West Indies. He was severely 
judged by naval officers of his service. One, 
however, need not go to the extent of Captain 
La Clocheterie, w^hom the Vicomte de Charlus 
(who kept a journal when crossing the Atlantic 
with Rochambeau's expedition next year) re- 
ports as saying: "He was a coward and a man of 
no talent." His failure is found rather in the mot 
of a really great French sailor, Suffren: "If he 
had only been as much of a seaman as he was 
brave — ■ — " 

The whole conduct of d'Estaing's campaign 
illustrates what superior strength at sea might 
accomplish but, in this case, did not. If he 
had, in going to America, pressed westward, 
even to the extent of towing his slow sailers, he 
would have made one of the great successes of 
history, and have ended the war in America. 
Failing this, he could, at once on his arrival. 



The American Navy 6i 

have forced the surrender of Newport, upon 
which he had but to close his hand and the place, 
with its 7,000 soldiers and sailors, and the bay 
would have been in possession of the allies. His 
fault, militarily considered, was in acceding to 
Sullivan's request for delay. Reading into the 
psychics of the question, this request had its 
basis in Sullivan's desire to make as good a show- 
ing as possible in the combined operations, and 
not from actual necessity, as the powerful 
French fleet in itself commanded the situation, 
and d'Estaing's compliance came from a nat- 
ural desire to meet the wishes of the American 
commander. But on neither side was it war. 
His leaving the bay at the crisis of events was 
an unfortunate want of judgment. His later 
action was but part of the ill-judged strategy of 
the time which ended in the fall of Charleston and 
the British occupancy of the whole South, its 
wholesale devastation and well-nigh subjugation. 
But neither side, British nor French, could 
understand how completely the whole was a 
question of naval domination. Washington 
saw, but he was powerless to do more than pro- 
claim again and again the truth, until finally 
in 1 78 1 he was listened to, the result of which was 
one of the decisive triumphs of all time. 



CHAPTER VI 

The new treaty with France was to bring into 
special prominence one of the most remarkable 
characters of his time, John Paul Jones. On 
October lo, 1776, he had been made the eigh- 
teenth captain on a list of twenty-four then es- 
tablished. He considered himself ill-treated, 
and justly so, as having been first on the list of 
lieutenants he should have been placed higher. 
His animadversions on the subject, in a letter 
to Robert Morris, are worth quoting. It 
showed along with some very just criticisms 
that he had a high and fitting estimate of his 
duties as a sea oflScer, and of the demands of his 
calling. He said: 

"I cannot but lament that so little delicacy 
hath been observed in the appointment and 
promotion of officers in the sea service, many of 
whom are not only grossly ilHterate, but want 
even the capacity of commanding merchant ves- 
sels. I was lately on a court-martial where a 
captain of marines made his mark and where 

62 



The American Navy 63 

the president could not read the oath which he 
attempted to administer without spelHng and 
making blunders. As the sea officers are so sub- 
ject to be seen by foreigners, what conclusions 
must they draw of Americans in general, from 
characters so rude and contracted? In my 
judgment the abilities of sea officers ought to 
be as far superior to the abilities of officers in 
the army as the nature of a sea service is more 
complicated and admits of a greater number of 
cases than can possibly happen on the land; 
therefore the discipline by sea ought to be the 
more perfect and regular, were it compatible 
with short enlistments."* 

On June 14, 1777, Jones was assigned to the 
command of the little cruiser Ranger, just com- 
pleted at Portsmouth, New Hampshire. On the 
same day Congress established the Stars and 
Stripes as the national flag, and it is said, and is 
probable, that Jones was the first to hoist this 
flag on a man-of-war. His ship was but 1 16 feet 
overall and 28 feet broad. She mounted eigh- 
teen 6-pounders. 

The delay in fitting out is not to the credit 
of the energy of those charged with providing 
the ship's equipment. The sails were not ready 
until late in October. With a crew of about 



■Jones Mss., July 28, 1777, quoted by Allen, I, 183. 



64 The American Navy 

one hundred and forty, "nearly all full-blooded 
Yankees,"she sailed on November ist, for France, 
carrying dispatches from Congress and taking 
two prizes on the way. Jones arrived at Nantes 
on December 2, 1777. 

He had a long wait in France before he again 
got to sea, but his frequent consultations with 
our commissioners, his always excellent advice 
in naval matters, and his general activity were 
worth the delay. It was not until April loth 
that he got to sea, starting on his famous cruise 
in the Irish Sea during which he took a number 
of prizes, among them the Drake, a sloop-of- 
war carrying twenty 6-pounders. He landed 
at Whitehaven, Scotland, and burned a ship, 
one of many which he had hoped to destroy in 
this port, and made the famous descent upon 
Lord Selkirk's estate, where his men carried 
off the family silver. But Jones had a muti- 
nous crew, thirsting for booty, and his concession 
of plunder was a case of force majeure. He 
later redeemed the silver, giving to the crew 
several hundred pounds as its valuation as 
prize, and returned it to the family. Jones had 
had much difficulty with both officers and crew, 
partially no doubt through his own roughness 
(mentioned in Fanning's narrative) toward the 



The American Navy 65 

former, and particularly through the peculiar 
ideas of liberty prevalent, which sometimes went 
so far as to claim that the movements of the 
ship should be put to a vote. 

Jones having arrived at Brest in May, 1778, 
with his prize, the Drake, sought a larger com- 
mand. He had to wait a year for it. After 
many strivings, one was found in the Due de 
Duras, a fourteen-year-old East Indiaman, 
which was bought, fitted as a man-of-war, and 
renamed the Bonhomme Richard in compliment 
to Franklin as being the nearest approach in 
French to the "Poor Richard" of the famous 
almanac. The ship was far from meeting re- 
quirements, being slow and weakly built, so 
that she finally carried twenty-eight 12 and 9 
pounders instead of i8's on the gun deck, eight 
6's on the forecastle, and on the after part of the 
lower deck six iS's, forty-two guns in all. She 
was provided with a mixed crew of Americans, 
French, EngHsh, a few Scandinavians, and 
eighty-three Irish and Scotch, Jones himself 
being of the latter by birth. Of the first there 
were in the beginning but seventy-nine, chiefly 
exchanged prisoners. Later, owing to muti- 
nous conduct of the British element, many of 
these were discharged and replaced by forty- 



66 The American Navy 

three newly arrived Americans just released 
from prison, and thirty Portuguese. The total 
was 227 officers and seamen, besides 130 French 
soldiers placed aboard to serve as marines. 

Jones's ideas were large: they included the 
fitting out of a large French squadron to act in 
concert and carrying a considerable number of 
troops to make an attack upon the Enghsh 
coast. This, however, fell through, and a squad- 
ron was organized of the Bonhomme Richard^ 
42; the Alliance^ 32; the Pallas, 32; the Cerf, 
cutter, 18, and the Fe7igeance, brigantine, of 12 
guns. 

The Alliance had arrived at Brest, twenty- 
three days from Boston, carrying Lafayette, 
on February 6, 1779. She had an unreliable 
crew, with many English and Irish, and a still 
more unreliable captain, Landais, who had been 
an officer in the French navy. He had been 
appointed a captain in the American service 
on the recommendation of Silas Deane, who 
seemed to have a faculty for making errors of 
the kind. Landais was to give much and con- 
tinuous trouble. 

The squadron did not finally get off until 
August 14, 1779. Its orders, prepared by 
FrankHn, with the advice of Sartine, the French 



The American Navy G'j 

Minister of Marine, were to cruise to the north 
of the British islands and after six weeks to go 
into the Texel, Holland. There were varying 
incidents of capture of prizes, designs to attack 
Leith, insubordinations of the French captains, 
etc., but on September 23d, when a convoy of 
forty vessels accompanied by two men-of-war 
was discovered off Flamborough Head, a prom- 
inent point a few miles south of Scarborough, 
England, Jones's moment had come. 

It was not until seven o'clock in the evening 
that the Bonhomme Richard came within gun- 
shot of the larger ship which turned out to be 
the Serapisy Captain Richard Pearson, of 50 
guns, 18 of which were i8-pounders. She car- 
ried 320 men. There then ensued the most re- 
markable duel in naval history. Jones was 
left unsupported by his accompanying subor- 
dinates, and he went into action short sixteen 
of his best men and a lieutenant, Lunt, who had 
been sent to secure a prize. The story of 
this remarkable battle must of necessity here be 
short; the full details must be sought else- 
where. But short as it must be, there is 
enough of it, however baldly told, to stir the 
blood. 

Jones closed with his antagonist early in the 



68 The American Navy 

action, and as they came in contact the two ships 
were lashed together by Jones, the stern of the 
Serapis being at the bow of the Bonhomme 
Richard. The latter's main deck battery of 12- 
pounders was silenced, two of the old six 18- 
pounders on the lower deck had burst, killing 
nearly all the guns' crews. Only three 9- 
pounders on the quarter deck could be used, 
and one of these had to be shifted from the off 
side. The guns of the Serapis were still active, 
but her upper deck had been cleared by the 
musketry fire from the tops of the Bonhomme 
Richard. The latter's prisoners (some 200) 
were released without orders, and in their fright 
that the ship was sinking, wiUingly worked the 
pumps; both ships were frequently afire. The 
men in the Bonhomme Richard's tops crawled 
along the yards into the tops of the Serapis and 
dropped hand grenades whenever any one ap- 
peared on deck; these grenades, at times going 
down the hatches and exploding on the lower 
deck, finally brought about an explosion of 
cartridges below which ran from gun to gun. 
This went far toward determining the battle. 
Meantime the erratic Landais fired three broad- 
sides, chiefly to the damage of the Bonhomme 
Richard^ as the shot holes were found in the 



The American Navy 69 

latter's unengaged side. There can be Httle 
question that he hoped this ship would sur- 
render when, with his own unharmed, he would 
capture both. Jones's doggedness won the day: 
at half-past ten Captain Pearson, influenced no 
doubt somewhat by the presence of the Alliance, 
surrendered. He stated that an incomplete 
list of his killed and wounded were forty-nine 
of the former and sixty-eight of the latter, or 
more than a third of the whole 320. Jones es- 
timated his loss at about 150, without stating 
the proportions. 

While this action was going on, the Pallas, 
30, Captain Cottineau, had engaged and taken 
the Countess of Scarborough, of 20 guns. The 
Baltic fleet under convoy was not attacked, as 
it should have been by the Alliance or the 
Vejigeance, a curious instance of inertia and in- 
capacity or worse, so long as neither chose to 
take part in the main action. 

Both the Serapis and Bonhomme Richard were 
terribly mauled. The latter's rudder, stern 
frame, and transoms were cut away, and the 
sides between the ports were at points driven in. 
It was ten next morning before the fires could be 
extinguished. On examination it was decided 
that it would be impossible to keep the ship 



yo The American Navy 

afloat if rough weather should come on(which 
in fact was the case), and during the night and 
next morning the wounded were removed. The 
men who had been brought from the Pallas to 
work the pumps were taken off^ the evening of 
the 25th (two days after the battle). Says 
Jones: 

"They did not abandon her until after nine 
o'clock; the water was then up to the lower deck, 
and a little after ten I saw with unexpressible 
grief the last of the Bonhomme Richard. No 
lives were lost with the ship, but it was impos- 
sible to save the stores of any sort whatever. 
I lost even the best part of my clothes, books 
and papers; and several of my officers lost all 
their clothes and efi^ects." 

The masts of the Serapis fell soon after the 
surrender, and jury masts were rigged from 
spars furnished by the Alliance, all the spare 
spars of the Serapis being too badly cut by shot. 
On September 26th she was able to steer for 
Holland in company with the rest of the squad- 
ron, and on October 3d entered the Texel after 
some demur on the part of the Dutch. Though 
Jones's instructions gave the Texel as the port 
to be made at the end of his six weeks' cruise, 



The American Navy 71 

his own wish was to go into Dunkirk and thus 
be under the shelter of an ally. The other cap- 
tains adhered to the letter of the instructions, 
and Jones felt obhged to yield. Much trouble 
would have been saved had his views prevailed. 
As an offset, however, to such disabilities as 
arose from the inability of Jones to dispose of 
the Serapis, the anger of the British Govern- 
ment against the Dutch as to the reception of 
the squadron in Dutch waters went far to bring- 
ing later the declaration of war by England 
against Holland. Jones was allowed to land his 
sick and wounded, who were cared for on an 
island in the bay, as were the prisoners, number- 
ing 537, sufficient to release by exchange all the 
American seamen who were prisoners in Eng- 
land. 

For Jones's further history, his having to put 
all his ships but the Alliance under the French 
flag to avoid the difficulties raised by Great 
Britain with Holland; his going in the Alliance 
to Lorient, France; the arrival there and sale of 
the Serapis; the charges against Landais; his 
short cruise in the Alliance; his unjust treat- 
ment by Arthur Lee, by which Landais regained 
command of the Alliance; Lee's embarkation in 
the Alliance for America and the necessity 



72 The American Navy 

during the voyage of depriving Landais of the 
command on account of evident insanity; the 
dismissal of Landais from the service; Jones's 
arrival in command of the Ariel at Philadelphia, 
February i8, 1781, after more than three years' 
absence, and his reception of the thanks of 
Congress; his appointment to the command of 
the new line-of-battle ship America which he 
lost through its presentation to France; his re- 
turn to Europe, and the rest of his adventurous 
career must be read in the many books devoted 
to the history of his life, not the least interest- 
ing part of which is to be found in Fanning's 
graphic narrative. He will always stand out 
boldly as one of the most fearless spirits of the 
sea, and had he lived in the Napoleonic epoch 
he would have been met by Napoleon as a 
kindred soul who might have saved him the 
great misfortune of Trafalgar, which so changed 
the history of Europe and the world. 



CHAPTER VII 

The activity of American privateers as well as 
Continental ships in British waters during 
1 777- 1 779 was very great, that of the Reprisal^ 
Lexington, Dolphin, and Revenge (the first two, 
Continental brigs) being particularly notable. 
France was at this period (1777) made a basis 
for the fitting out of Continental vessels and 
privateers, and for the supply of men in a way 
which would be far from possible to-day. Cap- 
tain Lambert Wickes of the Continental brig 
Reprisal and Gustavus Conyngham of the Con- 
tinental lugger Surprise and cutter Reve?ige, 
both of which latter were bought and fitted out 
by our commissioners in France, were two of 
those most active and prominent in the oper- 
ations on the British coast. Their names have 
come down to this day as specially brave and 
adventurous men. The former had cruised 
very successfully on our own coast and in the 
West Indies in 1776, and had been the first, as 
mentioned, to carry a ship of the regular navy 

73 



74 The American Navy 

to Europe, December, 1776, though privateers 
had preceded him. Two prizes taken into 
Nantes caused strong protests from Great 
Britain. The treaty of Utrecht, 1713, ex- 
pressly closed the ports of either power to the 
enemies of the other, so that the British case 
had a very sound basis. Vergennes unques- 
tionably, before our alliance, had to hold a 
course favoring the Americans which was full 
of difficulties. The details of the diplomacy 
of the moment cannot be entered upon. Suf- 
fice that the Reprisal refitted went to sea early 
in 1777, and brought in five prizes to add to 
Vergennes's difficulties. The British Ambas- 
sador, Stormont, demanded their release. He 
was answered that both captor and captured had 
been ordered to leave port and were probably 
already at sea, to which Stormont was later 
able to make reply that the Reprisal was under- 
going repairs at Lorient, and that the five prizes 
had been sold. The questions were bandied 
to and fro between the American commission- 
ers, the French Minister, and the British Am- 
bassador, with the result that the Reprisal 
received orders not to cruise near the French 
coast, but apparently the prizes remained in 
the hands of the purchasers. On May 28th 



The American Navy 75 

Wickes sailed in the Reprisal from St. Nazaire 
with the Continental brig Lexington, Captain 
Henry Johnson, and the cutter Dolphin, Cap- 
tain Nicholson, all under Wickes as senior officer, 
for a cruise through the Irish Channel. They 
were back in St. Malo on June 27th, having 
captured twenty prizes, of which three were re- 
leased and seven sunk. In July the commis- 
sioners were obliged to give orders that the 
Reprisal and Lexington should return directly 
to America, for which the Dolphin had already 
sailed as a packet, and to cruise no longer in 
Europe. They left in September; when only 
two days out the Lexington was captured. The 
Reprisal was lost on the Newfoundland Banks, 
but one man being saved. The loss of her en- 
terprising captain was keenly felt and deplored. 
Gustavus Conyngham had been selected to 
command the lugger Surprise fitting at Dun- 
kirk, and was given one of the commissions, of 
which a number had been sent out in blank 
signed by Hancock, President of Congress, and 
dated March i, 1777. He got to sea by May 
and, returning almost at once with two prizes, 
was, on the demand of the British Ambassador, 
with most of his crew, put in prison. His vessel 
was seized and the prizes released. His com- 



76 The American Navy 

mission was taken from him and not returned. 
Released, he was at once put in command of a 
newly purchased cutter, the Revenge^ with a crew 
of 106 men. He was given a new commission 
which was dated May 2, 1777. He cruised off the 
coast of Spain with remarkable success and then 
went to the West Indies. He was reported to 
have captured, by the time of his arrival there, 
sixty vessels, twenty-seven of which had been 
sent into port and thirty-three sunk or burned. 
After cruising successfully in the West Indies he 
arrived at Philadelphia on February 21, 1779. 
The Revenge was sold, but the purchaser fitted 
her out as a privateer with Conyngham in com- 
mand, using his Continental commission, dated 
May 2, 1777; this nearly caused Conyngham to 
lose his life, for he was captured by a British 
frigate in April, taken to New York, confined in 
irons, and was sent to England under an accusa- 
tion of piracy in that his cruise and captures in 
the Revenge early in 1777 had been before the 
date of this commission. In November, 1779, he 
escaped from Mill prison, where he had been con- 
fined. His active career, however, was ended.* 



*The identical commission for which Conyngham came near 
suffering was found a few years since in a Paris bookshop and is 
now in the collection of Navalia formed by the late Captain John 
S. Barnes of New York. 



The American Navy 'j'j 

In 1779 occurred one of the great naval dis- 
asters of the war. Some 800 British troops con- 
voyed by ships-of-war had in June taken posses- 
sion of Penobscot Bay to estabHsh there some 
of the many loyahsts who had gone to HaHfax, 
their chief refuge during the war. Maine was 
then a part of Massachusetts, and it was this 
state which took on the burden of dislodging 
the enemy. The Navy Board at Boston lent 
the Warren, 32; the Providence (sloop), 14; and 
the Diligent, 12. These and three state brig- 
antines, of 14 or 16 guns each, and thirteen 
privateers (insured by the state) made up the 
naval part. In all they mounted 324 guns and 
were manned by over 2,000 men. Captain 
Dudley Saltonstall was in chief command. 
There were about 1,000 militia commanded by 
General Solomon Lovell. This carefully pre- 
pared effort was a complete failure through the 
incompetency and want of push of Saltonstall. 
Arriving in the bay on July 25, 1779, the attack 
on three British vessels present and on the fort 
which was now ready was so dilatory and in- 
effective that at length, on August 13th, a Brit- 
ish fleet which had had time to come from New 
York appeared and drove the American vessels 
up the river, where all except two, which were 



78 The American Navy 

captured, were burned. The American loss was 
474 men. The remainder had to find their way 
back with great hardship through the Maine 
woods. This humiHating affair cost Massachu- 
setts a debt estimated at ^7,000,000. 

The year 1779, however, had been the most 
brilHant of the war for the small American navy. 
The exploits of John Paul Jones, of Gustavus 
Conyngham and Lambert Wickes in European 
waters made an undying page of history; nor 
should those of our small frigates, the Queen of 
France y Deane (later the Hague), Warren, Bos- 
ton, and Ranger on our own coasts as well as of 
the swarms of privateers in this year (289 of 
which were commissioned by Congress alone) and 
whose sweeping captures of the enemy's com- 
merce went so far to supply the needs of our 
ever-dwindling army, be forgotten. 

American affairs were now (at the beginning 
of 1780) at their lowest ebb. The struggle 
had lasted nearly five years. It was with diffi- 
culty that an army, nominally of 6,000 men, could 
be kept together. The men were "half- starved, 
imperfectly clothed, riotous, and robbing the 
country people . . . from sheer necessity. 
Desertion was continual, from one to two hun- 



The American Navy 79 

dred men a month going over to the enemy. 
. . . Only a miracle, thought Washington, 
could keep America from the humiliation of 
seeing her cause upheld solely by foreign arms. 
Throughout the land there was a weariness of 
war, a desire for peace at any price."* 

At least a third of our population is estimated 
to have been loyaHst, and another third luke- 
warm. At several periods there were more 
loyalists in the British service than in our own. 
Nor was this situation wholly confined to the 
army, for in 1779 there were fitted out at New 
York one hundred and twenty-one privateers 
in British employ, thirty-four of which carried 
from twenty to thirty-six guns. The whole 
were manned by between 9,000 and 10,000 
men. 

The navy was reduced almost as much as the 
army. The Boston, Providence, Ranger, and 
Queen of France had arrived at Charleston on 
December 23, 1779. The first three fell into 
the hands of the enemy on the surrender of 
Charleston on May 11, 1780, and became part 
of the British navy, the fourth along with the 
South Carolina ships Bricole, 44; the Truite, 26; 

*Van Tyne, "The American Revolution," 305, referring to 
Washington Writings (Spark's ed.) VI, 441 and VII, 159. N. Y. 
Docs. Rel. to Col. Hist., VIIL 800. 



8o The American Navy 

General Moultrie, 20, and Notre Dame, 16, had 
been sunk in the river, as also two small French 
ships-of-war V Aventure and Polacre. There 
thus remained in the latter part of 1780 but one 
of the original thirteen frigates, the Trumbull, 
which with the Dea7i, Confederacy, Alliance, and 
Saratoga (the last a sloop-of-war), formed in this 
year the entire Continental navy in service. 
The Deane (renamed the Hague) and the Alli- 
ance were the only two of these to survive the 
year. 



CHAPTER VIII 

The now unopposed command of the sea 
by the British navy and the consequent in- 
vasion and overrunning of the South brought 
darkest gloom and despondency to the American 
cause. 

It was well that Providence had given Amer- 
ica Washington who, when all things seemed to 
fail, held firm and carried us to victory. With- 
out him the nation could not have survived the 
throes of birth. Calm and undismayed, he 
made up for the inefficiency of Congress, the 
lethargy of the states, the discontent of all. 
Whatever our national shortcomings — past, 
present, or future — America can ever be proud 
of having produced this king of men, the great- 
est character in history. He was, in fact, the 
Revolution personified. The war was fought 
without even the semblance of a government, 
for even the "Articles of Confederation and 
Perpetual Union" reported on July 12, 1776, 
by a committee appointed on June loth (the 

81 



82 The American Navy 

same day as that on which the committee was 
appointed to draft the Declaration of Inde- 
pendence), v/ere not agreed to by Congress until 
November 17, 1777, and a sufficient number of 
states under the conditions of these articles did 
not ratify the action of Congress until March i, 
1781. Thus nearly six years of war passed 
before we had anything approaching a confed- 
eracy, and even then, as Washington well said, 
it was "but a shade without a substance." 
"The organized and carefully barricaded im- 
potence of this scheme of government," says 
an able authority, "is probably unequalled in 
history, with any nation surviving." Congress 
could only "request" of the several states, and 
but too often these requests bore no fruit what- 
ever. Attendance in Congress lagged, interest 
dwindled, and by 1780 but for Washington, so 
far as mortal can judge, the Revolution would 
have come to a dismal end. 

But Washington's time of cheer was at hand. 
From February, 1779, to March, 1780, La- 
fayette was in France and unceasing in his ef- 
forts in support of the American cause. It was 
chiefly due to his efforts that on May 2, 178c, 
seven line-of-battle ships and three frigates left 
Brest under the Chevalier de Ternay, convoy- 



The American Navy 83 

ing thirty-six transports carrying 5,027 troops, 
officers and men, under Lieutenant-General 
Count de Rochambeau. The enemy had, on 
October 25, 1779, withdrawn from Narragansett 
Bay to New York fearing an attack by 
d'Estaing's great fleet after its operations 
against Savannah. The French fleet anchored 
at Newport on July nth. 

The death of de Ternay in December, due, 
in Lafayette's judgment, to despondency caused 
by his hopeless view of things; the treason of 
Arnold which came to light in September; the 
blockade for most of the coming winter of the 
French squadron by, now, a superior British 
force; the arrival in the West Indies at the end 
of April, 178 1, of the Count de Grasse with a 
powerful addition to the French fleet; the in- 
formation that he expected to come on to the 
American coast; the pressing messages to him 
from Washington and Rochambeau to hasten 
his departure; the reply received on August 14th 
that he would sail on August 13th for the Ches- 
apeake with 3,300 troops, artillery, and siege 
guns, and 1,200,000 livres (francs) in money, 
determined the move of the small aUied armies 
to Virginia, where Cornwallis, now some months 
in that state, was finally to take up an en- 



84 The American Navy 

trenched position at Yorktown, his move from 
Portsmouth being completed on August 22d. 

The American and French armies, after a 
whole year's inaction, joined on July 6, 1781, 
taking position on a line from Dobbs' Ferry to 
the Bronx. The Fates were surely with America. 
Everything conspired for the allies' success; the 
position taken had convinced Clinton that New 
York was to be attacked; he pressed Cornwal- 
lis to send him every man he could spare, but 
Cornwallis could spare none. Rodney in the 
West Indies, misinformed as to De Grasse's in- 
tentions, and thinking he was to take but half 
his fleet instead of the whole, detached but four- 
teen of his own command to go north under Sir 
Samuel Hood to reinforce Admiral Graves at 
New York. Rodney himself left for England 
on leave of absence, carrying four ships with 
him. The two vessels dispatched to Graves 
with information of British intentions never 
reached him. He was east with his squadron 
when one, arriving at New York, was sent on to 
him but was driven ashore on Long Island by 
a superior force and destroyed; the other and 
more important one, giving word of Hood's 
departure, was captured. For this reason, 
though Graves returned to New York on August 



The American Navy 85 

i6th, he still remained in the dark as to Hood's 
movements. The whole was a marvel of good 
fortune for the Americans, while every move of 
De Grasse's fleet and of the allied armies were 
to fit with the perfection of mechanism. 

Hood left the West Indies on August loth. 
On the 25th he looked into the Chesapeake 
and, finding nothing, went on to Sandy Hook, 
where he arrived August 28th. That same 
evening word was received that De Barras (who 
had arrived from France as the successor of De 
Ternay) had sailed from Newport with his whole 
division of eight of the line, four frigates, and 
eighteen transports. It was now known to 
the British general that the allied armies were 
on their way south and that De Grasse was 
bound for the Chesapeake. Graves, with five 
of the line and a 50-gun ship, all that could be 
got ready in the time, joined Hood off Sandy 
Hook on August 31st and started south. He 
had nineteen ships-of-the-line to De Grasse's 
twenty-eight. But De Grasse was already in- 
side the capes, which he had reached on August 
30th, and was at anchor in Lynnhaven Bay, just 
within Cape Henry. He had at once landed his 
troops and had stationed cruisers in James 
River to prevent Cornwallis attempting to es- 



86 The American Navy- 

cape to North Carolina. His dispositions re- 
duced his available ships to twenty-four of the 
Hne. At this moment Washington "was cross- 
ing the Delaware on his way south, with 6,000 
regular troops, 2,000 American and 4,000 
French, to join Lafayette," who now, with the 
3,300 French from the fleet, had 8,000 regulars 
and mihtia. 

On September 5th Admiral Graves's fleet was 
sighted by the French in the northeast. It was 
at first thought to be that of De Barras, but, on 
discovering the mistake, De Grasse took a course 
which risked all by getting under way and going 
outside the capes to fight a battle. To get 
twenty-four heavy sailing ships under way and 
attempt to get them in any formation in a rea- 
sonable time, even with the ebb tide which was 
running, was, with the wind north-northeast, a 
difficult operation. Several had to tack in 
order to clear Cape Henry, and by the time they 
reached the open sea the French ships must 
have been in very straggling condition. Graves 
failed to take advantage of such an opportunity. 
Instead of crowding sail, with a wind as fair as 
he could wish, and pressing down for the French, 
whom he might have attacked in detail, he 
formed a line heading out to sea, to fight a 



The American Navy 87 

battle, partially under the old rule of parallel 
columns with each ship engaging her opposite, 
and partially under new ideas of tactics which 
Graves, just from England, had imbibed but 
which most of his captains had scarcely heard 
of. 

The action began about four o'clock, signals 
were not understood, and, taken all in all, the 
handling of the British fleet was badly botched. 
Furthermore, Sir Samuel Hood, who commanded 
the rear division and was an officer of highest 
reputation, showed no initiative such as, in the 
circumstances, might have been expected, his 
division getting scarcely into gunshot. Thus 
at sunset, when the battle ceased, the British 
were in decidedly the worse plight, with a loss 
of 90 killed and 246 wounded, against about 
200 killed and wounded of the French, and with 
several ships very severely injured, one, the 
Terrible, 74, so much so that she was in sinking 
condition, and five days later was burned. 
Though the two fleets were yet in sight of each 
other for four days, neither showed a wish to 
renew the action. On September lOth, when 
morning broke, the French were out of sight. 
Next day they reentered the Chesapeake, captur- 
ing near the entrance two frigates sent by 



88 The American Navy 

Graves to reconnoitre, one of which was the Iris 
which had been the American Hancock. They 
found at anchor within the capes the division 
of Barras which the day before had arrived 
from Newport with the siege artillery intended 
for use at Yorktown. On the 13th the British 
fleet stood in for the capes and sighted the 
French at anchor. There was nothing to do 
but to return north. On the 19th it was again 
at Sandy Hook, and American independence 
was won. 

Washington had not heard until September 
5th of De Grasse's arrival. "Standing on the 
river bank at Chester, he waved his hat in the 
air as the Comte de Rochambeau approached, 
and with many demonstrations of uncontrol- 
lable happiness he announced to him the good 
news." Had he known that at that moment 
De Grasse was under way to go to sea and fight 
a battle, he would have been less joyous. For 
it was only the want of initiative on the part of 
the British admiral that saved the situation. 
For had the latter at any time in the six days 
which the French spent at sea himself entered 
the Chesapeake, he could have held the posi- 
tion, and De Grasse's venture would have gone 
for nought. It is highly improbable that in such 



The American Navy 89 

circumstances de Grasse would have shown such 
initiative as to attack New York. It is clear 
that neither admiral had a clear sense of the 
strategy involved, for De Grasse himself but a 
little later was again desirous of leaving the 
Chesapeake to seek the British fleet, and was 
only held by the most earnest remonstrances of 
Washington. As it was, the army was trans- 
ported by September 26th to Williamsburg, and 
on October 19th Lord Cornwallis surrendered, 
thus, virtually, closing the war. De Grasse sailed 
November 4th to the West Indies and to ruin; 
for on April 12, 1782, he was signally defeated by 
Rodney and became a prisoner. 

The French army was an aid to our success; 
the French navy was a necessity. The result 
completely filled the dictum of Washington, 
who foresaw by a hundred years that which is 
to-day an axiom and one particularly applicable 
to our own country: "In any operation and un- 
der all circumstances, a decisive naval superior- 
ity is to be considered a fundamental principle 
and the basis upon which every hope of success 
must ultimately depend.* He would have 
made a great admiral, a career he narrowly es- 

*Memorandum dated July 15, 1780, sent by the hands of La- 
fayette to Rochambeau. 



90 The American Navy 

caped when it was proposed that he should go 
as midshipman under Admiral Vernon. The 
Fates fortunately decreed otherwise. 

The operations of the Continental navy were 
now confined to very few ships. The Alliance^ 
under Captain Barry, had left Boston February 
II, 1 78 1, carrying Colonel John Laurens and 
Thomas Paine. The former bore a letter which, 
addressed by Washington to Laurens, was to be 
shown Vergennes, putting strongly the neces- 
sity of money and ships, and giving the whole 
logic of the situation in the sentence: "Indeed, 
it is not to be conceived how [the British] could 
subsist a large force in this country if we had the 
command of the seas to interrupt the regular 
transmission of supplies from Europe." 

The Alliance was unhappy in the character 
of her crew, which illustrated the exigencies to 
which we were now driven. A large number 
were British prisoners. These on the return 
voyage formed a conspiracy to carry the ship to 
Ireland, in the suppression of which Barry ex- 
hibited courage and qualities for command of a 
high order. On the way he captured two Brit- 
ish cruisers, of 16 and 14 guns, the smaller of 
which was made a cartel to carry his prisoners, 
now about 250, into Halifax. The larger was 



The American Navy 91 

retaken by a squadron near Cape Cod. The 
Marquis de Lafayette, a French privateer which 
had left France at the same time as the Allia7ice, 
with a valuable cargo of military stores, suf- 
fered the same fate. 

The Deane, Confederacy, and Saratoga cruised 
this year in the West Indies, with small fortune, 
which was turned into very bad, by the capture 
of the Confederacy by a British squadron on 
April 15th. The Trumbull, at sea on her first 
cruise, with a mixed crew of wretched quality, 
was dismasted in a gale and was taken on August 
8th by the Iris and the General Monk, both of 
which were captured American ships taken into 
the British service, one, as just said, being the 
Hancock, and the latter a privateer, the General 
Washington. The Iris, as but just mentioned 
above, was taken by the French only a month 
later and the General Monk on April 7th of the 
next year by the Hyder Ally, under Captain 
Joshua Barney, in one of the notable actions 
of the war. 

Up to the peace signed September 3, 1783, 
privateering had continued active, 383 letters 
of marque being granted by Congress in 1782, 
but the Continental navy had practically dis- 
appeared. There were but five ships remain- 



92 The American Navy 

ing: the frigates Alliance, Hague, and Bourbon 
(the last not yet launched), and the ships Gen- 
eral Washington and Due de Lauzun. Only the 
first two were in commission. Our only line-of- 
battle ship, the newly launched America, had 
been given to France to replace the ]\Iagnifique, 
wrecked coming into Boston harbor. The few 
ships mentioned gradually disappeared : the Due 
de Lauzun was sent to France as a transport and 
sold; the Bourbon, launched at Middletown, 
Connecticut, July 31, 1783, was advertised for 
sale two months later, as was the Hague in 
August; the General Washington was sold the 
next year. Sentiment preserved the Alliance 
until August, 1785, when, with her sale, the Con- 
tinental navy passed into history. 

To recapitulate some data of the first chapter: 
The British navy had at the beginning of the 
war 270 ships, of which 131 were of the line 
(from 100 to 60 guns), and but 18,000 seamen. 
At the end, January 20, 1783, there were 468 
ships, of which 174 were of the line, and 110,000 
seamen. They had lost (taken, destroyed, 
burned, foundered, or wrecked) 202 ships carry- 
irig S>i30 guns. The Continental and state 
navies had lost (taken, destroyed, burned, 



The American Navy 93 

foundered, or wrecked) 39 ships, carrying 876 
guns. The French had lost (in all the ways just 
mentioned) 72 ships, with 2,636 guns; the 
Spanish 24, with 960 guns; the Dutch 9, with 
364 guns. 

The British during the war lost 3,087 mer- 
chant vessels, taken by Americans, French, 
Dutch, and Spanish; 879 of these were retaken 
or ransomed. They lost 89 privateers, of which 
14 were retaken or ransomed. They captured 
1,135 merchantmen, of which only 27 were re- 
taken or ransomed, and 216 privateers, of which 
only one was retaken.* The net result was heav- 
ily against them. 

The navy of the Revolution, however insuffi- 
cient and ineffective as an instrument of real 
war, served a good purpose. It kept up our com- 
munication with Europe; made many captures 
of material in ordnance, ammunition, and stores 
of utmost importance to our forces, and fought 
many gallant actions. But actions between 
small cruisers and captures of merchantmen are 
not the means which bring control of the sea. 
The action of greatest moment was that of the 
little flotilla on Lake Champlain in 1776, and 
this, even though defeated, was a main instru- 

*Clowes, "The Royal Navy," III, 396. 



94 The American Navy 

ment in gaining the French alhance and thus 
our independence. It is the battleship, in that 
day known as the ship-of-the-line, which decides 
the question of command of the world's highway 
and thus decides the outcome of war between 
powers separated by the ocean. The services of 
the small Continental navy thus from the very 
nature of things could effect comparatively little 
so long as the ship-of-the-line could go and come 
as it pleased. It was the French battleship in lar- 
ger numbers than the English that completely 
changed the melancholy outlook of 1780 and 
1781. In July of the latter year Rochambeau, 
in a letter to De Grasse urging him to come 
north, could use the words: "General Washing- 
ton has but a handful of men. . . . This 
country has been driven to bay and all its re- 
sources are giving out at once." He told but the 
painful fact. The presence of a dominating 
fleet gave us victory and independence; without 
it the Revolution would have failed. It took 
us a hundred years to realize the truth of the 
principle here stated, and we have yet to frame 
a pohcy in accord with its meaning. 

With the passing of the ships passed all sem- 
blance of naval organization. The Board of Ad- 



The American Navy 95 

miralty had really consisted of Robert Morris 
only, and the Congress of the loosely bound Con- 
federation was itself almost moribund. The 
United States found itself free, but it was 
the freedom of disorganization, an atrophy of 
government. The Revolution had been fought 
until March, 1781, without an established gov- 
ernment. This is a remarkable fact. We had 
yet to wait four years from the peace for a real 
instrument of government, the Constitution of 
1787. The adoption of this on September 13, 
1787, was the true birthday of the Republic 
rather than the 4th of July, 1776. The Rev- 
olution of 1787 was quite as momentous as that 
of the war just ended. 



96 



The American Navy 



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The American Navy 



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CHAPTER IX 

Stretching along the southern shore of the 
Mediterranean some i,8oo miles, in the latitude, 
roughly speaking, of Cape Hatteras, are the re- 
gions known to our forefathers as Barbary, The 
westernmost was Morocco, then Algiers, Tunis, 
and Tripoli. The last three were nominally ap- 
panages of the Turkish Empire. Anciently 
there had been along these shores a high civiliza- 
tion. Carthage (now Tunis) had disputed with 
Rome the empire of the Mediterranean; she 
failed through Rome's final dominancy at sea, 
and her power was utterly wrecked, as was the 
city itself. Rome ruled and built thriving cities 
throughout the coastline mentioned, the re- 
mains of which now mark but dimly the foot- 
steps of civilization and history. 

With the rise of Mohammedanism, the Arab 
power swept westward over the entire region. 
The antagonism of religion brought a continuous 
warfare between the European and African 
shores which developed into a piracy which 

98 



The American Navy 99 

lasted almost to our own days. A relic of the 
fear which Europe had for these bold corsairs, 
who captured vessels of all nations and carried 
crews and passengers into cruel slavery, is in the 
many towers of refuge still along the French and 
Italian rivieras, and the memory is yet in the 
Litany in the prayer-book of the Episcopal 
Church in England and America, where we pray 
for "all prisoners and captives." Long after the 
writer entered our navy, the Saturday evening 
toast, after "Sweethearts and Wives," was, 
"Here's to the downfall of the barbarous Moor." 
It was an echo of the epic period of the American 
navy. For we once did great things in Barbary, 
of which the average American to-day (and more's 
the pity) is almost wholly ignorant. It is in its 
earlier phase a tale of national humiliation in 
which all Europe also had full share, but in which 
our navy had no part; its later phase in which 
the navy came into action is a very proud story. 
The depredations of the Barbary powers were 
not confined to the Mediterranean, but extended 
into the North and Irish seas, many inhabitants 
being carried from these coasts into slavery. 
There were various efforts to punish these raid- 
ing powers in the seventeenth century by Dutch, 
French, and English, and as late as 1775 a great 



lOO The American Navy 

expedition was fitted out by Spain of nearly four 
hundred vessels, against Algiers, which, how- 
ever, ended in disaster. This has special interest 
to us, as Joshua Barney, who was to act a con- 
spicuous part in our naval annals, was impressed, 
with the Baltimore ship which he commanded, 
to assist in the transport of troops. 

The Barbary vessels were in general large, 
narrow rowboats, carrying usually two masts, 
with the lateen sail of the Mediterranean for 
use in fair winds. The name "galley" was ap- 
plied in Europe to the largest of such in ordinary 
use. There was, however, a much larger develop- 
ment in the galleasse, some few of which, used by 
the Neapolitans, carried 700 men, 300 of whom 
would be convicts at the oars. There was finally 
the galleon, the precursor of the frigate, which 
had masts and sails alone for propulsion. In 
the large galleys there might be as many as six 
men at an oar. It may be said that in general the 
development of the corsair ship followed slowly 
but fairly closely that of the ship of Europe, 
and in later years they had a number of the 
usual square-rigged vessels.* 

The Christian slaves were employed not only 

*For a full description of vessels of the galley period, see Ad- 
miral Jurien de la Graviere, "Deniers Jours de la Marine a Rames," 
and Lane-Poole, "Barbary Corsairs," Chap. XII. 



The American Navy loi 

in the galleys, but did all kinds of labor; the 
crew of our frigate Philadelphia, which in 1803 
grounded near Tripoli and thus was captured, 
was employed in building one of the defences 
against our own ships, which took the name of 
the American fort. In the main, however, the 
captivity was humane and not oppressive. 

The claim of the Barbary powers was ex- 
pressed in a statement of their envoy while in 
London in 1786, to our minister, John Adams: 
"That Turkey, Tripoli, Tunis, Algiers, and Mo- 
rocco were the sovereigns of the Mediterranean; 
and that no nation could navigate that sea with- 
out a treaty of peace with them."* Europe had 
practically accepted a situation of the most de- 
grading kind; every nautical power paid tribute 
in money or presents and all had representatives 
among the Barbary slaves. Even as late as 
1816, when the English finally acted, there were 
eighteen Englishmen among the slaves released 
by Lord Exmouth's expedition. 

But England's attitude had not been one of 
honor. There was no time when she might not 
have ended the foul situation. FrankHn could 
say in a letter on July 25, 1783, to our secretary 
of foreign affairs: "I think it not improbable that 

*Adams, "Works," VIII, 373. 



I02 The American Navy 

these rovers may be privately encouraged by 
the EngHsh to fall upon us and to prevent our 
interfering in the carrying trade; for I have in 
London heard it is a maxim among the mer- 
chants, that if there were no Algiers it would be 
worth England's while to build one. I wonder, 
however, that the rest of Europe do not com- 
bine to destroy those nests and secure commerce 
from their future piracies."* Three years later 
John Adams, our minister in London, was writ- 
ing Secretary Jay (February 17, 1786): "There 
are not wanting persons in England who will 
find means to stimulate this African [the Tripoli- 
tan envoy] to stir up his countrymen against 
American vessels."! British statesmanship, then 
as ever, was jealous of rival commerce on the 
seas. Lord Sheffield, in a pamphlet on Ameri- 
can commerce, could say: "It will not be in the 
interest of any of the great maritime powers to 
protect [Americans] from the Barbary States. 
If they know their interests, they will not en- 
courage the Americans to be carriers — that the 
Barbary States are advantageous to the mari- 
time powers is obvious." 

It is odd that at this period two men whose 



*"Dip. Corres. of the Revolution," IV, pp. 95, 149. 
t" Works," VIII, 372. 



The American Navy 103 

lives were of a sort that one would have sup- 
posed they would have advised each directly 
otherwise, exchanged characters. Thus while 
Thomas Jefferson, our minister to France, ad- 
vised in 1785 force as the best protection, John 
Adams in England, influenced perhaps by his 
surroundings, advised following the usual plan 
of paying an annual tribute. Jefferson later, 
most unhappily for his country, was violently 
antagonistic to the establishment of a navy. 
Adams was, and always had been, quite the re- 
verse. But he now felt that the country was 
too poor and too embarrassed by debt to use 
force. He wrote John Jay, Foreign Secre- 
tary, December 15, 1784: "As long as France, 
England, Holland, the Emperor, etc., will sub- 
mit to be tributaries to these robbers and even 
encourage them, to what purpose should we 
make war upon them? The resolution might be 
heroic but would not be wise . . . we can- 
not hurt them in the smallest degree. . . . 
Unless it were possible, then, to persuade the 
great maritime powers of Europe to unite in the 
suppression of these piracies, it would be very 
imprudent for us to entertain any thoughts of 
contending with them."* 

*Adams, "Works," VIII, 218. 



I04 The American Navy 

The two ministers had an extended corre- 
spondence, and though Adams said: "I will go 
all lengths with you in promoting a navy, 
whether it be applied to the Algerines or not," he 
still doubted the economy of dealing with Bar- 
bary by force. Jefferson 'stone was now, for him, 
strangely combative. Rewrote, August 20, 1785: 
"The question is whether their peace or war will 
be cheapest? But it is a question which should 
be addressed to our honor as well as our avarice, 
nor does it respect us as to these pirates only, 
but as to the nations of Europe. If we wish our 
commerce to be free and uninsulted, we must 
let these nations see that we have an energy 
which at present they disbelieve. The low opin- 
ion they entertain of our powers cannot fail to 
involve us soon in a naval war." 

Jefferson's views involved an association 
which would furnish one or more cruisers each 
to act against piracy in the Mediterranean. It 
included Portugal, Naples, the two Sicilies, 
Venice, Malta, Denmark, and Sweden, an ex- 
tremely difficult combination; but he doubted 
the good faith of others. In a letter to Monroe, 
August II, 1786, he says: "I think every power 
in Europe would soon fall into it except France, 
England, and perhaps Spain and Holland. Of 



The American Navy 105 

these there is only England who would give any 
real aid to the Algerines. . . ." He 
added: ''Were the honor and advantage of es- 
tablishing such a confederacy outof the question, 
yet the necessity that the United States should 
have some marine force, and the happiness of 
this, as the ostensible cause of beginning it, 
would decide on its propriety. It will be said 
there is no money in the treasury. There never 
will be money in the treasury till the confeder- 
acy shows its teeth. . . . Every rational 
citizen must wish to see an effective instrument 
of coercion and should fear to see it on any other 
element than the water. A naval force can never 
endanger our liberties nor occasion bloodshed; a 
land force would do both."* 

This was Jefferson at his best. It is extraor- 
dinary that when the time came to really assert 
ourselves against the seizure of our seamen and 
property by other powers than those of Barbary, 
he should have so completely failed. But in any 
case, at the time he was proposing his floating 
confederacy, our inchoate system of government 
of the period, which required each state to be 
solicited by Congress for funds, would no doubt, 
as Adams thought, have made it impossible to 

*JefFerson's Correspondence "Definitive Ed.," V, 88 and 386. 



io6 The American Navy 

provide the needed ships. Our vessels continued 
to be seized and their crews enslaved. 

It would be unjust to the memory of John 
Adams, to whom the Continental navy chiefly 
owed its beginnings, and who was ever the vig- 
orous supporter of the newer navy, not to record 
his life-long views as expressed to the House of 
Representatives in November, 1800: 'T con- 
fidently believe that few persons can be found 
within the United States who do not admit that 
a navy, well-organized, must constitute the 
natural and efficient defence of this country 
against all foreign hostility." To this he was 
consistent through the whole of his long life. In 
1785 he was simply doubtful of the travesty of 
government which then existed and was to have 
two more years of its ineffective life. 

In January, 1791, the United States, having 
now through its newly formed Constitution of 
1787 crystallized into a real nationality, the 
Senate Committee on Mediterranean Trade 
agreed that our trade could "be protected but 
by a naval force, and that it will be proper to re- 
sort to the same as soon as the state of the public 
finances will admit." But a year later the Senate 
was stating its "readiness to ratify treaties with 
Algiers providing for peace at a cost of forty 



The American Navy 107 

thousand dollars at the outset and annual trib- 
ute of twenty-five thousand; and also for the 
ransom of the captives, then thirteen in number, 
for forty thousand." 

Fifty thousand dollars was appropriated to 
begin with, and Paul Jones was appointed consul 
at Algiers and as our envoy to make a peace. 
But Jones died at Paris, July 18, 1792. Thomas 
Barclay, our consul in Morocco, was appointed; 
he also died very shortly, and David Humphreys, 
our minister to Portugal, succeeded him. But 
the Dey of Algiers refused to receive him. The 
seizures continued, and in 1793 eleven vessels 
were captured and the crews enslaved. There 
were now in Algiers over a hundred American 
captives. The English consul, who of course 
was acting on orders from home, was blamed by 
Humphreys for the situation. Finally the House 
resolved on January 2, 1792, but only by a ma- 
jority of two, that a naval force should be pro- 
vided. A bill providing for six ships at a cost of 
$600,000 was finally passed with a proviso that 
if peace could be arranged with Algiers work on 
these should stop. There had been much oppo- 
sition, many arguing "that we should follow the 
example of Europe by buying peace, or should 
hire a European navy to protect our trade; that 



io8 The American Navy 

a navy was a menace to liberty. . . ." Mad- 
ison opposed the bill, partly on the ground that 
a navy would lead to international complica- 
tions, particularly with England, and this opin- 
ion was shared by others. The opposition 
was chiefly from the South, the New England 
members, who represented a constituency which 
was suffering from the depredations, naturally 
favored the action. The bill provided for four 
ships to carry forty-four guns and two to carry 
thirty-six each, with full complements, pay, and 
rations, and ^688,888.82 was finally voted. The 
date of the approval of this bill, March 27, 1794, 
marks the establishment of the American navy. 
Joshua Humphreys of Philadelphia was the for- 
tunate selection as naval architect. His view 
was that these ships should be the most powerful 
of their class afloat, and this was finally sup- 
ported by General Knox, the Secretary of War, 
whose department was for some years to control 
the navy. 

But notwithstanding this action, we continued 
the negotiation of a treaty with Algiers, Thomas 
Humphreys being authorized July 19, 1794, to 
spend $800,000 (the cost of two ships-of-the- 
line) to effect it. Washington w^as at this time 
President, and Jefferson Secretary of State. The 



The American Navy 109 

treaty was concluded after much insulting con- 
duct on the part of the Dey, on September 5, 
1795, and only on the offer, as an additional pres- 
ent, of a 36-gun frigate. It was ratified by the 
Senate on March 6, 1796, and had "cost up to 
January, 1797, nearly a million dollars, includ- 
ing ^525,000 for ransom of the captives, various 
presents, and miscellaneous expenses; this was 
exclusive of the annuity in naval stores valued 
at something over $21,000, according to the es- 
timate, which afterward proved far too low."* 
Truly weakness came high. 

Notwithstanding the proviso of cessation of 
building in case a treaty should be made, Wash- 
ington's advice to continue the building of the 
ships was accepted by Congress, and in 1797 
there were launched the United States, the Con- 
stitution, and Constellation, all to become famous 
in our country's history. The last two are still 
afloat and their old age proudly cared for. 

In his annual message of December, 1796, 
Washington urged a naval force as indispen- 
sable, saying: "To secure respect to a neutral 
flag requires a naval force, organized and ready 
to vindicate it from insult or aggression. This 
may even prevent the necessity of going to war 

*Allen, 56. 



no The American Navy 

by discouraging belligerent powers from com- 
mitting such violations of the rights of the neu- 
tral party as may, first or last, leave no other 
option." 

The following, which illustrates the result of 
the meanness of spirit in Congress, is scarcely 
pleasant reading for an American to-day. Says 
the Portsmouth newspaper of January 20, 1798: 
"On Thursday morning, about sunrise, a gun 
was discharged from the Crescent frigate as a 
signal for getting under way, and at 10 a. m. 
she cleared the harbor with a fine leading breeze. 
Our best wishes follow Captain Newman, his 
officers and men. May they arrive in safety at 
the place of their destination and present to the 
Dey of Algiers one of the finest specimens of 
naval architecture which was ever borne upon 
Piscataqua's waters. 

" Blow all ye winds that fill the prosperous sail. 
And hush'd in peace be every adverse gale. 

"The Crescent is a present from the United 
States to the Dey as a compensation for delay 
in not fulfilling our treaty stipulations in proper 
time [!] . . . 

"The Crescent has many valuable presents on 
board for the Dey, and when she sailed was sup- 



The American Navy iii 

posed to be worth at least three hundred thou- 
sand dollars. Twenty-six barrels of dollars 
constituted a part of her cargo. It is worthy of 
remark that the captain, chief of the officers, and 
many of the privates of the Crescent frigate have 
been prisoners at Algiers."* 

There must be few Americans who do not 
blush for the want of public spirit which in this 
ship was so concretely exhibited. 

A treaty had been concluded with Tripoli in 
November, 1796, at a cost of nearly fifty-six 
thousand dollars, and one arranged with Tunis 
in August, 1797, at an estimated expense of one 
hundred and seven thousand dollars, but these 
estimates were much increased by our yielding 
to later demands. This treaty, finally concluded 
March 26, 1797, was ratified by our Senate on 
January 10, 1800. Its conclusion was due 
largely to the efforts of William Eaton, who had 
been appointed consul to Tunis in July, 1797. 
He held true views of the situation. "The 
United States set out wrongly and has pro- 
ceeded so. Too many concessions have been 
made to Algiers. There is but one language 
which can be held to these people and this is 
terror."- 

* Cooper, I, 240. 



112 The American Navy- 

Eaton, born in Connecticut in 1764, was a 
Revolutionary soldier at sixteen, a graduate 
later of Dartmouth College, and in 1792 a captain 
in the army. He was a most interesting char- 
acter whom it would have been well, on account 
of his bold and active spirit, to have put in entire 
control of our diplomatic affairs in Barbary. We 
shall hear of him later. 



CHAPTER X 

The depredations of the new French RepubHc 
had come to give an impetus to our new navy, 
and on April 27, 1798, ^950,000 was appro- 
priated for its increase, and a regular navy de- 
partment created. Benjamin Stoddart, of 
Georgetown, in the District of Columbia, was the 
first secretary. War against France was formally 
declared, in so far as authorizing, on July 9, 
1798, the capture of French ships, and authoriz- 
ing the President to issue commissions for priva- 
teers. On the same day a marine corps of 881 
of all ranks was established, to be commanded 
by a major. By July i6th the total force au- 
thorized then and previously was twelve frigates, 
twelve sloops of war from 20 to 24 guns, six 
smaller sloops, besides galleys and revenue cut- 
ters; a total of thirty. 

The first ship to get to sea under the new or- 
ganization was the Ganges, a purchased India- 
man, which sailed under command of Captain 
Richard Dale on May 22, 1798, on a coasting 

113 



114 The American Navy 

cruise with orders to capture all French cruisers 
on our coast with hostile intent. The Constella- 
tion, 38, Captain Truxton, and Delaware, 20, 
Captain Decatur, followed in June. The last 
made the first capture, a French privateer of 14 
guns and 70 men. She was condemned and 
bought into the navy under the name of Retalia- 
tion, with Lieutenant Bainbridge in command. 
The United States, 44, Captain Barry, went to 
sea early in July, followed by the Constitution, 
44, on the 20th, with four revenue brigs of from 
10 to 14 guns each. There were at sea in all, in 
1798, fifteen ships of the navy and eight revenue 
vessels, many of which latter were finally taken 
into the navy. It is worthy of note that one of 
these, the Pickering, was Preble's first command. 

All of these vessels except the George Washing- 
ton, Merrimack, and Ganges, the Montezuma, 
Baltimore, and Delazvare, and the Herald, Rich- 
mond, and Retaliation were built by the Govern- 
ment.* 

One of the first affairs of the new navy was 
a notable case of impressment of British seamen 
from the Baltimore, acting as convoy to a number 

*The following is the full list: United States, 44; the Constitution, 
44; Constellation, 38; George JVashington, 24; Portsmouth, 24; 
Merrimack, 24; Ganges, 24; Montezuma, 20; Baltijnore, 20; Dela- 
ware, 20; Herald, 18; Norfolk, 18; Pinck^iey, 18; Retaliation (cap- 
tured), 14; and eight revenue vessels of from 10 to 14 guns. 



The American Navy 115 

of merchantmen. Meeting a powerful British 
squadron off Havana, Captain PhilHps of the 
Baltimore was informed b}^ the British commo- 
dore of his intention to remove all British sea- 
men from his ship. Phillips announced his inten- 
tion of surrendering his ship rather than to 
submit to the outrage. Unfortunately there was 
a lawyer on board as passenger, and Phillips 
asked his judgment as to the legality of the Brit- 
ish commander's procedure. Had Phillips acted 
as he at first intended, viz. : to resist to the ut- 
most, short of an engagement which would have 
been folly against three line-of-battle ships, he 
would have done well, but his legal friend found 
reasons for yielding, which was done. Five men 
were taken, and three ships of the convoy seized, 
for what actual reason Cooper, who gives this 
case in great detail, does not say. Phillips was 
handicapped by his inexperience as a naval offi- 
cer, having been only just appointed into the 
navy from the merchant service. There were, 
too, dissentient opinions even among patriotic 
Americans of standing as to the justice of the 
British claims, many upholding the, then, Brit- 
ish doctrine of inalienable allegiance. Even so 
considerable a person as Gouverneur Morris, 
one of the ablest men America has produced and 



Ii6 The American Navy 

of large diplomatic and political experience, 
maintained the view. It was the first of many 
cases which had so large a part in bringing on the 
Warofi8i2. 

In November the Retaliation was captured by 
a French squadron, and Bainbridge was a pris- 
oner for the first, though not for the last, time in 
his career. By the good fortune of the release 
of his schooner as a cartel he was enabled to re- 
turn home. 

During 1799 we had twenty-eight vessels in 
active service. Most of the captains and many 
of the officers of lesser rank were men who had 
seen service during the Revolution, which, it 
must be remembered, had ended but sixteen years 
before; many of them of course were men with 
no experience of naval life, which differs from 
that of the merchant service much as does that 
of the raw militiaman from that of the seasoned 
soldier. 

There was a squadron often ships under Com- 
modore Barry, with his broad-pennant in the 
United States; a second of five under Captain 
Truxton in the Constellation; and a third of three 
under Captain Tingey. A number of French 
privateers were captured by each, but on Feb- 
ruary 8, 1799, the Constellation sighted near the 



The American Navy 117 

island of Nevis the French frigate VInsurgente, 
of forty i2-pounders and 409 men, which, after a 
hot action of an hour, surrendered. The Constel- 
lation carried 38 guns, those on her main deck 
being 24-pounders, and a crew of only 309. She 
was, however, distinctly superior in weight of 
gunfire. Among her midshipmen was David 
Porter of future fame, who was to be the father 
of an even more famous son. The Insurgente 
was carried into St. Kitts under very difficult 
circumstances by Lieutenant Rodgers, later one 
of the navy's worthies, and the progenitor of a 
famous family with now its sixth successive gen- 
eration in the naval service. 

It was now, in 1799, that Preble, promoted to 
be a captain and in command of the Essex, 32, 
carried the first American man-of-war east of 
the Cape of Good Hope. By the beginning of 
1800 France was disposed to peace, and on 
November 3d the United States sailed with the 
American envoys. 

The victory of the Constellation had warmed 
the American blood, and Congress in 1800 ap- 
propriated $2,482,593.90 for the naval service. 
This strictly naval war had now lasted a year 
and a half, and during 1800 we had thirty-five 
ships in the West Indies. Again the Constella- 



ii8 The American Navy 

tiofiy and under the same captain, was the lucky 
ship. On February i, 1800, she sighted ofFGua- 
daloupe a French frigate, La Vengeance^ of 52 
guns, which, deep with valuables which she was 
transporting to France, tried to avoid action. 
This, however, after a chase extending into the 
evening of the next day, was brought on, and 
lasted until i :oo a. m. of the 3d, when the French 
frigate hauled by the wind. In the endeavor to 
follow, the Constellation s mainmast, every shroud 
of which had been shot away, went by the board 
despite the efforts to repair damages, carrying 
with it midshipman Jarvis and the topmen aloft, 
all but one of whom were lost. The Constellation 
had fourteen men killed and twenty-five wounded, 
eleven of whom died later of their wounds. Her 
quarry got into Curafao dismasted and in a 
sinking condition with fifty killed and one hun- 
dred and ten wounded. The engagement had 
lasted five hours within pistol shot. 

These brilliant actions not only brought 
Truxton a gold medal from Congress and a great 
name, but greatly increased the popularity of 
the navy, service in which was now sought by 
the best young manhood of the country. 

There were many other successes in this year 
which included the capture of nearly fifty pri- 



The American Navy 119 

vateers, for the detail of which there is no space; 
but one of these actions, the cutting out of a 
French privateer, the Sandwich, in Puerto Plata, 
Santo Domingo, is notable as being brilHantly 
carried out by Isaac Hull, the first lieutenant of 
the Constitution, and who, as captain of the same 
ship twelve years later, was to capture the 
Guerriere. 

The only other capture of special note was 
that of the French cruiser Le Berceau, "a sin- 
gularly fine vessel of her class," by the Boston, 
on October 12, 1800, which was returned to 
France under the treaty of peace which had al- 
ready been signed on September 30th. 

The year involved some sea losses. The In- 
surgents, which had been taken into the service, 
sailed in July and was never again heard of; the 
Pickering sailed in August to a like fate. 



CHAPTER XI 

The ending of the war with France was but to 
find, shortly, another on our hands, for which 
the former, however, was an admirable prepara- 
tion at a minimum cost; for it had caused pro- 
vision of the absolute essentials to meet the new 
emergency: ships, officers, and men. The les- 
son to be learned was, however, largely to be 
disregarded by those now to come into political 
power. 

Fenimore Cooper began the seventeenth chap- 
ter of his classic history of the navy by some 
words of political wisdom which are applicable 
to this day, and apparently always will be: 
"Every form of government," he says, "has 
evils peculiar to itself. In a democracy there 
exists a standing necessity for reducing every- 
thing to the average comprehension, the high 
intelligence of a nation usually conceding as 
much to its ignorance as it imparts. One of the 
worst consequences in a practical sense, of this 
compromise of knowledge, is to be found in the 

120 



The American Navy 121 

want of establishments that require foresight 
and Uberahty to be well managed, for the his- 
tory of every democracy has shown that it has 
been deficient in the wisdom which is dependent 
on those expenditures that foster true economy, 
by anticipating evils and avoiding the waste of 
precipitation, want of system, and a want of 
knowledge." In every epoch of difficulty — the 
French spoHations, the British impressments, 
the War of 181 2, the Mexican War, our Civil 
War, and the Spanish War — this truth has been 
painfully apparent in the want of foresight and 
preparation of an adequate army and navy. It 
has cost us dear. 

In 1 801 came into power a new political school 
of which Jefferson was the great exponent. With 
strong French sympathies, he had not favored 
the naval war with France, and his party was 
bent upon naval economy. Thus an early act 
of his administration, which began March 4, 
1 801, was to carry into effect a law passed 
toward the close of the Congress which had just 
expired, it is true, but which had been elected 
under the new political inspiration. The law 
referred to empowered the President to sell all 
or any of the vessels of the navy with the ex- 
ception of thirteen frigates, and obliged him to 



122 The American Navy 

reduce the hst of officers to nine captains, thirty- 
six heutenants, and one hundred and fifty mid- 
shipmen. The selHng of twenty of the smaller 
ships was not so great an evil in itself, as new 
ordnance was coming into use and small guns 
of light calibre, carrying balls from six to nine 
and twelve pounds, were being superseded by 
carronades' — short guns with thin walls and very 
small charges. They were of two calibres, 32 
and 24 pounders. The former with a powder 
charge of two pounds had a range of about 300 
yards. It is evident that at long range the 
long gun with a much heavier charge had a 
great advantage. The carronade was only fit 
for close quarters. This change required ves- 
sels of much stouter build than the light sloops- 
of-war such as most of those sold were. But the 
mistake was that they were not replaced. The 
law of 1798 had authorized the building of six 
ships-of-the-line to carry 74 guns each. This 
was now unhappily suspended; an error bitterly 
to be repented. 

It was a period of utmost world unrest when 
we were to be ground between the upper and 
nether millstones of Napoleonic authority and 
British arrogance. Depredations upon our 
commerce were constant, not only by Barbary 



The American Navy 123 

corsairs but by highly civilized France and 
England which latter also for years impressed 
our seamen at will. It was a period when true 
statesmanship demanded a powerful naval 
force; when but a mere fraction of the losses by 
seizure of our merchant marine and of the cost 
of the War of 18 12 would have built a fleet of 
ships-of-the-line and would have saved us both 
the spoliation and the war. But Jefferson, 
though he had taken the finer stand as to the 
Barbary outrages, seemed incapable of under- 
standing that his views as to these were of uni- 
versal apphcation, and that they held good 
against Britain and France as well as against 
Algiers and Tripoli. He seemed obsessed with 
an enmity to any naval force. He expressed 
the view that a navy was "a ruinous folly."* 
And in his annual message of December 15, 
1802, advised "to add to our navy yard at 
Washington a dock within which our vessels 
may be laid up dry and under cover from the 
sun." Perhaps no more extraordinary views 
as to national defence ever came from any one 
with a claim to be a statesman. 

Jefferson's election had only just been pre- 
ceded by one of the most extraordinary inci- 

*Letter to Paine, September 6, 1807, "Writings," IX, 136. 



124 The American Navy 

dents of our naval history: the impressment in 
1800 of the frigate George Washington by the 
Dey of Algiers to carry a shipload of tribute to 
the Sultan of Turkey. This ship, commanded 
by Captain William Bainbridge, one of the most 
capable officers of our service, had been sent 
with our own tribute to Algiers, where he ar- 
rived September, 1800. The Dey had got into 
disfavor by making peace with France while 
Turkey was at war with that country on account 
of the occupancy of Egypt by Bonaparte. 
Hence the desire of the Dey for restoration to 
favor. He threatened instant war against the 
United States in case of Bainbridge's refusal. 
The George Washington lay under the guns of 
the port and escape was extremely doubtful; 
there was the strong probability of the seizure 
of the ship, the slavery of the officers and crew, 
and the consequent subjection of our large com- 
merce in the Mediterranean to destruction. 
Bainbridge, gallant man as he was, esteemed it 
his duty to sacrifice, possibly, his good name and 
comply. Our consul advised his so doing and 
he finally yielded, though in bitterness of spirit, 
aggravated by the attitude of the Dey, who 
said: "You pay me tribute by which you be- 
come my slaves. I have therefore a right to 



The American Navy 125 

order you as I please." The situation was but 
the outcome of years of compHance with such a 
system. 

Bainbridge sailed on October 19, 1800, for 
Constantinople with a mixed cargo: an ambas- 
sador and suite of a hundred, a hundred negro 
women and children, four horses, a hundred and 
fifty sheep, twenty-five cattle, four lions, four 
tigers, four antelopes, twelve parrots, and 
funds and specie and presents amounting to 
nearly a million dollars; all this in a small ship 
with accommodations for a crew of 131. An 
element of humor in the situation was the 
necessity of laying the ship's head to point 
to Mecca at the frequent times of prayer, 
one being stationed at the compass to insure 
correctness of direction. The fact that the ship 
was named George Washington added to the in- 
congruity of the situation. Death had saved 
Washington himself from the pain of knowledge. 
The cruise, however, had one benefit, in making 
known our flag and country to the Turks. Dur- 
ing his stay in Constantinople, Bainbridge's 
personal qualities and the excellent order of his 
ship made a deep impression and were of lasting 
benefit to his country. 

Throughout the year 1800 the attitude of the 



126 The American Navy 

Dey of Tripoli had become steadily more 
threatening, and by February, 1801, he was 
demanding a new treaty with a payment of 
$250,000 and an annual tribute of $20,000. On 
May 10, 1801, he declared war, and about June 
1st Captain Richard Dale (Paul Jones's first 
lieutenant in the Bonhomme Richard) sailed 
from Hampton Roads with three frigates : the 
President^ Philadelphia^ and Essex, and the 
schooner Enterprise, to protect our commerce 
by blockade of Tripoli and Tunis if necessary. 
A humiliating element of the situation was the 
carrying of $30,000 which it was hoped the Dey 
of Tripoli would accept as a compensation for 
the annuity of naval stores. 

Dale's arrival off TripoH caused much dis- 
turbance in the mind of the Dey, but nothing 
occurred until on August ist, when the Enter- 
prise captured a Tripolitan vessel of 14 guns and 
80 men, after an action of three hours, which 
was returned to Tripoli an empty hulk. Dale's 
orders not allowing him to take prizes, but to 
sink, burn, or destroy. This curious phase of 
things arose from the extraordinary views of 
President Jefferson as to his constitutional 
powers. War, as he saw things, could not 
exist except by declaration of Congress, how- 



The American Navy 127 

ever active the enemy in seizing American 
ships and making slaves of American citizens 
and seamen. The situation was remedied by 
Congress on February 6, 1802, which gave the 
President full powers to act, and was practically 
a declaration of war. 

Dale had orders to sail for home in October if 
things should become peaceful, and was to leave 
the Mediterranean in any case by December 
1st. For this there were two reasons: it was 
deemed unsafe to cruise in the Mediterranean 
in winter, and the crews were enHsted for but 
one year. Meanwhile, however, and despite 
the extraordinary views of the President, Dale 
carried out his semi-peaceful, semi-warlike 
orders, so far as to blockade Tripoli and capture 
ingoing vessels. In one of these were twenty 
TripoHtan soldiers and an officer, who were 
exchanged for three American prisoners. Dale 
completed his orders so far as to return in 
December with two ships only, leaving the 
Philadelphia and Essex; the first to watch Trip- 
oli from Syracuse as a base, the second to 
observe two TripoHtan vessels blockaded at 
Gibraltar. 

A new squadron was now formed with crews 
enlisted for two years. Commodore Morris 



128 The American Navy 

was ordered to the command with his broad- 
pennant in the Chesapeake of such later ill- 
fortune. The other ships were the Constellation, 
New York, John Adams, Adams, and Enterprise. 
It is not often that a family finds itself so 
honored as was the Adams family in this in- 
stance, with two ships of the name in the same 
squadron. Isaac Chauncey commanded the 
Chesapeake, John Rodgers the John Adams, 
Isaac Hull was first lieutenant of the New York, 
and OHver Hazard Perry was a midshipman in 
the Adams. All of these were to rise to high 
distinction. 

The ships of the new squadron sailed as they 
could be got ready, the Chesapeake on April 27, 
1802, the John Adams not until September 19th. 
There is no special need to follow the blockade 
of Tripoli by Morris's squadron: the many at- 
tacks upon the galleys, generally so close in 
shore as to make it difficult to absolutely destroy 
them; the rough experiences and dangers on 
such a coast from heavy weather. There were 
conspicuous cases of gallantry and of conduct 
which went far to form the character of the 
service yet in its infancy. Lieutenant David 
Porter particularly gave evidence of his coming 
fame. Morris, relieved temporarily by Com- 



The American Navy 129 

modore Rodgers, went home in October, 1803, 
to meet undeserved charges of want of vigor in 
his command, which ended in wrongful dis- 
missal from the service. 

By the middle of 1803 a new squadron was 
formed of the Constitution, Philadelphia, and 
of five brigs and schooners, the Argus, Siren, 
Nautilus, Vixen, and Enterprise. Edward Pre- 
ble was the commodore in command. 

It is a habit with some to call Paul Jones or 
John Barry the ''father of the navy" as race 
sentiment or particular inclination may rule, 
but neither has a claim of the sort. Jones never 
served in the newly established service or had 
anything to do with its organization. The 
ephemeral navy of the Revolution had entirely 
passed away; the navy of 1794 was not a 
reconstitution; it was a new birth, and with 
this Barry's connection was without special 
distinction. Jones was a Scot by birth; Barry 
was an Irishman. Both are in the first rank as 
naval officers, but neither did anything to form 
the new navy. This was the work of Edward 
Preble, American by long descent, tradition, and 
training. Born in Portland, Maine, August 
15, 1 76 1, he ran away when seventeen to go to 
sea in a privateer; he was shortly made a mid- 



130 The American Navy 

shipman in the Protector, the largest ship of 
the Massachusetts state navy; was in several 
actions, and when the Protector was captured 
became a prisoner in the prison ship Jersey, at 
New York. When released he was imme- 
diately again at sea, this time in the state 
privateer Winthrop, and was of the party which 
cut out an armed British brig from under the 
British fort in Penobscot Bay. When the 
United States navy came to life again he was 
commissioned one of the first five lieutenants. 
In 1799 he was promoted to captain and in 
command of the Essex convoyed fourteen val- 
uable merchantmen to China. His high temper 
and strict discipline were, in the early part of 
his Mediterranean service, to make him some- 
what unpopular, but his great qualities soon 
brought an admiration and regard which have 
come down as a cherished tradition of the ser- 
vice, as warm to-day as a hundred years since. 
It is to him should be given the credit of estab- 
lishing the character of the little navy which 
fought the War of 181 2, covering itself with 
fame, and bringing a new respect to our coun- 
try which owes his memory every honor, and 
continues to owe it in much greater measure 
than ever paid. 



The American Navy 131 

The Philadelphia was one of the first of the 
new squadron to arrive abroad. Her haste 
brought good fortune. Hearing at Gibraltar 
of TripoHtan vessels off Cape de Gatt, the 
southeastern corner of Spain, Captain Bain- 
bridge at once left, and, on the night of August 
26th, came in contact not with Tripolitans 
but with a Moorish ship, the Meshboha, of 
twenty-two guns with a crew of 120 men, and a 
captured brig from Boston, the Celia. We were 
not at war with Morocco, but the Moorish 
captain said that he had made the capture 
anticipating war. The Philadelphia secured 
her prizes at Gibraltar and went to her station 
off Tripoli. 

When the Constitution reached Gibraltar, 
Preble of course learned at once of the occur- 
rence mentioned, and with his flagship and 
three other vessels, one of which was the John 
Jdams, flying the broad-pennant of Commodore 
Rodgers, who, though the senior officer, cheer- 
fully gave his services to the new commander- 
in-chief, went to Tangier and demanded satis- 
faction. The result was the com.plete disavowal 
by Morocco of the hostile action. 



CHAPTER XII 

We now come to the other and vastly more 
honorable phase of our relations with the Bar- 
bary powers and to a series of actions which 
form one of the most dramatic chapters of 
American naval history. The Philadelphia and 
schooner Vixen were the only two vessels 
blockading Tripoli. It was October, with much 
rough weather. Carried by the gales well to 
the eastward of Tripoli, the Philadelphia on 
October 31st was returning, with the wind now 
shifted into the east, to her station. Sighting 
a vessel inshore, she gave chase and pursued 
until the soundings decreased to a danger 
point and the ship was hauled off shore. The 
coast was practically uncharted. The depth 
increased and then again suddenly decreased 
and the ship drove on to a reef which was one 
of several to the eastward of the port, and be- 
tween which, as m most coral formations, was 
deep water. The chase, knowing well the 
water, reached the harbor in safety. The firing 
132 



The American Navy 133 

had brought out nine gunboats and no time 
was to be lost if the ship were to be saved. She 
had driven up the smooth eastern slope of the 
reef her entire length. Guns were thrown 
overboard, a few only being reserved for de- 
fence, anchors cut from the bows, the foremast 
cut away, and every means taken to lighten the 
ship without avail. The hostile gunboats took 
positions from which they could safely fire; 
night was at hand; the Vixe7i was unfortunately 
absent in search of a Tripolitan cruiser, and the 
situation became such that it was imperative to 
surrender to save the lives of the ship's com- 
pany. The magazine was "drowned," holes 
bored in the ship's bottom, and all done which 
it was thought would insure the loss of the 
ship. The colors were then lowered. The 
Tripolitan crews acted in their usual manner, 
stripping the men of their clothing and seizing 
everything valuable, snatching even from Bain- 
bridge his epaulets, gloves, watch, and money 
when in the boat of his captors. It was ten at 
night when the 307 prisoners were landed at 
the town. The officers were very civilly re- 
ceived in state by the Pacha, given supper, and 
at one o'clock of the morning taken to the 
former American consulate, a house good 



134 The American Navy 

enough in itself but almost destitute of furni- 
ture and other comforts. But for the kindness 
then shown by Mr. Nicholas C. Nissen, the 
Danish consul, then as ever an unswerving 
friend of American prisoners, their condition 
would have been greatly more trying. His 
name should be held in grateful remembrance. 
He did indeed receive the thanks of Congress 
and had the lasting gratitude of the officers of 
the Philadelphia, who, after their release, pre- 
sented him in grateful recognition of his kind- 
ness with a handsome testimonial of silver. 

The men were confined in a warehouse much 
too small but were later transferred to a larger. 
They were set to various kinds of work, even 
to the building, as mentioned, of a fort which 
came to be known as the American fort and 
received much maltreatment, particularly after 
the burning of the Philadelphia in the harbor, 
which soon came to pass. 

The ship had been floated largely through 
the influence of a northerly gale which had 
raised the water-level on the coast and had on 
November 5th been brought into the harbor. 
Her guns and anchors were weighed, the former 
mounted, and work begun to put the ship in 
order. It is seldom that the soul of man is 



The American Navy 135 

more sorely tried than was that of her gallant 
captain when he became conscious of this suc- 
cess of the enemy. 

It was not until November 27th that Preble 
on his arrival at Malta received news con- 
firming rumors of the Philadelphia s loss in 
letters from Bainbridge. In one of December 
5, 1803, Bainbridge had suggested the de- 
struction of the Philadelphia, an idea which 
naturally had already occurred to Preble. On 
December 17th the latter sailed for Tripoli, 
taking with him the Enterprise, commanded 
by Decatur, who captured on the way a ketch (or 
topsail schooner) named the Mastico, with a 
crew of seventy. It was this captured vessel, 
renamed the Intrepid, which was finally used 
in the coming adventure and has thus come 
down through more than a century in the list 
of famous ships. 

There was no trouble in finding officers or 
men for the duty, but the whole was finally 
turned over to the commander of the Enterprise 
to arrange, and her crew only was to be em- 
ployed except that five midshipmen of the 
Constitution were detailed to assist. Sixty-two 
men of the Enterprise were taken. The offi- 
cers were Decatur, commanding; Lieutenants 



136 The American Navy 

Lawrence, Bainbridge, and Thorn, and Mid- 
shipman Macdonough, all of the Enterprise; 
Midshipmen Izard, Morris, Laws, Davis, and 
Rowe of the Constitution , and Salvador Catalano 
as pilot. Nearly two months from the incep- 
tion had been spent in maturing the plans, and 
on the evening of February 3d the Intrepid 
and Siren sailed together from Syracuse and 
were off Tripoli on the 7th. A gale of wind 
drove them to sea, and it was not until the i6th 
that they were again off Tripoli. At dark the 
Intrepid was two miles from the entrance, and 
here Midshipman T. O. Anderson, with a boat 
and nine men from the Siren (which was dis- 
guised as a merchantman), was taken on board. 
This made a total of eighty-four in the Intrepid. 
A careful division of duties had been made. 
Decatur, two midshipmen, and fifteen men were 
to hold the spar (or upper) deck; the others 
were to look after the lower decks except a mid- 
shipman and his boat's crew who were to secure 
the Philadelphia s boats and prevent the escape 
ashore of the Tripolitan crew. The watchword 
was "Philadelphia." 

The captured ship had her main and mizzen 
topmasts housed (partially lowered), the fore- 
mast which had been cut away was not yet 



The American Navy 137 

replaced; the sails were unbent and her lower 
yards lying across the bulwarks. Her forty 
guns were all loaded. She was lying in front of 
the castle well inshore. 

The night was almost calm with a smooth 
sea and a young moon, and the Intrepid crept 
slowly in, apparently exciting no distrust. The 
main part of her crew was kept concealed, only 
some ten or twelve being visible. She was 
steered straight for the Philadelphia s bow. 

When still some distance off, a hail from the 
Philadelphia was answered by the pilot, who 
stated the vessel to be from Malta, and that her 
anchors having been lost in a gale, permission 
was asked to make fast to the ship. A sudden 
shift of wind brought the Intrepid under the 
frigate's broadside and she drifted slowly 
astern, exposed to the Philadelphia' s port 
broadside at a distance of about forty yards. 
So completely were the Tripolitans deceived 
that they lowered a boat and sent a line. Some 
of the Intrepid's men had meanwhile got into 
her boat and taken one to the frigate's fore 
chains (supports to the shrouds). They then 
took the line from the frigate's boat which had 
been run from the after part of the ship and 
made it fast aboard the Intrepid. Both lines 



138 The American Navy 

were hauled upon by the men lying down con- 
cealed on her deck. On getting near the 
Philadelphia the Intrepid's anchors were dis- 
covered. On this, the Tripolitans prepared to 
cut the fasts, passing the cry of "Americanos." 
A strong pull brought the Intrepid alongside, 
"where she was secured quick as thought." 

The ship was immediately boarded. The 
Tripolitans crowded over to the starboard side 
and forward, offering practically no resistance, 
and large numbers jumped overboard. There 
was some struggle below, "but in less than ten 
minutes Decatur was on the quarter-deck in 
undisturbed possession of his prize." 

The orders to destroy the ship and not at- 
tempt to get her away, which in the circum- 
stances of not a sail bent or a yard aloft would 
have been almost impossible, were imperative. 
The arrangements for firing her were so com- 
plete that the combustibles prepared were 
alight in a few minutes, and in some twenty- 
five minutes from boarding the Americans were 
hastening out of the ship to escape the flames. 
Their movements were none too quick to escape; 
the fasts were cut and the Intrepid shoved clear 
only just in time herself to escape burning. 
The sixteen sweeps were manned, and, aided 



The American Navy 139 

by a light breeze, the Httle vessel with her brave 
crew intact swept out of the harbor under the 
fire of the batteries and the thunder of the 
Philadelphia s own guns as they heated and 
discharged themselves, one broadside toward 
the town, the other toward the Enghsh fort. 
The only shot striking the Intrepid was one 
passing through her topgallantsail. She was 
met outside the harbor by the Siren s boats. 
The Siren s commander had seen the rocket- 
signal, agreed upon, from the Philadelphia^ 
and in the calm had used his sweeps to close in 
and protect the Intrepid should she be attacked. 
Before the signal could be answered the flames 
were running aloft in the Philadelphia. "Pres- 
ently a boat was seen coming alongside and a 
man in a sailor's jacket sprang over the gangway 
of the brig. It was Decatur to announce his 
victory!"* On the 19th both vessels were again 
at Syracuse. This brilliant exploit made De- 
catur a captain at the age of twenty-five and 
promoted most of those who accompanied him. 
It remains as one of the most gallant and suc- 
cessful adventures of the sea, remarkable par- 
ticularly for the coolness of its procedure and 
calm courage of execution. It was worthy of 

*Condensed from Cooper chiefly and from Allen. 



140 The American Navy 

all the praise given it at the time and which has 
continued undimmed. 



The loss of the Philadelphia and Decatur's 
exploit gave an impetus to naval affairs, which 
struggled then, as ever since, under conditions 
of want of knowledge in our legislators and a 
poor system of administration. There was, 
for example, not a drydock in the whole coun- 
try. ** Facts," as Fenimore Cooper expresses 
it, "were still leading opinion, and the gallant 
men who were slowly fighting themselves into 
favor were merely performing an office that 
would seem inseparable from the advancement 
of every free people in civilization." 

Preble's whole force before Tripoli in July, 
1804, was the frigate Constitution, six small 
vessels of from 12 to 16 guns each, six gunboats, 
and two bomb-vessels; an excellent force for 
blockading and for attacking the Tripolitan 
gunboats, which hugged the shores, but not 
for bombarding the batteries in which were 
115 guns. 

From now on many brilliant actions between 
the smaller craft took place, in one of which was 
a famous incident of the general attack of 
August 4, 1804, when Decatur, having already 



The American Navy 141 

boarded and taken one gunboat, boarded 
another. The captain of the second was a 
large and powerful Turk who seized the pike 
with which Decatur attacked him and used it 
against the latter, who parried with his sword 
which broke at the hilt. The pike entered the 
fleshy part of Decatur's breast. Decatur suc- 
ceeded in tearing it out and grappled with the 
Turk. Both fell, the Turk uppermost. He 
felt for his poinard, but Decatur, grasping his 
arm with one hand, was able to take a small 
pistol from his waistcoat pocket and passing 
his arm around the Turk fired it into his back. 
The ball passed entirely through his foe and 
lodged in Decatur's clothes. While this was 
going on, another raised a sabre to cleave 
Decatur, but a young seaman, named Daniel 
Fraisher,* interposed his arm, which was nearly 
severed at the wrist. Lieutenant Trippe of 
Gunboat No. 6 had an equally desperate en- 
counter. His own and the enemy's gunboat 
separated with the shock, leaving only nine 
Americans aboard the TripoUtan. Trippe was 
attacked by a powerful young Turk, who in- 
flicted eight sabre wounds in the head and two 
in the breast. Trippe was brought to his knees, 

*See Allen, " Barbary Corsairs," 192, 



142 The American Navy 

but he was able to give his adversary a final 
thrust with his short pike, which ended the 
struggle. When the captain thus fell, the 
others surrendered. The desperate nature of 
the struggle undertaken by the six gunboats 
in the action may be understood when it is 
known that the two boats captured by Decatur 
carried about eighty men; of these fifty-two were 
known to be killed and wounded, many jumped 
overboard, and only eight unwounded prisoners 
were taken. Stephen Decatur's brother James 
had command of Gunboat No. 2. In boarding, 
he was shot through the forehead and died that 
evening. 

The details of the many sanguinary ac- 
tions during Preble's blockade cannot be given. 
Three captured gunboats, numbered 7, 8, and 9, 
were changed in rig and added to the fleet. On 
August 7th No. 7 blew up in action and of her 
crew of twenty-eight, ten, including Lieutenant 
Caldwell, her commander, and Midshipman 
Dorsey, were killed, and six wounded. 

The arrival of the John Adams on August 8th 
brought the unwelcome word to Preble of the 
coming of a new and more powerful force under 
Commodore Samuel Barron, his senior. This, as it 
was arranged, was an unfortunate necessity, as a 



The American Navy 143 

new squadron could not be organized without 
putting in command some of Preble's seniors, 
and it was deplored by the Secretary of the Navy 
in a letter to Preble. It is not, however, readily 
seen why the crews with Preble, the times of 
which had expired, could not have been replaced 
by new crews, and only the two captains junior 
to him sent. It was an act which showed feeble 
unaccustomedness to administration. Preble 
wrote in his private journal: "How much my 
feelings are lacerated by this supersedure at the 
moment of victory cannot be described and can 
be felt only by an officer placed in my mortify- 
ing situation." He kept up his attacks, how- 
ever, while awaiting his relief, and on the night 
of August 24th, after being much delayed by 
heavy weather, a night attack was made by 
bombardment with little reply. This was re- 
newed on the 28th; one Tripolitan gunboat was 
sunk, two ran ashore, and the rest retreated. 
The town was subjected to a heavy bombard- 
ment during which a 24-pound shot entered the 
quarters of the captive Americans, covering 
Bainbridge in the debris. 

On September 3d came Preble's fifth and last 
attack by bombardment. The next evening 
the Intrepid was sent in with the intent of blow- 



144 The American Navy 

ing her up in the midst of the Tripolitan fleet. 
A compartment was built in which was placed 
15,000 pounds of powder connected with a slow 
match expected to take fifteen minutes in burn- 
ing. Over the powder was placed one hundred 
13-inch and fifty 9-inch shells, with a quantity 
of solid shot and pig-iron ballast. She was com- 
manded by Commander Richard Somers, who 
volunteered for the work and took with him, as 
the only other officer, Lieutenant Wadsworth 
of the Constitution. Ten men were taken. At 
the last moment, before parting company with 
the three vessels which accompanied the Intrepid 
to a point near the entrance and stood by to re- 
ceive the boats when they should return, Lieu- 
tenant Joseph Israel of the Constitution went 
aboard the Intrepid to carry a message from the 
commodore and begged so to stay that Somers 
allowed him to do so. 

The night was dark and the Intrepid was soon 
lost in the gloom, when at 9:47, as marked in 
the log of the Constitution^ there was a terrific 
explosion, followed by cries of terror and beating 
of drums in the town and then silence. The 
boats which were to return never came. The 
bodies of the three officers and ten men were 
from time to time recovered by the Tripolitans, 



The American Navy 145 

but the explosion, which evidently occurred be- 
fore intended, has ever remained a mystery. 

Among the six names which appear on the 
monument now at the Naval Academy, erected 
by their brother officers to those killed at Trip- 
oli, are those of the three then lost, the three 
other names being Caldwell, James Decatur, 
and Dorsey. The total loss in Preble's squadron 
in these eleven months at Tripoli was thirty-two 
killed and twenty-two wounded. 



CHAPTER XIII 

Preble left for home without having come to 
terms with the Pacha of TripoH. He was not 
willing to rise above ^500 for each of the cap- 
tives, and would offer nothing for peace or for 
tribute. Had he remained, it is very possible 
that he would have forced a peace without a 
ransom. Peace, however, was to come under 
his successor largely through one of the extraor- 
dinary adventures of our history. 

Yusuf Karamanli, the Pacha of Tripoli, was 
the youngest of three brothers. In 1790 at the 
age of twenty he murdered the eldest, and when 
his father died in 1796, and the second brother, 
Hamet, was absent, he proclaimed himself Pa- 
cha. Hamet, rather a weakling, took refuge in 
Tunis, leaving his family at Tripoli. He had 
taken up arms against his brother, using Derne, 
some 500 miles east of Tripoli, as a base, but he 
was unsuccessful, and in 1804 fled to Egypt. 
The government in Washington, influenced 
largely by ex-Consul Eaton, had decided to use 

146 



The American Navy 147 

Hamet as an asset in the war against Yusuf, and 
thus placed at the disposition of the commodore 
a moderate amount of money and military sup- 
plies. Eaton was appointed a navy agent under 
Commodore Barron, with a recommendation 
from the Secretary of the Navy to use him in 
connection with an effort to establish Hamet at 
Tripoli in place of his brother Yusuf, It was a 
scheme in full accord with Eaton's adventurous 
spirit and worthy his real ability. 

The Argus, Captain Hull, thus left Malta in 
September, 1804, for Alexandria, nominally to 
convoy thence any vessels desiring protection, 
but really to carry Eaton to find Hamet and 
convey him to whatever should be decided as 
the most convenient point from which to act 
against TripoH. Hamet was up the Nile. Ea- 
ton explained frankly his intentions to the Vice- 
roy and passports were obtained for himself and 
Hamet out of Egypt. Hamet was finally reached, 
but such obstacles to leaving by sea were raised 
through the influence of the French consul that 
it was decided to go by land, it being feared that 
the few Arabs whom Hamet had raised might 
otherwise disappear. The Argus sailed for Malta 
with a letter from Eaton to the commodore re- 
questing "that the expedition be met at Bomba 



148 The American Navy 

Bay sixty miles east of Derne, with two more 
small vessels, a bomb-ketch, two field pieces, a 
hundred muskets, a hundred marines, and ten 
thousand dollars. A convention was made with 
Hamet, the United States promising to do all 
that was proper and right to reinstate him, re- 
imbursement of expenses to come from tribute 
paid by other nations. Eaton was to be recog- 
nized as commander-in-chief of the land forces 
operating against the usurping brother. 

The army was a motley array of some four 
hundred, though Eaton says many thousands 
could have been had had there been money and 
subsistence. There were besides Eaton nine 
Americans: Lieutenant O'Bannon, Midshipman 
Peck, and seven marines; an English volunteer; 
forty Greeks; some Arab horsemen, etc., and a 
caravan of 107 camels and a few asses. These 
began on March 8th a march across 500 and 
more miles to Derne. Bomba was reached after 
immense difficulties on April 15th. Signal-fires 
were built on a high hill which were sighted by 
the Argus. She brought a cheering letter from 
the commodore announcing aid. Two days later 
the Hornet arrived with an abundance of provi- 
sions, and on the 23 d, after a rest of a week, the 
march of sixty miles to Derne was resumed. 



The American Navy 149 

This was made in two days. Derne was at- 
tacked on the 27th from land and from sea by 
the Hornet and Nautilus (which had also ar- 
rived). The town was occupied after a strong 
resistance and some loss. A Tripolitan force 
now appeared, and there were unsuccessful ef- 
forts to dislodge Eaton's forces. After May 
1 8th the attacks ceased. Dispatches were sent 
to the commodore, and only the Argus remained 
at Derne. On May 19th there came dispatches 
from the commodore announcing peace negotia- 
tions, and on June nth came the Constellation 
announcing peace and with orders to evacuate 
Derne. There was nothing for the Ameri- 
cans to do but to embark, taking with them 
Hamet and his suite, twenty-five foreign can- 
noniers with their artillery, and the small party 
of Greeks. It was a pitiful abandonment of 
men who were our allies, brought about through 
the influence of Consul-General Lear, who, as 
previously mentioned, had been invested with 
full authority to negotiate a peace. 

Lear had spent the winter of 1 804-1 805 with 
Commodore Barron at Malta, over whom he ac- 
quired, in Barron's weakened condition of mind 
and health, a great influence. He was strongly 
opposed to Eaton's expedition, and was the main 



150 The American Navy 

factor in causing it to collapse; the aim of the 
expedition, which was the capture of Tripoli and 
dethronement of the Pacha, was not in accord 
with his views. On May 26th Lear arrived off 
Tripoli from Malta in the Essex, which delivered 
to Captain Rodgers of the Constitution a letter 
from Barron announcing the necessity of the 
relinquishment by the latter of the command. 
Lear had already been informed by a letter 
written by the Danish consul at Tripoli of the 
probability of the Pacha's willingness to treat, 
and at once on his arrival began negotiations. 
The preliminaries, after parleys of more than a 
week, were signed on June 3d. Prisoners were to 
be exchanged, the United States paying a bal- 
ance of $60,000. A year was allowed to settle 
disputes before action; prisoners were no longer 
to be enslaved, and were at the conclusion of 
peace to be restored without ransom. No trib- 
ute was to be paid in future. Hamet was to be 
"persuaded" to withdraw from Derne, and his 
family was to be restored to him. There was, 
however, a secret article which allowed the Pa- 
cha four years in which to make this restoration. 
The unwisdom of placing the negotiations 
wholly in the hands of Lear had resulted in an 
unsatisfactory peace, and attacks ensued which 



The American Navy 151 

must have caused him much bitterness; for 
General Eaton, as he was now called, pursued 
him violently in the press and before Congress 
to the end, in 181 1, of Eaton's life. Lear was 
strongly criticised in Congress itself, Senator 
Timothy Pickering declaring his conduct inex- 
cusable. Madison's instructions as Secretary of 
State anticipated that peace would be made 
"without any price or pecuniary compensation 
whatever"; and so undoubtedly it would have 
been had negotiations been put in the hands of 
the commodore of the now powerful force before 
Tripoli. Nor would Eaton's wonderful action 
have gone for nought, nor would Hamet, whom 
we had made our ally, been thrown overboard 
with so Httle consideration. Commodore Rod- 
gers allowed him two hundred dollars monthly 
to support himself and some fifteen dependents 
at Syracuse (the winter headquarters of the 
fleet) until twenty-four hundred dollars was 
voted him by Congress in 1806. His family, 
through pressure of our consul, was restored to 
him in October, 1807, and though his brother 
gave him residence in Morocco and a pension, 
and later the governorship of Derne, he had, two 
years later, to flee with his family to Egypt, 
where he died. 



152 The American Navy 

Eaton was received on his return with honor. 
Massachusetts granted him ten thousand acres 
in Maine (then a part of Massachusetts) and 
Congress met his disbursements. The expedi- 
tion to Derne had cost forty thousand dollars 
but Eaton declined everything for himself but 
his personal expenses. He died in 181 1 at the 
age of fifty-seven, ending, too early, a life of pic- 
turesque adventure, patriotic effort, and un- 
daunted courage. He is worthy of memory. 

Commodore Rodgers now turned his atten- 
tion to Tunis, where threatening conditions had 
arisen from the capture of two Tunis vessels 
which had attempted to run the blockade of 
Tripoli. He appeared on August 1st with nearly 
his whole force. A fortnight later, on an appear- 
ance of delay, Rodgers informed Lear officially 
that the Dey "must do one of three things by 
simple request or must do all three by force. He 
must give [a guarantee for the maintenance of 
peace to be witnessed by the English and French 
consuls], or he must give sufficient security for 
peace and send a minister to the United States, 
or he must make such alterations in the [exist- 
ing] treaty as you may require and as may satisfy 
you that there is confidence to be placed in what 



The American Navy 153 

he does. I have only to repeat that if he does 
not do all that is necessary and proper, at the 
risk of my conduct being disapproved by my 
country, he shall feel the vengeance of the 
squadron now in this bay." 

Rodgers now in a letter to the Secretary of 
the Navy of August 21, 1805, laid down the 
honorable dictum which has ever been a rule of 
conduct with the navy that: "Peace on honor- 
able terms is always preferable to war." If 
chastisement were to be inflicted he begged the 
honor of being the instrument, pledging that if 
he should be instructed by March, 1806, that 
he would obtain an honorable peace before Sep- 
tember, making the Dey to pay all the expenses 
of the war, and that, too, without any increase of 
force. The Dey had, however, already ac- 
cepted the proposal of sending a minister to the 
United States, and had agreed to keep the 
peace until the result of the mission should be 
known. 

Our Barbary difficulties were, with occasional 
troubles of a moderate nature, ended for nearly 
ten years. We continued, under the treaty with 
Algiers, to send an annual tribute of marine 
stores to the value of twenty-one thousand dol- 
lars. This, however, was but a remnant of our 



154 The American Navy 

early weakness and an honorable carrying out 
of a treaty. The spectacle of the treatment of 
our commerce by France and England roused 
the envy of the Dey of Algiers, and finally the 
War of 1812 overcame any good resolutions the 
then Dey had, and spoliation began anew. Thus, 
immediately after the peace, a powerful fleet 
was sent into the Mediterranean under Decatur, 
followed by another under Bainbridge, whose 
flagship, the Independence^ 74, was the first 
American ship-of-the-line in foreign waters. 
Farragut, who had already seen three years of 
most stirring service and was then but fourteen, 
was a midshipman aboard. But before Bain- 
bridge had arrived Decatur had appeared before 
Algiers and "at the mouths of our cannon," as 
Decatur expressed in his dispatch to the Navy 
Department, dictated a peace which abolished 
tribute in any form forever, released all Ameri- 
cans, and forced compensation for, and restora- 
tion of, all American property seized or in the 
Dey's hands. This was within six weeks of the 
sailing of the fleet from home. Decatur then 
visited Tunis and Tripoli, and forced the instant 
payment at each place of indemnities for British 
prizes which, taken into port by an American 
privateer, had been seized later by the British. 



The American Navy 155 

Of course the British consul protested, but with- 
out avail. He also caused the release of two 
Danes in remembrance of the unceasing kind- 
ness to Americans, through many years, of the 
Danish consul, Nissen, and of a Sicilian family 
of eight, in consideration of aid given to Preble 
by the king of the two Sicilies. It was a fine 
instance of gratitude acknowledged. 

Thus, practically, ended our troubles with 
Barbary. "It was not to be endured," said the 
English naval historian, Brenton, "that England 
should tolerate what America had resented and 
punished," and thus after one abortive threat, 
when he paid heavy ransom for 1,200 Neapoli- 
tans and Sicilians, during the negotiations for 
which he was grossly insulted, and the British 
consul and his family treated "in a manner the 
most scandalous and insulting,"* Lord Ex- 
mouth was sent in August, 18 16, with a powerful 
fleet, which, combined with a Dutch force, bom- 
barded Algiers to subjection, and Christian 
slavery was at an end. The Dey shortly before 
this having shown signs of regretting having 
made the American treaty, another powerful 
American fleet appeared shortly after Lord Ex- 



"William Shaler (many years consul at Algiers), 133. 



156 The American Navy 

mouth's bombardment, which removed the in- 
tention of renewal of hostile acts. 

Thus ended, practically, the extraordinary 
career of piracy and slavery which through so 
many generations had been submitted to by 
Europe. It was not, however, until 1824, when 
the demand for continuance of tribute from 
Holland was successfully resisted, that Algiers 
finally dismissed the idea of return to her ancient 
ways. 

It should be a proud memory to Americans 
that it was the American navy which first re- 
sisted and brought to terms the barbarous cor- 
sairs, so long the scourge of commerce and en- 
slavers of white men. The Frenchman Dupuy, 
at the end of his admirable history of our Bar- 
bary wars, pays us a fine tribute, saying: "The 
statesmen [of America], breaking loose from the 
unworthy yielding of Europe to the Barbary 
States, had in hardly thirty years broken the 
abominable traditions which the Christian 
powers had shamefully respected for ages."* 

*E. Dupuy, "Americains et Barbaresques," Paris, R. Roger 
et F Cernoviz, 99 Boulevard Raspail, 1910. 



CHAPTER XIV 

While we were fighting the Algerines, we were 
suffering from depredations on our commerce by 
France and England a hundredfold more serious 
than all we had undergone from the African cor- 
sairs. The story is as shameful to the states- 
manship of the period as our stand with regard 
to Barbary was honorable. 

Napoleon dominated Europe by land; Eng- 
land by sea. The former's great aim after sub- 
jecting the Continental states, rotten with the 
decaying feudalism of the past centuries, was to 
destroy English supremacy by closing all Eu- 
rope to English commerce, an effort which was 
to fail through one of the greatest instincts of 
man, that of trade. Almost universal war thus 
made neutral America the great carrier; our 
shipping increased by amazing bounds and cov- 
ered every sea. But between the two great 
antagonists it was to be heavily ground. Our 
losses were in many millions, our ships for a con- 
siderable period being seized at an average of 

^S7 



158 The American Navy 

three a day. It would take a book much larger 
than this to go into the details of this question 
which looms so large even to this day. Added 
to the question of ships was that of impressment 
of our seamen who were taken out of our mer- 
chantmen, and in two cases from men-of-war, 
to man those of the British navy, on the claim 
that a British subject was always a subject. In 
carrying out this dictum, a vast number of 
Americans were claimed as such from mere ap- 
pearance or other characteristic or for no reason 
whatever except that he was a likely man. Over 
11,000 were to be so taken before, in 181 2, we 
went to war. 

Jefferson was President for the eight years 
beginning March 4, 1801. His residence as min- 
ister in France from 1785 to 1788 had given 
him as mentioned leanings which affected all 
his later views, despite the monstrous excesses 
of the French Revolution. He had very peculiar 
ideas of the ocean-carrying trade, mentioning it 
as: "this protuberant navigation which has kept 
us in hot water from the commencement of the 
government." He would "an' he could," have 
made of America a rural community, apparently 
not being able to comprehend that man is, by 
nature, a trader; that trade is the real civilizer 



The American Navy 159 

and missioner beyond all other endeavors com- 
bined. Linked with this was a willingness to 
submit the country to unparalleled insult and 
injury in the seizure of ships and impressment 
of our seamen without taking any efficient or 
reasonable steps to resist such outrages. The 
extent of our Government's submission is well 
shown by Captain Basil Hall in his most inter- 
esting reminiscences as a seaman. Describing 
his life as a midshipman in the Leander, in the 
middle years of Jefferson's administration, he 
says: "Every morning at daybreak during our 
stay off New York we set about arresting the 
progress of all vessels we saw, firing off guns to 
the right and left, to make every ship that was 
running in heave to, or wait until we had leisure 
to send a boat on board 'to see,' in our Hngo, 
'what she was made of.' I have frequently 
known a dozen, and sometimes a couple of dozen 
ships, lying to, a league or two off the port, 
losing their fair wind, their tide and, worse 
than all, their market, for many hours, some- 
times the whole day, before our search was com- 
pleted." 

A crowning outrage came in 1807 when the 
frigate Chesapeake flying the broad-pennant of 
Commodore Samuel Barron was leaving for the 



i6o The American Navy 

Mediterranean. She had been preparing for 
some time for sea, but finally was hurried off in 
a state wholly unfit to go suddenly into action 
with any vessel of moderate force, and certainly 
not with the much more powerful ship which 
was about to attack her. This ship, the Leopard^ 
of 54 guns, had been lying, along with several 
other British men-of-war, in Lynnhaven Bay, 
just within the Capes of the Chesapeake. They 
were watching for two French frigates then lying 
off Annapolis, This occupancy, for such a pur- 
pose, of our waters, was in itself an insulting 
abuse of our neutrality, though Jefferson could 
speak of it as "enjoying our hospitality." 

The Chesapeake passed out of the capes about 
noon on June 22, 1807. When about ten miles 
outside the Leopard hailed saying she had a dis- 
patch for Commodore Barron. This " dispatch " 
proved to be a copy of an order from the British 
admiral, Berkeley, to search the Chesapeake for 
deserters from certain British ships, the order to 
be first shown to her captain. On Barron's re- 
fusal to submit to such outrage the Chesapeake 
was fired into by the Leopard^ without, in the 
unprepared state of the ship, being able to re- 
turn a gun. Twenty-one men were killed and 
wounded, the ship searched and four of the crew, 



The American Navy i6i 

claimed as British deserters, were taken away. 
"Of these, one was hanged, one died, and the 
other two, after prolonged disputation, were re- 
turned five years later to the deck of the Chesa- 
peake in formal reparation." A deeper insult to 
a nation could scarcely have been offered. All 
the same, it ended only on the part of the admin- 
istration in what may be called a fit of sulks 
known as the embargo, which from December, 
1807, to March, 1809, took American commerce 
by the throat and forbade our merchant ships 
to go to sea. It was much as if a man should re- 
duce himself to bread and water as a revenge 
against an enemy. 

Jefferson, meanwhile, with the British prac- 
tically blockading our ports and taking men from 
vessels entering New York and other harbors, 
was seized with a passion for gunboats, and 
shortly after the Chesapeake incident, which 
cried aloud for ships-of-the-line instead of the 
two hundred petty toys he devised and caused 
to be built, and which could not go to sea without 
striking their one gun into the hold, we find him 
saying: "Beheving, myself, that gunboats are 
the only water defence which can be useful to us, 
and protect us from the ruinous folly of a navy, 
I am pleased with everything which promises to 



i62 The American Navy 

improve them."* It was a mind far better 
fitted to deal with the manipulations of a polit- 
ical party than with the care of a nation which 
he was not so very far from wrecking by an in- 
sensate policy of peace at any price. Peace, 
however, cannot be kept by one only of the in- 
terested parties declaring such a preference. 
One must be in a position to command peace, 
and this failure was Jefferson's great mistake, a 
mistake which from every point of view was to 
cost us dear. "Whether with or without a war, 
a navy would have saved us the six years of hu- 
miliation which were to intervene between 1806 
and 181 2; it would have saved the embargo 
which was to tie to the wharves in rotting idle- 
ness more than a million tons of shipping which 
had been engaged in foreign trade; to bring 
grass-grown streets to our greatest ports, and 
strain the sentiment of the several sections of 
the Union to the point of separation. It would 
have saved the War of 1812, the capture and 
burning of Washington, and the shameful inep- 
titude, with one brilliant exception, of our army 
commanders in that contest. . . . There 
would have been a cessation of British impress- 



*Jefferson, "Works," V, 189. 



The American Navy 163 

ment and there would have been no such orders 
in council as those directed to the destruction of 
American commerce; or had these come before 
America was ready with her navy there would 
have been quick renunciation."* 

Gallatin, Jefferson's Secretary of the Treasury, 
pressed to apply the surplus of two millions a 
year ("and," said he, "it is a very low calcula- 
tion"), which he considered would be lost in case 
of war, wholly "to the building of ships of the 
line."t Said Gouverneur Morris in the Senate 
(and it was the expression of one of the ablest 
minds of the country) : "When we have twenty 
ships-of-the-line at sea, and there is no good 
reason why we should not have them, we shall be 
respected by all Europe. . . . The expense 
compared with the benefit is moderate, nay, tri- 
fling. Whatever sums are necessary to secure 
the national independence must be paid. . . . 
If we will not pay to be defended, we must pay 
for being conquered. "f 

Instead of a fleet which would have com- 
manded respect, the United States had built in 
the years 1801-1811 "two sloops of 18 guns and 

*Chadwick, " Relations of U. S. and Spain," I (Diplomacy), io6. 
fGallatin to Jefferson, September 15, 1805, "Writings," I, 
241-254. 
lAnnals of Congress, 1802, 1803, 255. 



164 The American Navy- 

two brigs of 16, and out of twelve frigates had 
permitted three to rot at their moorings"; and 
this while 917 American ships had been seized 
by the British, many more than this number by 
the French, and our men taken from our vessels 
by the thousand and impressed into the British 
service. There is an official record of 6,257 of 
these, but it is known that the number ran to 
over 11,000. Such things, if we were to survive 
as a nation, could only bring war, whether Jef- 
ferson and Madison wished war or not. The in- 
stigators of such conditions had not long to wait 
to repent their folly. 

The affair of the Chesapeake had stirred the 
soul of the little navy, at least, to its depth. 
There were now, in 18 10, in commission, the 
President^ 44; Constitution^ 44; United States^ 44; 
Essex, 32; John Adams, 24; Wasp, 18; Hornet, 
18; Argus, 16; Siren, 16; Nautilus, 12; Enterprise, 
12, Vixen, 12. The whole list is given, as nearly 
all these were to make names for themselves. 
Attention, too, began to be turned to the lakes, 
for war was now foreseen by all naval officers 
and at least some of the administration. The 
British had a considerable force upon the Ameri- 
can coast, but they were now more chary of giv- 
ing offence. The danger was emphasized on May 



The American Navy 165 

16, 181 1, when the President, carrying Commo- 
dore Rodgers's broad-pennant, and at sea on ac- 
count of having heard of the impressment of a 
seaman near Sandy Hook, sighted a strange 
man-of-war which stood away. The Preside7it 
gave chase but did not come near until about 
8:30 in the evening when, on a hail from the 
President, the stranger fired a gun which struck 
the President's mainmast. The latter at once 
fired a broadside, and recognizing shortly that 
her antagonist was disabled ceased fire. The 
other began anew but was soon silenced. At 
daylight the President sent a boat and found that 
the ship was the British sloop-of-war, Little Belt, 
of 18 guns. She had suffered severely and thirty- 
one of her people had been killed and wounded. 
Offers of aid were given but declined, and the 
British cruiser stood for Halifax. 

Naturally the strong tension already existing 
was increased and matters moved rapidly. On 
June 18, 1 81 2, the United States declared war. 

At the moment of America's declaration of war 
against England Napoleon was on his way to 
Russia with an army destined never to return. 
Spain was being desolated by the struggle of the 
French and British in the peninsula; all the 
Spanish provinces in South America were in rev- 



i66 The American Navy 

olution. With the entry of the United States 
the whole western world was at war. 

Our population at this time, excluding negroes, 
was about 7,500,000; that of Great Britain was 
about 15,000,000. We had a navy of three large 
and one small frigate, one sloop-of-war, and seven 
smaller vessels, with 500 officers, of whom twelve 
were captains. There were 5,230 men in the en- 
listed force, of whom 2,436 were destined for the 
cruising ships, "the remainder being for service 
at the forts and navy yards, in the gunboats, and 
on the lakes." In the British navy were over a 
thousand ships. 

There can of course be no comparison between 
such forces; nor could there in the long run be 
any doubt as to the result, but the American 
navy was to achieve, in the unequal struggle, a 
series of victories which brought results psychi- 
cally the equal of victories of great fleets. It is 
not that we were continuously victorious, but 
in the main our success was so great and of a 
character to which the British navy and public 
were so unaccustomed that our victories were a 
staggering blow to Britain's self-sufficiency. It 
must be remembered that the French navy of 
Louis XVI's time had been, so far as officers and 
morale were concerned, swept out of existence 



The American Navy 167 

by the French Revolution. The French fleet of 
the Consular and Napoleonic period was now not 
only ill-ofiicered,but through the constant block- 
ades of the British had but little of the sea habit 
by which only a navy can be efficient. The 
Spanish navy had no real organization or other 
qualities of success under circumstances of even 
much worse neglect. The British ships, well offi- 
cered, well manned, and with constant sea prac- 
tice, had no real antagonists, for it is absurd to 
compare in efficiency such organizations as that 
which fought under Nelson at Trafalgar and 
those under Villeneuve and Gravina in the same 
battle. The American navy was to show a dif- 
ferent standard. 



CHAPTER XV 

There were three important and epoch-making 
events in the war: the victory of the Constitution 
over the Guerriere, the battle of Lake Erie, and 
the battle of Lake Champlain. Each of these 
was of such immense importance that they over- 
shadow all others, picturesque and striking as 
others were. 

The administration had at first only consid- 
ered the laying up of our ships, but the indig- 
nant protests of our naval officers caused 
another course. The first ships to get to sea 
were those at New York: the President, 44, Com- 
modore Rodgers; the Essex, 32, Captain David 
Porter; and the Hornet, 18, Master Commandant 
Lawrence. These were joined down the bay on 
June 2 1 St by the United States, 44, Commodore 
Decatur; and the Congress, 36, Lieutenant Com- 
mandant Sinclair from Norfolk. All except the 
Essex, which was overhauling her rigging, got to 
sea on the 21st, immediately after the reception 
of the declaration of war, and stood southeast to 
168 



The American Navy 169 

intercept a reported fleet of West Indiamen. On 
June 23d, however, a frigate, later known to be 
the Belvidera, was sighted and chased. On 
nearing her, Rodgers himself went forward to 
direct the firing, and at 4:30 he fired the 
starboard forecastle gun, the first shot of the 
war. The next gun was fired from the main 
deck by the officer of the division, and a third 
was fired by Rodgers. The three shots had all 
struck the chase, killing and wounding seven 
men. A fourth was now fired from the main 
deck. This gun burst, hfting the forecastle 
deck, killing and wounding sixteen men. Among 
the latter was Rodgers, who was thrown into the 
air and in falling broke his leg. The forward 
guns being thrown out of action, the President 
was obliged to yaw from time to time to bring 
her broadside guns to bear. This gave the chase 
an advantage which was added to by her throw- 
ing overboard boats and anchors and fourteen 
tons of water. By midnight she was out of dan- 
ger. The President does not seem to have been 
handled as well as she might have been, but ac- 
count must be taken of the very serious accident 
aboard and of the injury to the commodore. 
The Belvidera s fire killed and wounded six of 
the President's crew. She was well handled and 



170 The American Navy 

her captain, Richard Byron, deserves marked 
credit for his escape. Rodgers continued his 
cruise in pursuit of the West Indiaman as far as 
the entrance to the Enghsh Channel, but by 
August 31st was in Boston, having made but 
seven prizes and one recapture. 

The Essex did not leave New York until June 
23d. The ship carried, mostly, only carronades 
which were totally inefficient except at close 
quarters. This fact placed her at a great dis- 
advantage when in meeting a convoy of troops 
she was unable to bring to action the convoying 
frigate. She cut out, however, one ship with 
197 soldiers aboard. But on August 13 th she 
captured the sloop-of-war, Alert, of twenty 18- 
pounder carronades, the first man-of-war prize 
of the war. The Essex returned to New York 
on September 7th, having taken ten prizes and 
423 prisoners. 

The Constitutioji, Captain Hull, had returned, 
just before the outbreak of the war, from Europe 
where she had been sent to pay the interest on 
our Dutch loan. She shipped a new crew, and 
on July 1 2th sailed from Annapolis. On the 
17th when off the Virginia coast, and barely out 
of sight of land, six vessels were discovered, one 
of which, as it turned out, and much the near- 



The American Navy 171 

est, being the Guerriere. The next morning, the 
weather almost calm, there were four frigates, a 
ship-of-the-Hne, and a brig and a schooner just 
out of gunshot; the two last were prizes. There 
then ensued a chase famous in American naval 
annals for the admirable way in which the Con- 
stitution was handled, and for her success. She 
hoisted out her boats in the calm and towed; 
the enemy put the boats of two ships to tow the 
headmost. Their advantage was overcome by 
Hull's using all the cordage of the ship available 
for such a purpose in running a kedge ahead 
nearly half a mile and hauling in upon the haw- 
ser. The kedges thus employed caused the 
Constitution to gain largely until the enemy dis- 
covered the method and himself applied it. For 
two days this most exciting and exhausting chase 
continued. On the evening of the 20th there was 
a heavy squall, which was utilized by Hull with 
the utmost judgment and during which a large 
gain in distance was made. On its clearing away 
all apprehension ended; all but two of the frig- 
ates were far distant and most of the fleet hull 
down. At 8:15 next morning the English gave 
up the chase, thus ending as exciting three 
days and nights as any of the war. The 
admirable manner in which the Constitution 



172 The American Navy 

was handled has ever been the admiration 
of seamen. 

The Constitution went into Boston, but Hull, 
fearing orders for detachment, which in fact were 
on the way from Washington, hurried to sea 
again on August 2d. On the 19th, at a point 
some 400 miles southeast of Halifax, he met the 
British frigate, Guerriere, Captain Dacres. The 
latter on the Constitution s near approach lay-to 
with her maintopsail to the mast, showing her 
willingness to engage. The battle began a little 
after 6:00 p. m., and before seven the Guerriere 
was dismasted and in a sinking condition. Her 
crew was taken off; she was set afire, and in a 
quarter of an hour blew up. The Constitution 
was practically uninjured and in a few hours 
could have gone into action again. She was, it 
is true, the heavier ship, with thirty 24-pounders 
against tVitGuerriere's thirty 1 8's, and twenty-four 
32-pounder carronades against the Guerriere' s 
sixteen; and a total of 55 guns and 468 men 
against the Guerriere's 49 guns and 272 men, 
but the injury was entirely disproportionate. 
The Guerriere had seventy-nine men killed and 
wounded. The Constitution had seven killed 
and seven wounded. The Guerriere lost every 
mast and her hull was so riddled that she could 



The American Navy 173 

not be carried into port. So little was the Con- 
stitution injured that in the same evening all 
damage was repaired and another ship, sup- 
posedly an enemy, which appeared at 2:00 a. m., 
sheered off. 

The ships were not markedly different in size, 
the Constitution being 1,576 tons American meas- 
urement, the Guerriere 1,338 British. But by 
the latter the Constitution would have been but 
1,426. The difference in size and force, however, 
was a small matter considering the fact that be- 
fore the outbreak of the war it was confidently 
affirmed that British sloops-of-war would he 
alongside American frigates with impunity. 

The capture of the Guerriere by the Constitu- 
tion is a great landmark in our history — a second 
"shot heard round the world." It was not sim- 
ply the taking of a British frigate; it was a second 
declaration of American independence. We had 
so long been called spaniels and curs in the Brit- 
ish press; we had so long submitted basely (the 
word is none too strong to describe our adminis- 
tration of the JefFersonian period); there had 
become so strongly entrenched in the British 
and French mind that we would submit to any 
insult so long as our ships might sail, even at the 
cost of the immense toll they took of them, that 



174 The American Navy 

our going to war was considered impossible. 
New England, the chief sufferer, was in a danger- 
ous spirit which threatened secession. All this 
changed instantly when the news spread from 
town to town, from farm to farm. The Ameri- 
cans became another people. It revived the dor- 
mant spirit of nationality and gave a deathblow 
to the disunionist spirit of the period. How 
it permeated the soul of the country was shown 
in a remarkable way at the death of a lady 
of the Adams family in 1903. Born in 1808, 
she was but four years old at the time of 
the battle, but so vividly had the exultation 
of her elders been impressed upon the child's 
mind, that on the day of her death, more 
than ninety years after, her mind reverted to 
but one thought, the most deeply impressed 
of her childhood. In tremulous tones, though 
otherwise apparently unconscious, she kept re- 
peating through this last day of her life the ex- 
pression of her elders in 181 2: "Thank God for 
Hull's victory."* Nothing could show more 
strongly the immensity of exultation and relief. 
The Constitution was to have other victories, 
was to come unscathed through the war, and 



*Told the author by General C. F. Adams. See also "American 
Histor. Rev.," April, 1913, p. 521. 



The American Navy 175 

was for many years to carry our flag in honor in 
many seas; but this victory alone should en- 
shrine the ship in the hearts of all true Americans 
as an instrument which went far to preserve 
this Union and its government. Fortunately, 
through Oliver Wendell Holmes's noble poem, she 
still remains, honored in her old age, a glorious 
memory of victory in a noble cause. 

On October i8th the sloop-of-war Wasp, of 18 
guns and 135 men, commanded by Captain 
Jacob Jones, captured the British brig Frolic, of 
19 guns and no men. The first lieutenant, Bid- 
die, who had gallantly led the boarders, hauled 
down the Frolic's flag at 12:15, forty-three 
minutes after the beginning of the action. Al- 
most at once afterward both of the Frolic's masts 
went by the board. Not twenty of her men had 
escaped unhurt. Every officer was wounded, 
and the first lieutenant and master died soon 
after. Her total loss was thus ninety killed and 
wounded. Says the distinguished French Ad- 
miral Jurien de la Graviere, commenting on this 
action: "On occasions when the roughness of 
the sea would seem to render all aim excessively 
uncertain the effects of [the American] artillery 
were not less murderous than under more ad- 



176 The American Navy 

vantageous conditions." Unfortunately, a little 
later, the British Poictiers, 74, came in sight, and 
the Wasp not only had to yield her capture but 
was herself carried a prize into Bermuda, where 
Jones and his men were later exchanged. Cap- 
tain Jones was promoted to the command of the 
Macedonian, which had been captured by the 
United States only a week after the Wasp's own 
brilliant action. 

The United States and Argus, under Commo- 
dore Decatur, had left Boston on October 8th 
in company with Commodore Rodgers, com- 
manding the President and the Congress. The 
latter was successful in making one valuable 
prize and eight others of but small value, and re- 
entered Boston on December 31st. Decatur 
had separated from Rodgers's command on Oc- 
tober 1 2th, and on the i8th, about 500 miles 
south by west of the Azores, he met the frigate 
Macedonian, of 49 guns and 301 men, com- 
manded by Captain Richard Carden. There 
was about the same difference in force as between 
the Constitution and Guerriere and about the 
same in destruction. The Macedonian had forty- 
three killed and mortally wounded, and sixty- 
one wounded; the United States had a lieutenant 
and six seamen killed or mortally wounded, and 



The American Navy 177 

five wounded. The action lasted an hour and a 
half. The Macedonian had received over a hun- 
dred shot in the hull, her mizzenmast had gone 
by the board, and her fore and maintopmasts 
at the cap. Her rigging was badly cut and many 
of her guns had been dismounted. On the other 
hand, the United States had suffered no injuries 
which could not at once be repaired. It was 
clear that the American gunnery was immensely 
superior, though the Macedonian had been re- 
garded a crack ship. The British ship had on 
board eight impressed Americans. These, though 
objecting to fighting their countrymen, were 
obliged to stay at the guns, and three were killed. 

Fortunately the damages to the Macedonian 
were not so severe that she had to be destroyed; 
convoyed by the United States, she was carried 
into New London, reaching there on December 
4th. 

On October 26, 1812, Commodore Bainbridge 
sailed from Boston with the Constitution^ which 
he personally commanded, and the Hornet, 18, 
Captain Lawrence. The Essex, under Captain 
David Porter, was also to be part of Bain- 
bridge's squadron, but she was in the Delaware 
and did not get to sea until two days after Bain- 
bridge left Boston. In anticipation of a long 



178 The American Navy 

cruise, the ship carried an unusual number of 
both officers and men. Very unfortunately, she 
had to retain, against Porter's protest, a bat- 
tery of short-range carronades with but six long 
l2-pounders. She was given the island of Fer- 
nando de Noronha, off Brazil, as a rendezvous. 
She was not to meet her consorts, but to have 
adventures of her own of a very remarkable 
character. 

Bainbridge, touching at Fernando de Noronha, 
went into Bahia, Brazil, and found there a Brit- 
ish sloop-of-war of the same force as the Hornet. 
Lawrence challenged her captain to a fight, 
pledging that the Constitution would not inter- 
fere. The challenge, however, was not accepted, 
among the reasons being that the Bonne Citoy- 
enne had on board £500,000 in species. Bain- 
bridge, leaving the Hornet to watch the British 
ship, went to sea. December 29th, being still 
near Bahia, he sighted two ships : one turned out 
to be the frigate Java; the other a captured ship^ 
the Willia7n, in company. The latter was di- 
rected to go into Bahia and the Java stood to- 
ward the Co7istitution. The latter stood off to 
get clear of the land, in plain view, and thus get 
out of neutral waters. There was a mutual read- 
iness to engage. The Java came down with a 



The American Navy 179 

light free wind, furhng her mainsail and royals. 
The Constitution, with royal yards aloft, and 
which she carried throughout the battle, was un- 
der about the same canvas. The firing began at 
2:00 P. M., with a shot at long range from the 
Constitution, but the two ships quickly neared 
to pistol range. They approached so near that 
they were less than 600 feet apart. The Java was 
being so much cut up aloft that an attempt was 
made to board, but during this the Constitution 
poured in a most destructive raking fire (i. e., 
lengthwise of the enemy), bringing down the 
Java's maintopmast and cutting away the fore- 
mast just under the foretop. The attempt to 
board failed, the ships fell apart and began anew 
as furiously as ever. Captain Lambert of the 
Java was killed and the ship continued to be 
fought gallantly by her first lieutenant, Chads, 
who was already wounded. But the British, 
with the wreck of the maintopmast with its 
hamper over the side, the foretopmast gone, and 
a little later the mizzenmast and what remained 
of the foremast, could do no more; the Java's 
guns were completely silenced. At 4:05, the 
Java's flag being shot away, Bainbridge thought 
she had struck. He then hauled by the wind 
and crossed the Java's bows. The latter's main- 



i8o The American Navy 

mast fell, leaving her a complete wreck. The 
Constitution went to windward, spent an hour in 
repairing the very moderate damages to her rig- 
ging, and then again stood down for her enemy, 
whose flag had again been shown. This, of 
course, meant nothing in such circumstances, 
and as soon as the Constitution stood across her 
bows it was struck. 

The Constitution, after her repairs of an hour, 
was now again, in naval language, all ataunto. 
Her loss had been eight seamen and one marine 
killed; the fifth lieutenant, John C. Aylwin, and 
two seamen mortally wounded; Commodore 
Bainbridge and twelve seamen severely wounded; 
seven seamen and two marines slightly wounded; 
a total killed and wounded of thirty-four. 

The Java had been cut to pieces; "she was a 
riddled and entirely dismasted hulk." She lost 
her captain and five midshipmen killed or mor- 
tally wounded, and six officers and four mid- 
shipmen wounded. Her total loss was forty- 
eight killed and one hundred and two wounded.* 

The two ships were not very unequal in force, 



*The British accounts were often so inaccurate and garbled, and 
in James's "Naval History" so frequently glaringly untrue that 
only little dependence, in some instances, can be placed upon them. 
For a discussion of this phase, see Roosevelt's "Naval War of 
1812" passim. Part of this account is condensed from this latter. 



The American Navy i8i 

the Constitution being about lo per cent, stronger 
in weight of gunfire and with about lo per cent, 
more men. The larger number of men aboard 
the Java than she usually carried was due to her 
having on board men for some other ships. Both 
ships were handled with remarkable skill and 
coolness, but the American gunnery had shown 
itself enormously superior. It had so wrecked 
the Java that Bainbridge, now 5,000 miles from 
home and on an unfriendly coast, gave up the 
idea of attempting to save the ship. He lay by 
for several days removing the wounded and 
saving the effects of the crew. The Java was 
then blown up, and the Constitution went into 
Bahia and paroled the Java's officers and crew. 

"Our gallant enemy," reported Lieutenant 
Chads, "has treated us most generously," and 
Lieutenant-General Hislop who with his staff 
were passengers in the Java for the East, pre- 
sented Commodore Bainbridge with a very hand- 
some sword as a token of gratitude for the kind- 
ness with which he had treated the prisoners.* 

Bainbridge, his ship needing repairs after a 
long period of service which had begun before 
the war, sailed from Bahia on January 6, 1813, 

*!Roosevelt, 129. 



1 82 The American Navy 

and reached Boston February 27th, having been 
absent 119 days. The Hornet had been left at 
Bahia observing the Bonne Citoyenne, but the 
arrival of the Montagu, 74, relieved the captain 
of the British sloop-of-war from risking his ship 
and treasure. The Hornet, on the Montagu s ar- 
rival, put to sea late in the evening unmolested. 
The war had now lasted six months, and in- 
stead of the little American navy being swept 
from the sea, it had been a David to smite a 
Goliath. The capture of three British frigates 
in the three successive combats stirred Britain 
to the quick. Said the Pilot of London : " Five 
hundred merchantmen [taken] and three frig- 
ates! Can this be true? Will the EngHsh people 
read this unmoved? Any man who foretold 
such disasters this day last year would have been 
treated as a madman or a traitor. He would 
have been told that ere seven months had gone 
the American flag would have been swept from 
the ocean, the American navy destroyed, and 
the maritime arsenals of the United States re- 
duced to ashes. Yet not one of the American 
frigates has struck. They leave their ports when 
they choose, and return when it suits their con- 
venience. They cross the Atlantic, they visit 
the West Indies, they come to the chops of the 



The American Navy 183 

Channel, they parade along the coast of South 
America. Nothing chases them; nothing inter- 
cepts them — nay, nothing engages them but to 
yield in triumph."* 



•■Cited by McMasters, "History of the United States," IV, 901. 



CHAPTER XVI 

The British force on our own coast was now, in 
1 813, much increased. Particular attention was 
paid to the approaches of New York and to the 
Chesapeake, which latter region was devastated. 
Destruction was carried on under the general or- 
ders of the British Admiralty to "destroy and 
lay waste all towns and districts of the United 
States found accessive to the attacks of the Brit- 
ish armaments." Hampton, in Virginia, was 
thus sacked with a brutality which even the 
very prejudiced British historian, James, called 
"revolting to human nature." 

On February 24th the Hornety which we left 
taking leave of the Montagu, 74, at Bahia, was on 
January 24th off Demarara. A brig, the Es- 
piegle, was inside the bar; another, standing in 
for the port, was the Peacock. She was ready to 
engage, and at 5:25 p. m. action opened; four- 
teen minutes later the Peacock was a prize and 
sinking. The two vessels were equal in size and 
nearly equal in men, the Hornet having aboard 



The American Navy 185 

135 to the Peacock's 122. The Hornet was su- 
perior in so far as carrying 32-pound carronades 
to the Peacock's 24's; but weight of shot made no 
difference for the Peacock's guns did scarcely any 
damage. Lawrence, overcrowded with prisoners, 
returned to the United States, anchoring at 
Holmes Hole on March 19th. Less than three 
months later he was to die a defeated man, 
aboard the Chesapeake, the victim of rashness 
and over-confidence. 

The Chesapeake, throughout her career an ill- 
omened ship, had made a cruise under Captain 
Evans, leaving Boston December 13, 181 2, and 
returning there April 9, 1813, having captured 
five merchantmen. The term of enlistment of 
the crew was up, and there being a difficulty over 
prize money, most of the men refused to enlist. 
Captain Evans on account of ill-health gave up 
the command, and Lawrence was appointed in 
his stead. He joined about the middle of May; 
he left Boston Harbor to fight the Shannon a 
fortnight later. Thus in two weeks he had to get 
new officers and a new crew together and prepare 
for sea. As for target practice, or for even the or- 
dinary "shaking down," there was no oppor- 
tunity whatever. So new were some of the men 
to their ship "that the last draft that arrived 



1 86 The American Navy 

still had their hammocks and bags lying in the 
boats stowed over the booms when the ship was 
captured."* Privateering had now risen to such 
prominence that the same difficulties were ex- 
perienced as to men as in the times of the Revo- 
lution, when it was often impossible to man the 
ships of the navy on account of the attractions 
which the other and freer service offered. As a 
consequence a large number of foreigners had 
to be taken, including some forty British and a 
number of Portuguese, these latter in the best 
circumstances being what one would not select 
from choice. In this case they were particularly 
troublesome, a Portuguese boatswain's mate 
being the ringleader in what became almost a 
mutiny on account of a question of prize money. 
The first lieutenant. Page, was ill ashore; he was 
replaced by a young lieutenant, Ludlow, who 
had been third on the Chesapeake's last cruise ; the 
third and fourth were only midshipmen with act- 
ing appointments. To go to sea thus and fight a 
battle with a ship which had been in commission 
six and a half years, under a particularly able 
captain, was simple madness. But this, driven 
by over-confidence and perhaps an over-desire for 
distinction, is what Lawrence did. 

*Roosevelt, 178. 



The American Navy 187 

Captain Philip Bowes Vere Broke, to give him 
his full name, had commissioned the Shannon, 
a new ship, on September 14, 1806. He was sui 
generis in his own service, for he carried on tar- 
get practice twice a week, whereas the usual 
custom in the British navy of the time was once 
a year; his guns were furnished with sights, 
which was also unusual, and he was a kindly 
captain with the good-will of his crew, like- 
wise unusual in those days of free use of the 
cat. 

The two ships, without going into detail, were 
practically of equal force, each carrying 52 guns. 
The Chesapeake had 379 men; the Shannon 330, 
30 of whom were new hands. The Shannon had 
been off Boston for some time, when on June ist 
Broke sent a letter to Lawrence challenging him 
to meet the Shannon later at a given point. It 
is a great pity that this failed to reach Lawrence 
in time. 

On May 31st the Chesapeake dropped down to 
the lower bay; the men were stationed at the 
guns and were exercised at the battery. On 
June 1st, a little after midday, she stood to sea 
under all sails, even to studding sails. The 
Shannon stood off shore under easy sail until 
about eighteen miles from Boston Light, where 



1 88 The American Navy 

she awaited her foe, which had now also reduced 
her canvas. 

There is no need to go into the manoeuvres, 
which can be found in many books. Lawrence 
brought his ship so close that both vessels suf- 
fered severely. He was soon mortally wounded 
and the sailing master (who looked after the 
handling of the ship under the captain's orders) 
was killed. The two most important officers 
were thus removed early in the action. A heavy 
explosion occurred in the Chesapeake, probably 
by the ignition of cartridges lying on the deck. 
At six o'clock the two ships came together, the 
Shannon s anchor catching in one of the after 
ports of the Chesapeake. Broke now ordered 
"away boarders." The Chesapeake's first lieu- 
tenant, Ludlow, received a wound of which later 
he died. Cox, the third lieutenant, coming up 
from the main deck, was so unmanned by the 
conditions of things that he turned and ran be- 
low, an act for which he was later court- 
martialled and dismissed from the service. As 
Broke came aboard heading some twenty men, 
the only opposition that could be offered at the 
moment came from the nine marines, all that 
were left unhurt of forty-four. Their com- 
mander. Broom, and a corporal, were dead, 



The American Navy 189 

and both sergeants were wounded. The only 
officer there at the moment was the chaplain, 
Livermore, who fired his pistol at Broke, and 
himself was severely wounded, in return, by a 
sword cut from Broke. The large number of 
mercenaries aboard had run below. Lieutenant 
George Budd, stationed on the main deck, now 
ran up, followed by some dozen men, and at- 
tacked the boarders, kilHng the purser, Aldham, 
and the captain's clerk. Drum, but Budd was 
soon wounded and knocked down the main 
hatchway. The wounded Ludlow struggled to 
the spar deck, and received another wound. 
Broke himself showed brilHant courage in lead- 
ing his men and was severely wounded. Just 
fifteen minutes after the action began, the 
Chesapeake' s colors were hauled down. "Of her 
379 men, 61 were killed or mortally wounded, 
including her captain, first and fourth lieuten- 
ants, the lieutenant commanding the marines, 
the master, boatswain, and three midshipm.en; 
85 were wounded more or less severely, includ- 
ing both her other lieutenants, five midship- 
men, and the chaplain; total, 148; the loss falling 
entirely upon the American portion of the 
crew. Of the Shannon s men, 33 were killed 
outright or died of their wounds, including her 



igo The American Navy- 

first lieutenant, purser, captain's clerk, and one 
midshipman, and 50 were wounded, including 
the captain and boatswain; total, 83."* 

The Chesapeake was taken to Halifax. Law- 
rence and Ludlow were buried there with every 
honor. The remains of the former were later 
taken to New York, where in the churchyard of 
old Trinity they now lie. Lawrence's dying 
words: "Don't give up the ship," were later 
blazoned on a flag flown by Perry on Lake Erie, 
where the dead hero was to have his revenge, 
for hero he was, however mistaken in judgment. 
His fatal action was the ignoring of the value 
of preparation in war. Discipline and train- 
ing are as necessary as valor, an axiom which our 
people are only too slow to learn. 

The result caused immense rejoicing in Eng- 
land. It is the only naval action of the war 
which to-day receives recognition there, and 
I doubt if the British people in general, of the 
present, know of any other. And while treating 
of it, there is a persistent unfairness in ignoring 
conditions of the Chesapeake; even in articles 
which were written in 1913, the hundredth year 
later, by historians from whom fairness might 
be expected, no mention was made of them. It 

*Roosevelt, 187. 



The American Navy 191 

is left to another and fairer foreigner, a French- 
man, Admiral Jurien de la Graviere, the 
most distinguished writer on naval affairs of 
his nation, to tell the truth, when he said: 
"Fortune was not fickle, she was merely logi- 
cal," 

A little later there was an action which was 
really discreditable to us: that of the Jrgus, a 
brig of 298 tons and 10 guns, against the British 
Pelican, of 467 tons and 1 1 guns. The Argus 
had been cruising in the English Channel "cap- 
turing and burning ship after ship and creating 
the greatest consternation among the London 
merchants." On August 13th she had captured 
a brig laden with wine from Oporto, a success 
which was to be apparently her undoing. Next 
day she met the Pelican. The Argus' s captain, 
Allen, was killed early in the action, as were 
also two midshipmen; her first lieutenant was 
wounded. The odds were against her, but not 
to such degree as to account for the too slight 
resistance later in the action. It is not unlikely, 
as has been said by competent historians, that 
the captured port had much to do with this. 
The results of such actions had previously been 
so markedly different that there is reason to 
suspect this. The capture of the Argus was 



192 The American Navy 

soon offset by that of the British brig Boxer, of 
66 men and 14 guns, by the Enterprise, of 104 
men and 16 guns. Captain Blyth of the 
Boxer was killed early in the action, as was 
also Lieutenant Burrows of the Enterprise. 
The few remaining American brigs disappeared 
by capture by much superior forces, most of 
them by squadrons from which there was no 
escape. 

There had undoubtedly by this time been a 
falling off in the character of the American 
crews. The Atlantic now swarmed with pri- 
vateers which, as in our Revolution, attracted 
the best men; the navy thus labored under a 
severe handicap. The privateers did immense 
damage to British commerce and caused the 
British merchant to long for peace, but they 
damaged our real naval interests. This damage 
would have been more real had not the British 
naval power now begun to tell in blockade, 
which became one of absolute strictness. The 
United States and the captured Macedonian, 
which had been repaired and commissioned at 
New York, got to New London by way of Hell 
Gate, but were so strictly watched that they 
remained there for the rest of the war. Naval 
action was now, perforce, to be confined almost 



The American Navy 193 

entirely to the hikes, where it was momentous 
in character. The fights on the ocean were 
but exhibitions of abihty and prowess; those 
on the lakes were vital to the outcome of the 
war. 



CHAPTER XVII 

Our army efforts on the frontier of Canada had 
been great failures. In the very beginning of 
the war General William Hull, Governor of 
Michigan, had been obliged to surrender his 
small army at Detroit for the simple reason 
that he was faced by starvation. He was tried 
and sentenced to death, but was reprieved by 
President Madison. But the fault was not 
wholly Hull's. It was, along with Hull's age 
and inefficiency, the ineptitude of our own ad- 
ministrative and legislative authorities in Wash- 
ington. Our northern defence was thus to fall 
upon the navy. 

There was in 1813 no vessel of war on Lake 
Erie, and but one, the Oneida^ of 116 tons, built 
four years before the war, on Ontario. The 
British had long had a force on this lake, and 
in 181 2 there were six vessels, carrying in all 
about 80 guns; the largest was the Royal George^ 
of 22. Had the British commander been com- 
petent he could easily have controlled the lake. 

194 



The American Navy 195 

He attacked Sackett's Harbor in July, but Lieu- 
tenant Woolsey, commanding the Oneida, landed 
his guns, and with the batteries thus formed beat 
him off. Commodore Isaac Chauncey was 
now, in August, 181 2, sent to command both 
lakes. Guns, officers, shipwrights, and stores 
were transported from New York, and by No- 
vember a small fleet was ready. Before this, 
however. Lieutenant L. D. Elliot, who had been 
sent to Buffalo to look after Lake Erie, had made 
a brilliant expedition against the Detroit, which 
had been surrendered at the time of Hull's dis- 
aster, and another vessel, the Caledonia. Both 
were captured on the Canada side of the lake 
at Fort Erie by boarding, a small army detach- 
ment assisting. The Detroit was burned. 

On November 8th Chauncey made a spirited 
attack on the harbor of Kingston, and kept up 
his activities until navigation was closed by ice 
early in December. The winter was spent in 
building. A new ship, however, named the 
Madison, had already (November 24th) been 
launched at Sackett's Harbor. Nine weeks 
before her timber had stood in the forest. 

By the opening of navigation in 181 3 each 
combatant had a considerable fleet on Lake 
Ontario, though nearly all were but mere gun- 



196 The American Navy 

boats. The British, recognizing the immense 
importance of control of the lakes, had selected 
an able officer. Sir James L. Yeo, to command. 
The outcome of the season's operations, how- 
ever, for the detail of which one should look to 
larger books, was that the Americans were left 
in naval control. In the course of the summer 
the hostile squadrons were three times engaged. 
Chauncey's courage and spirit have received, 
and deserved, high praise for "the rapidity and 
decision with which he created a force, as it 
might be in a wilderness, the professional re- 
sources which he discovered in attaining this 
great end, and the combined gallantry and 
prudence with which he manoeuvred before the 
enemy . . . while the intrepidity with 
which he carried his own ship into action off 
York has always been a subject of honest exul- 
tation in the service to which he belongs." This 
high praise from one so able to judge as Feni- 
more Cooper, himself in early life a naval officer, 
holds to this day. 

What Chauncey did on Lake Ontario, Perry 
was to do, and much more, on Erie. He had 
been reared in Preble's school at Tripoli, but 
by 1806 he was at Newport superintending the 
building of some of Jefferson's absurd gunboats, 



The American Navy 197 

and to duty such as this he was kept for six 
years, an inglorious inaction for such a spirit. 
No attention was paid by a nerveless Secretary 
of the Navy for his application for the lakes 
until it was pressed by Chauncey, on which he 
was ordered to report at Sackett's Harbor with 
his best men. Receiving his orders on Febru- 
ary 17th, fifty men were on their way before 
sunset; a hundred more followed, and Perry 
himself on the 22d. He reached Sackett's 
Harbor on March 3d, and, after two weeks, was 
ordered to Erie. Sailing-master Dobbins and 
Noah Brown, master shipwright, already had 
three gunboats well under way and keels laid 
for two brigs. The timber for their construc- 
tion had been but a few days before trees in the 
forest.* But nothing had been provided in the 
way of armament, cordage, stores, men, or 
officers. These dribbled in through the appeals 
and constant personal work of Perry. In five 
months he had his little fleet fairly ready. On 
August loth he went in search of the British. 
He had the brigs Lawrence and Niagara, of 20 
guns each, and eight schooners carrying, one 
three, the others two and one guns each. The 
British commodore, Barclay, had the ship 

*Condensed from McMaster, IV, 33. 



\ 



198 The American Navy 

Detroit, of 19 guns; the Queen Charlotte, of 17; the 
Lady Prevost, a schooner of 13, and three small 
craft of 10, 3, and i . Perry had in all 416 men fit 
for duty; Barclay 440. On September loth they 
met. 

The action began at 11:45. How Perry 
fought his ship unsupported by the Niagara 
until the Lawrence was a wreck and but 20 of 
his 100 men were left unhurt; how he fired him- 
self the last heavy gun from his ship with the 
help of the purser and chaplain, and then jumped 
into a small boat, pulled by his brother and four 
seamen, boarded the Niagara, took personal 
command, and carried her to victory, make a 
story of courage and resource unsurpassed in 
any of the sea fights of history. Never did one 
man more personify a victory. 

The British flag was struck at 3 :oo p.m., after 
a most gallant struggle. Twenty-nine Ameri- 
cans were killed or mortally wounded and 94 
wounded. The British lost 41 killed and 94 
wounded. The moral effect throughout the 
country, which covered itself with bonfires and 
rejoicings, was almost equal to that of the vic- 
tory of the Constitution. But besides this there 
was the great concrete result of the evacuation 
of Detroit and Michigan by the British and 



The American Navy 199 

their occupancy by the Americans. To Perry's 
victory and Chauncey's success on Lake On- 
tario is due that we preserved our northwestern 
frontier in the coming peace. 

The winter of 1813-1814 was passed on Lake 
Ontario by both antagonists in building ships 
for the next campaign. The largest put afloat 
at Sackett's Harbor by the Americans, the 
arming and equipping of which was under enor- 
mous difficulties of transportation through the 
then almost roadless forest, was the Superior, 
of 62 guns; but the British built a much larger, 
the iS^. Lawrence, of 112 guns. But it was not 
until October 15th that she was in service, too 
late in the season to affect the situation. Had 
the war continued, the lakes would have been 
the scene of naval operations greater than any 
carried on by us upon the sea, aided curiously 
enough by the British blockade of our coast, 
which caused the transfer to the lakes of the 
crews of the blockaded frigates. We shall hear 
a little later of still another momentous battle 
on our inland waters. For the moment we 
turn again to the ocean. 

It may be remembered that the Essex, under 
Captain David Porter, was to form part of 



200 The American Navy 

Bainbridge's command when the latter left 
Boston October 26, 181 2, with the Hornet. 
Porter was then in Delaware River. He left 
on October 28th, but when he reached the ren- 
dezvous appointed his consorts had gone. On 
his way thither a British brig transport, the 
Nocton, was captured, with ^55,000 in specie, 
which in the circumstances to come was to be a 
most valuable aid. The prize was sent with a 
crew of seventeen men to the United States, 
but was overhauled by a frigate and captured 
after passing Bermuda. Porter continued on 
to the second rendezvous off Cape Frio, where 
he arrived December 25th, four days before the 
capture of the Java. Porter remained on the 
Brazilian coast until near the end of January, 
181 3, when, hearing no news of his consorts, he 
started for the Pacific, where for a full year he 
was to cruise at will, capturing nearly every 
British whaler in that ocean, arming some, de- 
stroying others, and recapturing and protecting 
our own. British commerce was swept from 
what was then called the South Sea. The story 
of this cruise in which the captain of the Essex 
showed a surpassing boldness, energy, and re- 
source is one of the most romantic in history. 
After nearly a year of continuous success in 



The American Navy 201 

crippling the enemy's commerce, during which 
the Essex supported herself and armed her con- 
sorts entirely from her prizes, Porter was desir- 
ous of meeting a British man-of-war, and hear- 
ing of the dispatch of the frigate Phoebe, of 36 
guns, to the Pacific, he went to Valparaiso to 
await her coming. But instead of one ship 
came two, the Cherub accompanying the former. 
This cruising in couples was the outcome of one 
of the most remarkable orders ever issued by 
the British Admiralty; its issuance was the 
highest compliment ever paid any navy. The 
order in full cannot be omitted, it read: 

*'My Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty 
having received intelligence that several Ameri- 
can ships-of-war are now at sea, I have their 
lordships' commands to acquaint you therewith, 
and that they do not conceive that any of his 
Majesty's frigates should attempt to engage, 
single-handed, the larger class of American 
ships, which, though maybe called frigates, are 
of a size, complement, and weight of metal much 
beyond that class and more resembling line- 
of-battle ships. 

"In the event of one of his Majesty's frigates 
under your orders falling in with one of these 
ships, his captain should endeavor in the first 
instance to secure the retreat of his Majesty's 



202 The American Navy 

ship; but if he finds that he has an advantage 
in saiHng, he should endeavor to mancEuvre, and 
keeping company with her, without coming to 
action, in the hope of falHng in with some other 
of his Majesty's ships, with whose assistance 
the enemy might be attacked with a reasonable 
hope of success. 

"It is their lordships' further directions that 
you make this known as soon as possible to the 
several captains commanding his Majesty's 
ships."* 



There is a delightfully ingenuous recognition 
of the alarm that had been inspired by our vic- 
tories in the hope that we might be attacked by 
two together, "with a reasonable hope of suc- 
cess." It was absurd to compare our frigates 
with line-of-battle ships. They were undoubt- 
edly heavier than the usual frigate, though some 
then in the British navy were quite as powerful. 
But the fact that our ships were as good as any 
of their class and better than most was all the 
more to the credit of their designers. But the 
Co?istitution, one of our best, was "but ver}^ 
little more than one half the force of one of the 
smallest true liners England possessed !"t 

*''The Croker Papers," I, 44. 

fRoosevelt, 71, where a careful analysis of several pages is given 
to this subject. 



The American Navy 203 

The Essex thus anchored at Valparaiso on 
January 12, 1814. She had in company one 
of her captured merchantmen, renamed the 
Essex Junior with 60 men, ten long 6's, and ten 
18-pound carronades. She was of course wholly 
unfit to meet a regular cruiser. On February 
8th the Phoebe, 36, Captain Hillyar, and the 
Cherub, 18, Captain Tucker, appeared. There 
was an evident design on the part of Hillyar 
to run aboard the Essex, but a very near ap- 
proach revealed the latter's crew at her guns, 
and he backed his yards, inquiring, meanwhile, 
of Captain Porter's health. Porter politely 
replied, but warned Hillyar not to fall foul, 
adding later, "You have no business where you 
are; if you touch a rope-yarn of this ship I shall 
board instantly." It had been well had the 
two ships fought then and there, for later the 
Essex was to be taken at a much greater dis- 
advantage. The two British ships established 
a blockade, and on Porter's endeavor to fight 
the Phoebe singly on February 27th she ran 
down and joined her consort. On March 
28th, however, Porter, who had already decided 
to go to sea, parted his port cable in a gale of 
wind and dragged his other anchor in the deep 
roadstead and very difficult anchorage, under 



204 The American Navy 

the best of circumstances, at Valparaiso. He 
had, by several trials, assured himself of the 
superior speed of the Essex, and now, under way, 
was sure of getting clear of his enemies. In 
rounding the outermost headland of the bay, his 
ship was struck by a heavy squall, which careened 
her to the gunwale and carried away the main- 
topmast. The Essex attempted to regain the 
harbor, but an adverse wind and her crippled 
condition prevented this. She thus stood north- 
ward and anchored three miles north of the 
town and half a mile from a small Chilean bat- 
tery. She was within pistol shot of the shore 
and far within neutral waters. But our Brit- 
ish kindred have never recked of such small 
matters as neutrality unless such stickling 
served their purpose. Both British ships thus 
stood in with flags and mottoes at every mast- 
head, deliberately took position out of range of 
the short-range carronades of the Essex (which 
carried but about 300 yards), and opened fire. 
The time was 4:00 p.m. Now was made appar- 
ent the justice of Porter's demand for a battery 
of long-range guns which he had made before 
leaving the United States, but which was re- 
fused him. He thus had to fight the action 
with but his six long 12-pounders. The result 



The American Navy 205 

was the loss of the ship, but never was ship more 
gallantly fought. Near the end she caught fire 
and a quantity of powder exploded below. 
Many men were knocked overboard and some, 
jumping into the water to swim ashore when 
the ship had become a total wreck, succeeded. 
At 6:20 the ship was surrendered. Of the 255 
of the crew 58 had been killed, 66 wounded, 
and 31 drowned; 24 reached the shore. The 
Phoebe had lost 4 killed, including her first 
lieutenant, and 7 wounded; the Cherub i killed 
and 3 wounded. Such were the benefits of 
being able to fight at long taw. Captain 
Hillyar is not to be blamed for so doing; his 
business was to capture the Essex, and he did 
this with as little loss to himself and consort as 
might be. But all the honors were with the 
American. Hillyar's flagrant violation of the 
neutrality of Chile was in British eyes but an 
easily condoned incident, and he received all 
the praise and regard which would have been 
due for taking the Essex in fairest fight. He 
gave at least every credit to the brave defenders 
of our ship. As usual in modern British ac- 
counts of this notable battle, no reference is 
made to the crippled state of the Essex, nor to 
her being in neutral waters, nor to the fact that 



2o6 The American Navy 

she had a battery incomparably inferior in 
range, nor that two ships were employed against 
one to do the work. The "American frigate 
Essex was captured by the British frigate 
Phoebe," and British self-respect thereby saved. 

One officer who did his duty bravely and well 
in the Essex, as did all, was later to achieve fame 
as the most brilliant naval officer of his time: 
David Glasgow Farragut, then aged twelve 
years and eight months. Farragut continued 
his battle even after the surrender in a stand-up 
fight aboard the Phoebe for the preservation of 
his pet young pig, Murphy, an animal always a 
favorite of sailors. He won. 

The Constellation, of noble record, was a vic- 
tim of the blockade, and, beyond aiding in the 
defence of Norfolk, had to remain passive. The 
Adams, after a successful cruise so far as affect- 
ing the enemy's trade very seriously, had to be 
burned while careened in the Penobscot to es- 
cape capture by an overwhelming force. The 
Peacock, of II guns, captured the British brig 
Epervier, of 9, with ^118,000 in specie aboard, 
on April 29, 1814. The JVasp, 22, in a daring and 
successful cruise of destruction in the English 
Channel, met and captured on June 28th the 
British Reindeer, 18, of considerably less force, 



The American Navy 207 

in an action which was honorable to the cap- 
tains and crews of both ships. On September 
1st, after a briUiant night action, she captured 
the Avon, of 18 guns. The Wasp was driven 
off by the approach of three new antagonists, 
who had to go to the assistance of the Avon, 
which sank after the removal of several of her 
crew. The Wasp, after taking a number of 
prizes, spoke on October 4th a Swedish brig and 
received from her Lieutenant McKnight and 
Master's Mate Lyman, both on their way home 
from the Essex. This was the last ever heard 
of her and her brilHant and lamented captain. 
The last memento of her, besides that of Octo- 
ber 9th in the journal of the Swedish brig, the 
Adonis, was a prize, the Atlanta, which reached 
Savannah November 4th under Midshipman 
Geisinger. 



CHAPTER XVIII 

There was to be one other battle on the lakes, 
that of Lake Champlain, which was to have 
momentous consequences quite equal to that of 
Lake Erie, and place the name of young Thomas 
MacDonough high on the list of benefactors of 
his country. MacDonough, on September 28, 
1 81 2, had been directed to proceed immediately 
and take command on the lake, the control 
having previously been under a young lieuten- 
ant, Sydney Smith. There was, however, little 
to command. The Americans had three armed 
sloops and a few small gunboats and galleys (the 
latter propelled only by oars). But this was 
larger than that of the British, until on June 
3, 1813, two of the sloops, the Growler and the 
Eaghy in pursuit of some of the British flotilla 
which had ventured into the American part of 
the lake, found themselves in the narrow reaches 
of the north end with a south wind against 
which it was impossible to work back. Here 
they were attacked both by gunboats and by 

208 



The American Navy 209 

troops on both shores of the narrow waters, and 
had to surrender. Thenceforward, until May, 
1 814, the British by the addition of the captured 
American sloops were in control. Manned 
temporarily by seamen from the sloop-of-war 
Wasp at Quebec, the British flotilla raided 
Plattsburgh on June 30, 1813, destroyed the 
pubUc buildings there and at Swanton in Ver- 
mont, and threatened the destruction of the 
new vessels building by MacDonough. On 
April II, 1 814, he launched the ship Saratoga. 
By the end of May he was afloat with the Sara- 
toga^ of 26 guns, 8 of which were long 24-pound- 
ers, the remainder being 32 and 42 pounder 
carronades; the schooner Ticonderoga, the sloop 
Preble, and ten galleys. Once more the Ameri- 
cans were in control. The British, however, 
were urging forward with all haste, to assist 
in the coming invasion, a ship much more than 
the Saratoga's equal. This was the Confiance, 
of 37 guns, 27 of which were long 24-pounders 
and the others carronades of 24 and 32 pounds. 
On August 25th she was launched. With her 
tonnage of over 1,200 against the 734 of 
the Saratoga and with her great superiority in 
long guns, she was an enemy to be reckoned 
with. 



2IO The American Navy 

The European wars had now closed. Four 
brigades of Wellington's army had been sent to 
Canada from Bordeaux. They came with 
orders to "give immediate protection to his 
Majesty's possessions in America," by the entire 
destruction of Sackett's Harbor and of the 
naval establishments on Lake Erie and Lake 
Champlain.* 

The governor-general of Canada, Sir George 
Prevost, who also was in command of the army, 
now had, exclusive of officers, 29,437 men, 
nearly all of whom were regulars seasoned by 
years of service under Wellington. He decided 
to advance by the west side of the lake reporting 
that as "Vermont has shown a disinclination to 
the war, and, as it is sending in specie and pro- 
visions, I will confine offensive operations to the 
west side of Lake Champlain. "f 

On August 31st Prevost moved south with an 
army variously estimated at from 11,000 to 
14,000 men. The American army under General 
Alexander Macomb was less than 2,000, but by 
September 4th came in 700 militia from the 
neighborhood, and by the nth "other militia 

*"The Public Life of Sir George Prevost," 136, quoted by 
Mahan, 362. 

fReport in Canadian Archives, 1896, Lower Canada, p. 31. 
For some mortifying details in this subject see Mahan, "The War 
of 1812," 363-365- 



The American Navy 211 

from New York and volunteers from Vermont 
. . . in encouraging contrast to their fellow- 
citizens who were making money by abetting 
the enemy." The British entered Plattsburg 
on the 6th. Macomb retreated across the 
Saranac, a small, fordable river on which the 
town stands, and entrenched. Had Prevost 
had the courage to attack Macomb with his 
large and seasoned army, Macdonough would 
have had either to withdraw up the lake or risk a 
battle in the open lake, where the Confiance would 
have been more than a match for his whole 
squadron. He had anchored under Cumberland 
Head, somewhat over a mile from the west 
shore with the Eagle, Saratoga, Ticonderoga, 
and Preble in a line from north to south in the 
order named. West of this line were his ten 
gunboats. His fourteen vessels totalled but 
2,244 tons, with 86 guns and 882 men. The 
British commodore, Downie, had sixteen vessels, 
amounting in all to 2,402 tons, with 92 guns and 
937 men, but his flagship, as mentioned, was 
nearly twice the size and force of the Saratoga. 

But now came to the aid of the Americans the 
nervousness of the incapable British general who 
insisted upon immediate action by the British 
squadron in his support. The Confiance had 



212 The American Navy 

only been launched on August 25th; to make 
her ready for action in seventeen days was a task 
of Hercules, and that she was, in a way, made 
ready, reflects the highest credit upon the energy 
and ability of those in charge. Commodore 
Downie had joined only on September 2d; the 
crew had been hastily gathered from ships at 
Quebec, the last detachment coming aboard only 
the night but one before the battle. The men 
were thus largely unknown to the officers and to 
one another. The ship hauled into the stream on 
September 7th with the artificers still hard at 
work on the hundreds of fittings so necessary in 
the equipment of a man-of-war. They did not 
leave her until two hours before the beginning 
of battle. The situation of unpreparedness was 
very comparable to that of the Chesapeake in like 
circumstances, except that Macdonough's own 
ship had been launched but four months earlier. 
Prevost, by the fact of his position as gover- 
nor-general, was in a position to command 
obedience, and his peremptory insistence caused 
Downie to move earlier than he should, un- 
doubtedly against the latter's better judgment. 
He thus on the morning of September 11, 1814, 
stood up the narrow reaches of the northern 
part of the lake, with a fair wind from the north- 



The American Navy 213 

east. He had every reason to expect a simul- 
taneous attack by Prevost on the American 
troops, but none came. Having passed Cumber- 
land Head, it was too late to await any action by 
Prevost. 

Macdonough had so admirably chosen his 
position that the British in rounding Cumber- 
land Head were forced to stand nearly north- 
west and almost head on to the American line. 
They were thus subjected to a raking fire 
(lengthwise of the ship). The Confianc£, being 
in the lead and having thus a concentration 
upon her of the American fire, suffered severely 
before anchoring within five hundred yards 
of the line. Within fifteen minutes her cap- 
tain was dead. The day was finally won by 
"winding" the Saratoga (turning her end for 
end), for which excellent previous arrangements 
had been made. A new and, in great degree, un- 
injured broadside was thus brought into use, 
and shortly after, about 11, the Confiance hauled 
down her colors. The whole action lasted, by 
Macdonough's report, two hours and twenty 
minutes.* 



*The most complete account of this battle and events con- 
nected with it is in Mahan, 377-381, largely drawn on in this 
account. 



214 The American Navy 

The immediate effect of the victory was 
Prevost's retreat without delay into Canada. 
The general result was the end of the war, of 
which it was really the ''decisive" battle. No 
longer could Castlereagh, the British foreign 
minister, hold Great Britian "entitled to claim 
the use of the lakes as a military barrier."* 

To Macdonough and Perry, the former under 
thirty-one, the latter but twenty-eight years old 
at the time of their victories, our country owes 
the preservation of its northern boundaries at 
the coming peace. It is a great debt. 

*Instructions to Peace Commissioners, August 14, 18 14. 



CHAPTER XIX 

The war had no more than begun when the 
question of peace was being considered. The 
United States had gone to war for two causes: 
the "Orders in Council" which bore so heavily 
upon our shipping; and the impressment of our 
seamen. The former were revoked on June 
23d, five days after the declaration of war by 
Congress; peace was to be made without even a 
mention of the latter. 

Actual steps toward peace were taken through 
Russia even as early as September, 181 2. The 
whole is a long story, but on November 4th 
a direct negotiation was offered by England 
which was accepted by the United States on 
January 5, 1814, and commissioners were ap- 
pointed, with Ghent as the place of meeting. It 
is well that action was thus early, for by April 
Great Britain's hands were largely free in 
Europe, and she could turn her efforts more 
freely upon America, and this she did in the ex- 
pedition against Louisiana (which was to end in 
215 



2i6 The American Navy 

almost unequalled disaster), and in the abortive 
invasion turned back by Macdonough's victory. 
The British state of mind was expressed in a 
letter from Gallatin, then in London, to Monroe, 
the Secretary of State: "You may rest assured," 
he said, "of the general hostile spirit of this 
nation, and of its wish to inflict serious injury 
upon the United States; that no resistance can 
be expected from Europe; and that no better 
terms will be obtained than the status ante 
helium.'* And so it turned out. On Christmas 
Eve, 1814, peace was signed, and though im- 
pressment was ignored, it was never again to be 
attempted. Nor was there cause, for there was 
not to be a naval war upon the ocean in which 
Britain was to be engaged for a hundred years. 
Before hostilities on the water came to an end 
there were, however, to be several notable naval 
events, one of the most remarkable being the 
defence on September 26, 1814, of the privateer 
General Armstrongs Captain Reid, at Fayal, 
Azores, against a boat attack from three Brit- 
ish ships, the Pla?itagenet, 74; Rota, 38; and 
Carnation, 18. The British were repulsed with 
the loss of 34 killed and 86 wounded. The next 
day the Carnation stood in to attack alone, and 
was driven oflF; but with a 74 present besides two 



The American Navy 217 

other ships, the question of saving the Httle 
vessel was hopeless, and she was scuttled, the 
crew escaping ashore. 

In those days news travelled slowly, and thus 
it was that after the peace the President^ one of a 
squadron under Commodore Decatur, separated 
from her consorts, was captured, after she had 
driven off the Endymion frigate, by the squad- 
ron accompanying the latter. On February 20, 
1 81 5, the Cyane and Levant, sloops-of-war, were 
captured in a night action, 300 miles from 
Madeira, by the Constitution, Captain Stewart, 
who was to be the instrument of trouble many 
years after to Britain, through his grandfather- 
hood of Charles Stewart Parnell. 

This action was remarkable for the brilHant 
handling of Stewart's ship. The Levant was re- 
captured by a British squadron at Porto Praya, 
in the Cape Verdes, where she had taken refuge 
against the British squadron, which had vainly 
chased the Constitution. It was another instance, 
added to those of the Essex and the General 
Armstrong, of the disregard of the English of a 
neutrality so highly esteemed in these latter 
days. 

The capture, on March 23d, of the British 
Penguin by the Hornet, Captain Biddle, of 



2i8 The American Navy 

equal force, was the last real action of the war, 
that of the Peacock and British Nautilus in the 
Indian Ocean on June 30th, on account of the 
former's superiority in force, not calling for any 
but mere mention. 

But the history of the War of 181 2 cannot 
close without mention of the crowning victory on 
land. New Orleans, on January 8, 181 5. In 
this, perhaps the severest and completest repulse 
ever suffered by a British army, the navy bore 
a most important part, for by its efforts was 
prevented the flanking of General Jackson's 
force from the river. The naval vessels, the 
Louisiana, with Commodore Patterson, and the 
Caroline, Lieutenant J. D. Henley, controlled 
the river situation on the British left flank un- 
til the latter was burned by hot shot from the 
British trenches. The Louisia^ia then shifted to 
cover Jackson's right. The situation forced 
the British to transport siege pieces from the 
fleet, seventy miles away; this gave time for 
Jackson to strengthen his position and time for 
reinforcements to join him. The Louisiana's 
guns were now landed and a battery established 
which would flank the newly established British 
battery as well as their attacking columns; the 
result was the destruction of the British battery 



The American Navy 219 

soon after it had opened fire. The British 
move, on the day of the main attack, to capture 
the Louisiana s battery on the right bank of the 
river, was finally successful through the flight of 
the supporting militia, but it was too late; the 
naval battery had already assisted in the bloody 
repulse of the main body, and there was nothing 
left to the capturing party but withdrawal.* 

The war was now ended. It had been a 
second War of Independence, which had re- 
leased America from the strong British influence 
which had still obtained and had established a 
real national spirit. The world recognized the 
birth of a new power upon the ocean, which the 
future was to reckon with, though America her- 
self was slow to accept her new situation. We 
had, however, afloat in 181 5, three line-of-battle 
ships, the Washington, Independence, and Frank- 
lin, andinthisyesir wewere to end, as has already 
been mentioned, our Barbary troubles forever by 
the action of Decatur in command of the largest 
fleet we were to have at sea for many years. We 
began a new life with a self-respect which had 
needed a war for its revival. 

There was one note at least of dissatisfaction 
over the peace. The London Times, comment- 

*For a complete account see Mahan, "War of 1812," II, 391, 396. 



220 The American Navy 

ingin its issue of December 30, 18 14, said: "We 
have retired from the combat with the stripes 
yet bleeding on our backs. Even yet, however, 
if we could but close the war with some great 
naval triumph, the reputation of our maritime 
greatness might be partially restored. But to 
say that it has not hitherto suffered in the 
estimation of all Europe, and, what is worse, of 
America herself, is to belie common sense and 
universal experience. ' Two or three of our ships 
have struck to a force vastly inferior!' No; 
not two or three, but many on the ocean and 
whole squadrons on the lakes; and the numbers 
are to be viewed with relation to the comparative 
magnitude of the two navies. Scarcely is there 
an American ship-of-war which has not to boast 
a victory over the British flag; scarcely one 
British ship in thirty or forty that has beaten 
an American. With the bravest seamen and 
the most powerful navy in the world, we retire 
from the contest when the balance of defeat is so 
heavily against us."* And more defeats were 
yet to come. Perhaps yet more would have 
come, for just as the war closed, the first war- 
steamer to be built for over ten years, the 
Fulton^ was ready for sea. With a double hull 

*Quoted by Maclay, "History of the Navy," II, 82. 



The American Navy 221 

of such thickness as to be impervious to harm 
from any but the heaviest guns, moved by a 
wheel in the middle which was protected from 
shot, it seems almost a pity that she should not 
have been tried with her two 100-pound guns 
upon the ships blockading New York. But 
even as it was America had good reason to be 
well satisfied with the work of her navy. 



CHAPTER XX 

Though thirty-one years was to pass before the 
United States was again to be at war with a 
foreign power, and then with Mexico — which 
had no navy — they were far from being years 
of idleness or want of deeds accompHshed. 

Our flag was now shown in every sea and with 
the weight and authority which success always 
carries. Thus N. P. Willis, who in the early 
thirties was the guest of wardroom officers of 
the flagship in the Mediterranean, says in his 
"PenciHngs by the Way": 

"From the comparisons I have made between 
our own ships and the ships-of-war of other 
nations, I think we may well be proud of our 
navy. I had learned in Europe long before 
joining the United States that the respect we 
exact from foreigners is paid more to America 
afloat than to a continent they think as far ofi^ at 
least as the moon. They see our men-of-war 
and they know very well what they have done 
and, from the appearance and character of our 
officers, what they might do again — and there is 

222 



The American Navy 223 

a tangibility in the deductions from knowledge 
and eyesight which beats books and statistics. 
I have heard Englishmen deny one by one every 
claim we have to political and moral superiority, 
but I have found none illiberal enough to refuse 
a compliment — and a handsome one — to Yankee 
ships."* 

The world was yet a world of piracy, and the 
extirpation of these wolves of the sea was a work 
which, when finished in the Mediterranean and 
in the West Indies, was to continue in the Far 
East to our own day. The situation, however, 
in the Caribbean Sea and its adjacent waters was 
particularly serious from the anarchic conditions 
arising through the revolt of Spain's American 
dominions, with the exception of Cuba, Puerto 
Rico, and Mexico, and this last was to join in 
the upheaval in 1821. But all became nests of 
piracy. The fault in the beginning was with 
our own Government, which had allowed too 
freely the fitting out of vessels, usually schooners, 
in our ports which sailed away for Venezuela or 
Argentina and there took out letters of marque 
and flew the insurgent flags. They captured not 
only Spanish vessels, but whatever seemed Hkely 



*Quoted by Soley, "Admiral Porter," 41. 



224 The American Navy 

prize, and our own ships suffered as well as 
others. Galveston and Matagorda had also for 
years after the peace of 1 8 1 5 been bases of piracy 
under the claim of patriotism. Our war with 
England had in fact so developed the greed in 
privateering that the more adventurous kept it 
up in the new form. Florida, Louisiana, Texas, 
and Mexico at the time thus bred pirates much 
as ill-conditioned ponds breed mosquitoes. 
When Mexico declared independence in 1821 
and there was nothing left to Spain but Cuba and 
Puerto Rico, numerous privateers were fitted 
out from there against the privateers of the 
patriots, and the former became in turn as bad 
as the latter. Havana itself was one of the 
strongholds of these villains, the captain-general 
sharing in the profits, and each of the many 
curiously formed, deep, bottlelike harbors of 
Cuba was a pirate refuge. For nine years, from 
1 8 17 to 1826, the navy was busily engaged in 
suppressing these marauders, and it was on such 
duty, in 1819, that Commodore Oliver Hazard 
Perry, in command of a squadron in the Carib- 
bean, lost his life through yellow fever caught in 
the Orinoco. He was but thirty-four years old. 
But while this work had its losses, it had also 
great uses, besides protecting the commercial 



The American Navy 225 

world, in serving as a school for the greatest 
admiral of his or any time in fact, and for 
another great officer who was bound to him by 
pecuHarly romantic ties. These were Farragut 
and Porter, who forty or more years later were 
to come to such distinguished fame. The story 
needs a telling. 

The first Porter, a merchant captain, born in 
Massachusetts in 1727, had two sons, of whom 
David was the later admiral's grandfather. 
This grandfather served as a privateersman, 
was a captain in the Massachusetts state navy 
in the Revolution, was captured and confined in 
the Jersey prison ship, escaped, and served at 
sea for the rest of the war. Becoming again a 
merchant captain, his bold and successful re- 
sistance to the impressment of his men by a 
British man-of-war in Santo Domingo led, when 
the navy came to life in 1794, to his appointment 
as a saiHng master. He was in command of the 
naval station at New Orleans when in 1808, 
having had a sunstroke while fishing on Lake 
Ponchartrian, he was found and cared for by 
George Farragut, a sailing master in the navy who 
lived on the borders of the lake. Porter died, and 
Mrs. Farragut dying of yellow fever, both were 
buried on the same day, June 22, 1808. 



226 The American Navy 

Some time after, the late Porter's son David, 
whom we have met herein as the captain of the 
famous EsseXy took charge of the New Orleans 
station, and in recognition of the great kindness 
of the Farragut family offered to adopt one of 
the motherless boys and train him for the navy. 
It was thus that the future victor at New 
Orleans and at Mobile Bay had his start in life. 
Farragut, born July 5, 1801, was taken into 
Porter's family, and on December 17, 1810, 
received his appointment as midshipman. He 
was then just nine years five months and twelve 
days old.* In 181 1 he was at sea with Porter 
in the Essex and took a very active and valorous 
part in the famous battle in 1814 in which she 
was overcome by great odds. It was in the 
year before this (181 3) that the youngest David 
Porter was born. The careers of the two men 
were to be curiously linked through life, and the 
period of piracy mentioned was one which was 
to be largely formative of their characters. 
Both were to rise to the highest honors in their 
profession and leave great and worthy names. 



*Not so young, however, as was, when appointed midshipman, 
an admiral under whom the author served in 1865, S. W. Godon. 
He told me that he was appointed at so early an age that for 
some years he was taken by a servant on quarter day to the navy 
yard to draw his pay. 



The American Navy 227 

Their stories make books which all boys, young 
or old, should read and thereby stir their blood. 
By 1822 it had become necessary to employ a 
large force on the Caribbean, and Commodore 
Porter (he of the Essex) was selected for the 
command. By 1826 piracy in those waters was 
at an end, but the righteous punishment given 
some of the depredators at Cape Fajardo at the 
eastern end of Puerto Rico, though not at all 
excessive, was, as an invasion of Spanish terri- 
tory, made a cause of investigation, and Porter's 
conduct was found "censurable" by the court- 
martial before which the matter was brought. 
This was too much for Porter's high spirit, and 
he at once resigned from the navy and never 
thereafter would speak to a member of the court. 
In 1826 he became commander-in-chief of the 
then somewhat considerable Mexican navy, 
Mexico now being at war with Spain, and it was 
as a midshipman in this service that the younger 
Porter, now thirteen, began his sea-going life. 
He was, in 1828, in one of the severest and 
bloodiest battles of his career, that of the brig 
Guerrero^ in which he was serving, with the 
Spanish frigate Lealtad, west of Havana. His 
career as a Mexican midshipman ended in im- 
prisonment, a quick release, and an appointment 



228 The American Navy 

as midshipman in our own navy, his father, the 
commodore, having thrown up his Mexican 
appointment. The latter was to end his career 
as our first minister to Turkey, to which post 
he was appointed by President Jackson, to whom 
Porter was a man after his own heart. He ended 
his Hfe, than which there have been few of such 
romantic and gallant exploit, at Constantinople 
on March 28, 1843, at the age of sixty-three, and 
after fourteen years' service as minister. 

The following years of the navy until the 
Mexican War were thus years of commerce- 
protecting and of the usual routine of naval duty 
varied by punitive expeditions in the East and 
in the Pacific. There was the well-known ex- 
ploring expedition of Lieutenant Wilkes in the 
years 1838-1842, the discoveries of which were 
for years to be minimized by British jealousy, 
but which are now recognized at their full value; 
the establishment of the Naval Observatory, 
1842; of the Naval Academy in 1845; and the 
introduction of steam vessels, the first to see 
actual service in our navy being a small pur- 
chased vessel, the Sea Gull, used against the 
pirates of Cuba in 1823.* Throughout the 

*Spears, 112. 



The American Navy 229 

period, too, of the Seminole War in Florida the 
navy did its share in a not overglorious but most 
trying duty. 

War was declared with Mexico on May 12, 
1846. The share of the navy in the occupancy 
of the east coast of the country, apart from its 
landing a very efficient battery of heavy guns at 
Vera Cruz, which assisted materially in a quick 
surrender of the place, was not of very great 
importance beyond occupying all the other 
towns of the coast, a duty in every case gallantly 
performed. The importance of naval action in 
the Pacific was far different, for it secured to us 
California, then a part of Mexico. Whatever the 
laterofficialstatements as to British intent, ornon- 
intent, it was well that our ships wereon theground 
first and in possession; in any case our action on 
the California coast forestalled any question. 

There was from the treaty of peace with 
Mexico, February 2, 1848, to our next and great- 
est war, an interval of but thirteen years. This 
was one of the periods of greatest transition in 
which the ships and guns which had existed for 
over two hundred years with but moderate change 
were to take a long step to complete transfor- 
mation, from sail to steam, and from the smooth- 
bore to the rifle. In the matter of guns, though, 



230 The American Navy 

we were much slower to change than was Europe. 
We were to carry aboard our ships, during the 
Civil War and for long after, the smooth-bore 
Dahlgren gun, so called from the bottlelike form 
given it by the inventor, Commander (later 
Rear-Admiral) J. A. Dahlgren. 

One by one, or at most by occasional twos, the 
new-fangled idea — the steamship — had made its 
way. In 1837 had been built the Fulton^ of 4 
guns; in 1841, the Alissouri, which was to perish 
by fire at Gibraltar but two years later, 1843; 
and the Mississippi, a sister ship, which after 
many years of honorable service was to find her 
grave in the river of her name at Port Hudson on 
March 14, 1863; in 1843 was built our first screw 
steamer, the Princeton; in 1844 at Erie our first 
iron steamer, the Michigan, for service on the 
lakes, where she cruised for many years and 
became in lapse of time a curiosity; in 1848, the 
Saranac; and in 1850 the two fine old side-wheel 
frigates, the Susquehanna and the Powhatan. By 
1855 we were building the five frigates, Wahash, 
Roanoke, Colorado, Merrimac, and Minnesota, the 
finest of their time, but which except the Merri- 
w^c, transformed into an ironclad, were to cut no 
figure in the coming Civil War on account of their 
deep draft. Their time had passed even by 1861. 



CHAPTER XXI 

Though there were many mutterings of the com- 
ing tempest in the decade 1 850-1 860, the navy, 
whose duty, unaffected by internal poUtics, lay 
abroad, went its even tenor. We had come to 
the verge of war with Spain in 1852 over the 
case of the Black Warrior. There had been 
filibustering expeditions and the slave trade to 
look after; threatenings of difficulties with 
England; a successful expedition to Paraguay in 
1858 and 1859 to demand reparation for the 
firing upon the United States steamer Water 
Witch; and most notable and most momentous 
of all, the expedition, 1852-1854, resulting in the 
opening of Japan. 

Meanwhile was swiftly gathering the storm of 
secession. Despite the Kansas war, the John 
Brown raid, and fierce political antagonisms, the 
illimitable optimism of the American people 
would not admit the idea of danger until the 
convulsion was upon them. So little could our 
people in i860 recognize that they were rapidly 
231 



232 The American Navy 

being carried into the abyss of war, that in the 
last days of the Congress which closed on June 
25th of that year, "at the instance of Sherman, 
of Ohio, the estimate for repairs and equipment 
of the navy was cut down a million. 
Senator Pugh, of the same state, could say: 'I 
think we have spent enough money on the navy, 
certainly for the service it has rendered, and for 
one I shall vote against building a single ship 
under any pretence at all.' The blatant Love- 
joy, in the face of the rising storm, said: T am 
tired of appropriating money for the army and 
navy when absolutely they are of no use what- 
ever ... I want to strike a blow at this 
whole navy expenditure and let the navy go out 
of existence. . . . Let us blow the whole 
thing up! Let these vessels rot, and when we 
want vessels to fight, we can get mercantile 
vessels and arm them with our citizens.' . 
The whole existing steam navy consisted of but 
twenty-three vessels which could be called 
efficient and thirteen which were worthless, and 
while there was a willingness and effort on the 
part of the Northern senators and representa- 
tives to add to the force, it was put wholly upon 
the ground of the suppression of the slave trade. 
Morse, of Maine, the chairman of the Naval 



The American Navy 233 

Committee in the House, urged that the increase 
should take the form of a purchase of small 
steamers of six to nine feet draught for African 
service. There appears no glimmering in the 
mind of any one of the speakers of the coming of 
a great war, then but nine months distant, and 
in which the North could not have been success- 
ful had it not been for the throttling of the 
blockade and the occupancy of the Mississippi."* 
Besides the legislative incapacity just men- 
tioned, and the equally inept legislation which 
for ten years or more had quarrelled over carry- 
ing slavery into impossible regions, our admin- 
istrative departments were absurdly inefficient 
and, in the case of the War Department, cor- 
rupt, in that the Secretary of War had steadily 
been distributing arms, such as they were, in 
the South. Never did the government of a 
great country go to war under such conditions 
of ineptitude as did ours. Buchanan's effort 
to reinforce Fort Sumter had come to grief 
through the folly of General Scott, who had 
caused the change from the heavily armed war- 
steamer, Brooklyn^ lying at Fort Monroe, to the 
merchant steamer, Star of the West. Had the 



*Chadwick, "The Causes of the Civil War," American Nation 
Series, Vol. XIX, 124, 125. 



234 The American Navy 

Brooklyn gone, as was intended, the Confederates 
would not have dared to fire upon her. Had 
they done so, the raw mihtia which had never 
before fired a cannon would have been driven 
from their improvised battery, and Charleston 
harbor would have been ours permanently. It 
was the same when Mr. Lincoln made the second 
effort and the Powhatan was diverted to Pensa- 
cola through the officiousness of the Secretary 
of State, who meddled with affairs with which 
he had nothing to do and caused orders to be 
sent to the Powhatan without the knowledge of 
the Secretary of the Navy. 

Our officers from the South resigned by scores, 
and our Southern navy yards, Norfolk and 
Pensacola, left under the command of aged 
officers, were surrendered with enormous loss, 
particularly in cannon, many hundreds of which 
thus went to arm the Southern batteries on the 
coast and more particularly on the Mississippi. 
The following ships were burned and scuttled 
at Norfolk on April 20, 1861 : the Pennsylvania^ 
120; Columbus, 74; Delaware, 74; Raritan, 44; 
Columbia, 44; Merrimac, 40; Germantown, 20; 
Plymouth, 20, and Dolphin, 10. All but the 
Merrimac were sailing ships and thus, with this 
exception, no great loss. General Scott, weak- 



The American Navy 235 

eiied by age, was still commander-in-chief, and 
failed to man the Southern forts, which, prop- 
erly, should have been done in the first days 
of secession, and every port of the South thus 
held by the Federal Government. In such case 
there .could have been no war. As it was, a few 
militia marched in and took possession against 
what was only, in most cases, a sergeant-in- 
charge. Never was any government so thor- 
oughly inefficient, and it was the inefficiency of 
years of ineptitude, not of a day. 

But the South occupied every fort and began 
war. To the trained strategist the action to be 
taken so far as the navy was concerned was 
simple: to blockade every port and to occupy 
the Mississippi, The former would cut off the 
importation of military supplies, in which the 
South was terribly deficient; the latter would cut 
the Confederacy in twain and isolate the great 
food supply of her armies. The former of 
course to be effective was a matter of ships, and 
it took time to supply these; the latter could 
and should have been done at once, before the 
defences of the Mississippi were thoroughly es- 
tablished and organized as they were to be. 

The magnitude of the work of blockade is 
evident in the fact "that there were 185 harbor 



236 The American Navy 

and river openings in the Confederate coast- 
hne. . . . This coastHne extended from 
Alexandria, Virginia, to the Mexican port of 
Matamoros, which Hes forty miles up the Rio 
Grande. The Continental line so measured was 
3,549 miles long."* Our few ships were scat- 
tered over the world. There were but three 
instantly available. During the war these were 
increased to 600 by building and by purchasing 
everything which could steam and carry a gun, 
down to ferry-boats. We improvised a great 
navy — of a kind. It could not, however, until 
our ironclad fleet of turreted vessels were built, 
have stood for a moment before a great regular 
force. Fortunately, foreign complications were 
avoided and we had to do with a government 
which itself had to improvise such vessels as it 
could or get them from England and France, 
and the former was full willing until she came 
herself to the verge of war on that account. 
She launched the Alabama and Shenandoah 
which, though officered by Southerners, were 
manned by Englishmen, and built blockade 
runners by the hundreds, which kept the Con- 
federacy alive. 

By great good fortune the Secretary of the 

*Spcars, "Farragut," 159, 160. 



The American Navy 237 

Navy, Gideon Welles, himself a civilian of 
fine mind and good hard sense, though with no 
initiative and with no knowledge of war, was 
supplemented by an Assistant-Secretary, Gus- 
tavus V. Fox, a former officer of the navy, of 
strong character and great energy. He was to 
become practically a chief-of-staff. There had 
been no plan of operations, no laying down of a 
broad scheme such as, had there been any real 
organization of the services, there would have 
been by a general staff. Congress has resisted 
sudh an organization in the navy to this day. 
Even the Civil War has not been able to teach 
it the wisdom of this. Thus, admits Mr. Welles 
himself, "but for some redeeming successes at 
Hatteras and Port Royal the whole belligerent 
operations of 1861 would have been pronounced 
weak and imbecile failures." 

The work of strengthening the blockade was 
carried on with great energy. By building and 
purchasing every available steam vessel in the 
country which could carry a gun, there were 
by December, 1864, 559 steam vessels in the 
service, carrying 3,760 guns and about 51,000 
men. Fortunately there had been enough 
freedom from prejudice to accept the plans of 
Ericsson for building the Monitory which ap- 



238 The American Navy 

peared in the very nick of time, to save our 
wooden fleet from total destruction in Hampton 
Roads by the Virginia, so much better known 
under her original name of the Merrimac, which 
had been one of the frigates so ignominiously 
sunk at Norfolk on the surrender of that yard, 
raised, and with immense energy converted by 
the Confederates into a formidable ironclad. 
The story of the Monitor's battle, on March 
9, 1862, under Worden; his almost fatal wound- 
ing; and the continuance of the fight to victory 
by Dana Greene, her young first lieutenant, a 
mere boy, is among the stories which will last 
forever.* 

Hatteras inlet had been taken and occupied 
on August 28, 1 861; Port Royal on Novem- 
ber 7th. 

There was one man at least, David D. Porter, 
yet only a lieutenant at the age of forty-nine, 
who, when blockading, July, 1861, the passes of 
the river in the Powhatan, saw the importance 
and feasibility of occupying the Mississippi. 
Porter, north again in November, brought the 
subject before the Navy Department, and urged 



*The inventor of the revolving turret was Mr. T. R. Timby, 
vs^ho took out a patent in 1841 and received a royalty of ^5,000 for 
each turret built by Ericsson. 



The American Navy 239 

as commander of the expedition his adopted 
brother, Farragut, senior to Porter in age by 
thirteen years, and far his superior in rank. 

Farragut had left Norfolk declaring, it is 
reported, at a meeting of Southern naval officers, 
some of whom were bound to him by his mar- 
riage to a Norfolk wife: "Gentlemen, I would 
see every man of you damned before I would 
raise my arm against the flag."* The expres- 
sion is not exactly in consonance with Farragut's 
calm and restrained nature, but it fits so well 
with his later one from the shrouds of the Hart- 
ford in Mobile Bay, that it may be taken as 
true. In any case, Farragut left Norfolk on 
April 1 8th, with his wife and son, Loyall. He 
found Baltimore, on his arrival there in the Bay 
Line steamer, in possession of the mob which had 
attacked the Sixth Massachusetts Regiment 
passing through that morning, April 19th, He 
went to Hastirigs-on-the-Hudson and awaited 
orders. 

Every Southern officer was then suspected, 
and it required Porter's utmost powers to con- 
vince the Secretary of the Navy that Farragut 
was the man for the great effort which was to 
be made. On Porter's going to Hastings, he 

*Spears, 152. 



240 The American Navy 

found Farragut thoroughly in accord with the 
plan and eager for the work. He reached 
Washington on December 12, 1861, and on 
January 9, 1862, was appointed commander-in- 
chief of the West Gulf Blockading Squadron, 
with his flag in the Hartford, a. sister ship to the 
Brooklyn, each carrying twenty-two 9-inch 
smooth-bore guns and two 20-pounder rifles. 
It is far from the least of Porter's services to 
his country that he should have been the in- 
strument of this selection. 

We all know the story of the passage of the 
forts by the fleet (numbering seventeen ships, 
with 179 guns) with the rising of the moon, early 
in the morning of April 24, 1862; of the fire rafts 
(one of which set the Hartford afire) ; of the fight 
with the eleven Confederate steamers (one an 
ironclad ram) above the forts; the arrival off 
New Orleans. Says George W. Cable: "I went 
to the riverside; there far into the night I saw 
hundreds of drays carrying cotton out of the 
presses and yards to the wharves, where it was 
fired. The glare of these sinuous miles of flame 
set men and women weeping and wailing thirty 
miles away on the farther shore of Lake Pont- 
chartrain. But the next day was a day of terrors. 
. . . The firemen were out, but they cast 



The American Navy 241 

fire upon the waters, putting the torch to the 
empty ships and cutting them loose to float 
down the river. Whoever could go was go- 
ing. . . . My employer left the city. I 
closed the doors and ran to the river to see the 
sights, , . . 'Are the Yankee ships in 
sight?' I asked an idler. He pointed to the 
tops of their naked masts as they showed up 
across the huge bend of the river. They were 
engaging the batteries at Camp Chalmette — 
the old field of Jackson's renown. Presently 
that was over. Ah me! I see them now as 
they came slowly round Slaughter House Point 
into full view, silent, so grim and terrible, black 
with men, heavy with deadly portent, the long- 
banished Stars and Stripes flying against the 
frowning sky. Oh, for the Mississippi, the Mis- 
sissippi! Just then she came down upon them. 
But now drifting helplessly — a mass of flames. 

"The crowds on the levee howled and 
screamed with rage. The swarming decks an- 
swered never a word; but one old tar on the Hart- 
ford, standing with a lanyard in his hand beside 
a great pivot gun, so plain in view you could see 
him smile, silently patted its big black breech 
and blandly grinned."* 

*Cable, Century Magazine, April, 1885, p. 922. 



242 The American Navy 

The ships anchored, and now came as bold an 
act as any of these stirring hours. Captain 
Theodorus Bailey, Farragut's flag captain, and 
Lieutenant George Perkins, of beloved memory 
in the navy, landed and calmly walked through 
a howling mob crying " Hang them ! hang them !" 
to the city hall and demanded the hauling down 
of the state flag and surrender of the city. 

It was not until the 28th that everything was 
settled by the surrender of the forts to Com- 
mander Porter, who had remained below with 
his mortar flotilla, which had done such good 
service. Mention should be made of the very 
improper action of the British ship Mersey, 
which, following Farragut's fleet up the river, 
anchored near the Hartford, where the men 
aboard sang Confederate songs and acted 
otherwise in a way so off'ensive that Farragut 
was obliged to call the English captain's at- 
tention to their conduct. Farragut should, in 
fact, have ordered the ship out of the river. 

The first step only had been taken. There 
were yet to come great and ever-memorable 
battles before Port Hudson and Vicksburg; 
fights with ironclads, and expeditions up the 
rivers by squadrons of improvised men-of-war 
under Flag Officers Davis and Foote, both of 



The American Navy 243 

gallant memory. Finally the command of the 
navy, extending over the whole of the vast river 
system of which the Mississippi was the main 
artery, fell gradually to Porter, who on the fall of 
Vicksburg, in which his fleet played so great a 
part, was made a rear-admiral. His command 
was now extended down to New Orleans. He 
had over 150 vessels under his flag, and on 
August 7, 1863, he was able to write from New 
Orleans that the "river is entirely free from 
guerrillas, and merchant vessels can travel it 
without danger." But there was plenty of 
fighting yet for the navy in the affluents of the 
Mississippi, and the Red River expedition of 
March 12 to May 16, 1864, in aid of General 
Banks's ill-advised campaign, came near to 
causing the destruction of the most important 
part of Porter's fleet through the falHng of the 
water. The building of the famous dam by 
Colonel Bailey of the volunteers, and the suc- 
cessful passage thereby of the fleet into deeper 
water, is one of the great dramatic events of the 
war. 

While such things were happening on the 
western rivers, scores of actions were taking 
place in Atlantic waters. The siege of Charles- 
ton was a continuous operation and was to 



244 The American Navy 

remain such to the end of the war; the ironclad 
had come into extended use; the Confederate 
ironclad Atlafita had been captured in Wassaw 
Sound in Georgia by the monitor Weehawken^ 
under Captain John Rodgers. There were in all, 
during the year 1863, 145 engagements by the 
navy, great and small. 

The year 1864 was to bring the Civil War 
well toward a close. The blockade had become 
one of extreme rigor; the region west of the Mis- 
sissippi had been entirely cut off, and the whole 
South was now reduced to a poverty of arms, 
equipment, food, clothing, and medical supplies, 
the want of all of which was gradually reducing 
its armies to a state of inanition. Before the 
end of the war every port had been closed, 
Wilmington, in North Carohna, being the last. 
Between November, 1861, and March, 1864, 
eighty-four different steamers were running 
between Nassau and Confederate ports, of 
which thirty-seven were captured and twenty- 
four wrecked or otherwise destroyed.* These 
vessels were built in Great Britain especially for 
the service, were laden with British cargoes, and 
used the British Bahamas and Bermudas as 

*Spears, 166. 



The American Navy 245 

ports of call and supply. Nassau bloomed into 
one of the greatest and most active ports of the 
world. 

In addition to the remarkable episode of Red 
River already mentioned, which resulted in 
saving Porter's fleet, the last year of the war was 
to include some of its most important and 
striking events: the appearance in April of the 
powerful ironclad Albemarle; her career, and her 
final destruction by a torpedo through the heroic 
bravery of Lieutenant Gushing on the night of 
October 27-28; the fight of the Kearsarge and 
Alabama on June 19th; the battle of Mobile Bay 
on August 5th; the appearance of the ironclad 
Stonewall and the bombardments of Fort Fisher 
at the end of December and in the beginning of 
the new year. 

The destruction of the Alabama on a Sunday 
morning off Cherbourg brought to an end the 
career of a ship built in England and manned 
by an English crew, which for more than two 
years had sunk or burned our merchantmen. 
Her captain escaped being taken, as the English 
yacht Deerhound, which had accompanied the 
Alabama out of the harbor to the point seven 
miles out where the Kearsarge awaited her, took 
him aboard before he could be reached by the 



246 The American Navy 

boats from the Kearsarge. That this aid, if it 
should be necessary, was prearranged, is shown 
by the statement of Winslow of the Kearsarge, 
that the Deerhound had received aboard Captain 
Semmes's valuables the night before. It was a 
notable victory and went far to set aright the 
British mind, so susceptible to "success." 

Mobile, which so soon followed, was the 
crown of Farragut's career, and fixes his place 
as the greatest of naval commanders. His dar- 
ing, his consummate decision, his perfect self- 
reliance in situations such as never before fell to 
an admiral to face, and his thorough command of 
such, justify every praise. And in character — 
simplicity, kindliness, and uprightness, and in 
every quality which we are apt to assign to the 
best breeding of the sea — he was among the very 
first. Of but one other, so far as I have known 
men, can so much be said — Sampson his suc- 
cessor of thirty-three years after. 

Farragut's climbing aloft in the main shrouds, 
where his flag-lieutenant, John Crittenden 
Watson (who still survives him, an honored 
admiral), lashed him to prevent his falling; his 
anger with the slowing of the Brooklyn when her 
captain saw the monitor Tecumseh go down 
before him from the explosion of a mine; Far- 



The American Navy 247 

ragut's order, shouted from aloft: ''Damn the 
torpedoes. Full speed ahead!"; the more than 
Sydneyan courtesy of Tunis Craven, the captain 
of the unfortunate Tecumseh, in stepping aside 
from the port of the turret and saying to the 
pilot: "After you, sir," and going down with his 
ship; the final magnificent grappling of the 
Hartford, Monongahela, and Lackawanna with 
the ironclad Tennessee, make a story which it 
needs a poet to tell and which should be en- 
shrined in the heart of every lover of complete 
courage and genius in action, and in no man 
were these more personified than in Farragut. 
America would seem to have lost that genius for 
praise in poetry of her heroes and heroic actions 
which has remained in full vigor in England, 
whose poets seem to rise ever to the occasion, 
even if at times soaring somewhat above it. 
But better the latter than none at all. Still, 
whether sung or not (for Brownell's fine poem 
was but a taste of what should be), Mobile Bay 
remains one of the finest dramas ever enacted 
upon the salt flood of ocean. 

The great bombardments of Fort Fisher on 
December 24th, 25th, and 27th, and again on 
January 1 1 th-i 5th by the fleet of fifty-eight ships 
under Admiral Porter, during which the fort 



248 The American Navy- 

was assaulted by 2,000 seamen and marines 
which, though unsuccessful in itself, greatly 
assisted that of the army, were the last naval 
events of high importance of the war. During 
this bombardment, in which the most powerful 
ships of the navy assisted, 16,682 projectiles 
were fired, weighing 1,652,638 pounds. All of 
the nineteen guns on the sea face of the fort 
were dismounted. 

On April 9th came the surrender of Lee at 
Appomattox, and peace. 



CHAPTER XXII 

The end of the "Brothers' War" had made of 
the United States a nation. Our country took 
its place in the world, and its fleets again reached 
into every sea. But the lessons of the navy had 
not touched the dull minds which in June, i860, 
had voted down the supplies of the little navy 
which was to expand so greatly in the four suc- 
ceeding years. To such, the whole work of de- 
feating the Confederacy appeared to be the more 
spectacular work of the army. The constric- 
tion of the blockade was not of the dramatic 
character of Gettysburg or the battles of the 
Wilderness. Its meaning was to filter but slowly 
into even the more thoughtful. Thus for years, 
while immense changes were going on else- 
where, we were at a standstill in naval matters, 
or rather slowly sinking to absolute nonentity. 
By 1882 the shameful condition of neglect began 
to be remedied. That year may be taken as 
the birth-year of our navy of to-day. For seven 
years we had to go abroad for such material—;; 
249 



250 The American Navy 

gun-forgings, shafting, and armor — as we wanted, 
until our naval demands forced upon our steel 
estabhshments the work of putting themselves 
in order. The story of this work has never been 
told, but the country can be assured that it was 
to the navy that the initial great development 
of steel manufacture in this country was due. 
In 1882 we could make only a forged iron shaft 
for the little Dolphin, which promptly broke on 
her trial trip. It was through arrangements 
made by the Navy Department that our steel 
works, beginning with Bethlehem, established 
modern conditions. 

The story of the building of the new navy is 
outside the scope of this book. It suffices to 
say that by 1898 we had in service four battle- 
ships, the Iowa, Indiana, Oregon, and Massachu- 
setts, of the first class; the Texas, of the second; 
two armored cruisers, the New York and Brook- 
lyn; eleven protected cruisers of from 3,000 to 
7,735 tons, and twenty unprotected cruisers 
of from 839 to 2,089 tons. We also had eight 
torpedo boats, a dynamite vessel, the Vesuvius, 
and six ships of the monitor type, from 4,000 
to 6,060 tons. It was with this fleet we fought 
the war with Spain. 

The causes of this war stretch back through 



The American Navy 251 

generations. Their foundation was, essentially, 
a difference in race. The American is mainly 
an Anglo-Saxon, direct and practical in his 
way; the Spaniard an oriental, courteous, kindly 
in the relations of friendship and family, with 
much that is lovable, but impracticable, tribal 
in his tendencies, knowing little of the modern 
phases of government by a constitution, and 
bloodthirsty and devastating in putting down 
revolt or in settling political differences. An 
anarchic century in Spain produced hke con- 
ditions in Cuba. Our proximity to Cuba and 
our many commercial interests there were very 
strong elements in the situation. 

A great impetus was given to feeling for Cuba 
and against Spain by the explosion of the 
Maine in Havana Harbor about 9:30 p. m., 
February 15th. Two months, however, were 
yet to pass before war was declared, though 
at the last moment Spain had acceded to all our 
demands. While our diplomacy may thus be said 
to have been not entirely "correct," President 
McKinley may be ruled to have been wise in 
cutting the Gordian knot by war, which his mes- 
sage of April II, 1898, practically did in refer- 
ring the whole subject to Congress. The joint 
resolution passed and signed on April 20th, 



252 The American Navy 

demanding that Spain should rehnquish her 
authority in Cuba, was of course taken as a 
declaration of war by Spain, and April 21st was 
declared by Congress a few days later as the 
official date of its beginning. 

On the afternoon of May 21st Captain Wil- 
liam T. Sampson, who was now in command of 
the North Atlantic station, and was with the 
flagship New York off the reef at Key West 
where well-nigh all the available ships in the 
Atlantic were collected, received a telegram 
announcing his assignment to the command, 
with the rank of rear-admiral, an advancement 
only possible by selection by the President in 
time of war. This was the first indication of 
actual hostilities, but it was soon followed by 
another ordering to blockade immediately the 
coast of Cuba from Cardenas to Bahia Honda 
(a little west of Havana). Gathering during 
the night outside the reef (distant six miles from 
Key West) all the ships ready to move, the fleet 
early next morning was on its way, and by even- 
ing was off Havana, the searchlights of which 
were sweeping the sea in expectancy of the 
American fleet. Powerfully armed as were its 
batteries, they were, curiously enough, so dis- 
posed that they were open to attack from the 



The American Navy 253 

southwest, with Httle possibiHty of return. It 
was Sampson's eager wish to make this attack 
at once, and a battle-order had been drawn in 
anticipation of war, early in April, but the Navy 
Department in a letter of April 6th set its face 
so decidedly against the attempt, that Sampson 
had to yield. The department from the view 
of the necessity of preserving the fleet to meet 
Cervera was justified, but Sampson's view, as 
later analysis of the situation showed, was cor- 
rect. Had action been allowed, Havana would 
have been ours, without loss, on April 23d. 

In addition to Sampson's command, a squad- 
ron made up of the Brooklyn, Massachusetts, and 
Texas was stationed at Hampton Roads under 
Commodore Schley; and several others, among 
them the fast Columbia and Minneapolis and 
the cruiser San Francisco, were kept north to 
meet the clamor of the seacoast in general for 
protection. The pubHc could not understand 
that the only real protection was concentration 
against, and the destruction of, the enemy's 
fleet. 

As the joint resolution of Congress of April 
20th declared the aim of the United States to be 
relinquishment of Spanish authority in the is- 
land of Cuba, our main sphere of action was 



254 The American Navy 

naturally the Caribbean. As soon as Spain 
should have yielded the island, the war would 
naturally end unless Spain should choose to con- 
tinue it. There were in the island, by official 
statement, 159,297 regular troops and 119,160 
volunteers. The American regular army, dis- 
tributed from Maine to Alaska, was but 28,183. 
Of course it was necessary to call for a large 
number of volunteers. 

To preserve Cuba it was necessary for Spain 
to preserve communication with the island. 
This could be done only by obtaining and keep- 
ing command of the Atlantic. To do this she 
had an effective force of only four armored 
cruisers: the Infanta Maria Teresa, Almirante 
Oquendo, Fizcaya (Biscay), and Cristobal Colon, 
each of about 7,000 tons. A battleship, the 
Pelayo, and a large armored cruiser, the Carlos 
F, were not yet ready for service. This was of 
course a hopeless disparity of fighting force as 
compared with Admiral Sampson's fleet of five 
powerful battleships and two armored cruisers. 
Admiral Cervera, who had been placed in com- 
mand of the Spanish squadron, saw this clearly 
and protested, without avail, against sending it 
across the Atlantic. On April 29, 1898, he 
left the Cape Verde Islands with the four ar- 



The American Navy 255 

mored cruisers first mentioned and with three 
torpedo-boat destroyers, with orders to go to 
San Juan, Puerto Rico. 

Commodore George Dewey, commanding our 
naval forces in Asia, had, under the orders of the 
department, collected his whole force at Hong 
Kong in anticipation of the war, and had made 
ready for the eventuahty. The Baltimore^ a 
large cruiser for the period, had fortunately 
reached him in time with a precious supply of 
extra ammunition. The British Declaration of 
Neutrality had obliged him to withdraw on 
April 24th his force consisting of the Olympia, 
Baltimore, Boston, Raleigh, Concord, Petrel, and 
the revenue cutter McCulloch, from Hong Kong 
to Mirs Bay, thirty miles away on the China 
coast. Here, on April 26th, he received a tele- 
gram informing him officially of the declaration 
of war and adding: "Commence operations at 
once, particularly against the Spanish fleet. 
You must capture vessels or destroy. Use ut- 
most endeavors." The last three words were 
certainly unnecessary. He left as soon as possi- 
ble, this being the afternoon of May 27th. It 
was 620 miles to Manila. 

It must be confessed that the outlook for the 



256 The American Navy 

Spanish at Manila was not cheerful. They had 
but two vessels of any considerable size, the 
Reina Cristina and the Castilla, of 3,100 and 
3,300 tons, and the latter, whigh had been in use 
as a receiving ship, had no motive power. In 
addition there were available two small cruisers 
of 1,152 tons, two of 1,040, and a gunboat of 
500. Three other small vessels, one the Felasco, 
of 1,139 tons, were under repairs, with some of 
their guns in the batteries at the entrance of the 
bay, twenty-five miles away. Dewey had the 
Olympia, of 5,870 tons; Baltimore, 4,413; 
Raleigh, 3,183; Boston, 3,000; Concord, 1,710; 
and Petrel, 892. The guns, besides a number of 
3 and 6 pounders, were: 



AMERICAN 

Ten 8-inch 

Twenty-three 6-inch 
Twenty 5-inch 



The complements of the two squadrons were: 
American, 1,707 men; Spanish, 1,664. 

It was a ten-mile stretch across the entrance 
to the bay, divided into two deep channels by 
islands upon which had been hastily established 



SPANISH 




Seven 


6.3- 


-inch 


Four 


5-9- 


■inch 


Twenty 


4-7- 


-inch 


Eleven 


3-4- 


■inch 




2.24- 


inch 



The American Navy 257 

batteries mounted with seventeen guns varying 
in cahbre from 7 to 4.3 inch; nine of these were 
muzzle-loaders and thus could not be fired 
nearly so rapidly as the 4.3-inch, which were 
quick-firers. At Manila were mounted 226 
guns of all kinds, most of which were inefficient; 
but there were twelve good breech-loaders of 
from 9.45-inch to 4.7-inch, with much less range, 
however, than the modern 8-inch carried by the 
Olympia. The Manila defences, however, were 
such that it would have been much wiser for 
Montojo to have anchored close as possible to 
the fortifications and thus obtain such support 
as was available. As it was, he was out of their 
protection, supported by only eight guns, mostly 
ineffective weapons, in battery at Sangley Point 
and Cavite; three of these, two 6.3-inch and one 
4.7-inch, were of value. 

Dewey was ofi^ Subig Bay on Saturday, April 
30th. After examining the bay for the Spanish 
ships he stood for Manila, fifty-seven miles 
away. At midnight he passed the rock El 
Fraile in Boca Grande, the battery on which 
fired upon the squadron, which answered with a 
few shots. At five o'clock the squadron was 
near the mouth of the river, on both sides of 
which Manila is built, when the Spanish squad- 



258 The American Navy 

ron was sighted at anchor off Cavite, six miles 
to the southward, and our ships at once turned 
in that direction. Fire was opened at 5:41 
by the Olympia. The American squadron stood 
down slowly to the westward, turned and turned 
again, passing thus five times before the anch- 
ored Spanish ships, thrice to the west, twice 
to the east. After an action of two hours, on a 
report of shortness of ammunition (which proved 
incorrect) the squadron hauled off for a count 
of its supply and to give the men breakfast, the 
captains being called aboard to report damages. 
None of these were serious, and no men had 
been killed, though several were wounded. 
During this time the Spanish squadron was seen 
to be in flames, and the American squadron 
then stood in and completed its work. The 
victory was complete. The Americans had 
fired in all 5,859 shots, 1,414 of which were 5, 
6, and 8 inch; there remained 2,861 of the 
heavier shell and over 30,000 of the 6, 3, and i 
pounders. 

The result of the action depended upon gun- 
nery efficiency, as there was no ship on either 
side which was not thoroughly vulnerable to 
the guns used. And though our gunnery was 
(as also at Santiago) far below the present high 



The American Navy 259 

standard, the result was positive proof of great 
superiority to that of the Spanish. 

The Americans had two officers and six men 
wounded in the Baltimore. Otherwise they 
were scathless. The Spanish loss, as reckoned 
by "painstaking inquiry" by an American offi- 
cer, was 167 killed and 214 wounded. Admiral 
Montojo's own statement, which puts his 
whole force at but 1,134, was 75 killed and 
281 wounded. 

Dewey cut and buoyed the cable on May 2d, 
took position in the bay, and awaited the com- 
ing of troops which were soon to be on their 
way. He sent the revenue cutter McCulloch, 
which had taken no part in the action, to tele- 
graph his victory home. Before he had cut the 
cable, however, the news had been telegraphed 
to Madrid, and it was thence received on May 
2d with great enthusiasm in the United States. 
On May loth Dewey received the thanks of 
Congress and was raised to the rank of Admiral 
of the Navy. 

While the victory was to have great results in 
determining our attitude toward the Philip- 
pines, it could in no sense determine the result 
of the war; this could only be attained by the 
destruction of one or the other battle fleets 



26o The American Navy 

now in the Atlantic. The event, however, put 
a very diflPerent complexion upon the attitude 
of Europe. There was to be no further Euro- 
pean talk of putting limitations upon our con- 
duct of the struggle. 



CHAPTER XXIII 

Naval action now shifts almost entirely to 
the Caribbean. Until in the last days of the 
war there was to be in the Pacific no further 
special naval movement beyond the seizure 
of Guam by the Charlesto?i on June nth and 
the sending to Manila the monitors Monterey 
and Monadnock to reinforce Dewey. The first 
of the army sailed from San Francisco on May 
28th. 

The departure of Cervera from the Cape 
Verdes caused Admiral Sampson to move from 
Havana east 970 miles to San Juan, Puerto 
Rico, with the expectancy of finding there the 
Spanish fleet. This move was based upon the 
view that as it was but from 1,200 to 1,400 miles 
from San Juan to important points on our coast, 
it was an absolute necessity to make sure that 
if the Spanish squadron arrived there it should 
not be allowed to leave and be free to raid our 
seaboard. Sampson's prescience was right. 
Cervera's orders were to go there and then do as 
261 



262 The American Navy 

he thought best. Had he not himself been so 
slow in crossing the Atlantic, Sampson would 
have found him at San Juan, and the Spanish 
fleet would have been destroyed on May 12th 
instead of July 3d. 

Continuous breakdowns of the two monitors 
accompanying Sampson caused such delay that 
his squadron was not off San Juan until May 
I2th, An attack on the fortifications began at 
5 A.M., and continued for three hours, when 
Sampson withdrew with no damage to the ships 
and with the loss of one man killed and four 
wounded aboard the New York. As Cervera 
was clearly not in port, and as it was necessary 
not to risk overmuch the American ships before 
he could be met, it was thought inadvisable 
to continue the action, though as known later 
the place was ready to surrender to another 
attack. As Cervera was much overdue and 
no word had as yet been received of his where- 
abouts, the American squadron stood west (with 
a view to covering Havana), sending into St. 
Thomas, only sixty miles to the east, for news. 

It was not until in the early morning of May 
15th, off Puerto Plata, that word came of Cer- 
vera's having reached Cura9ao. At the same 
time a dispatch from Washington was received 



The American Navy 263 

by Sampson informing him that the Flying 
Squadron was en route to Key West and direct- 
ing Sampson himself to proceed there with all 
possible dispatch. 

Cervera had arrived off Martinique on the 
evening of May i ith and had sent in a destroyer 
for news, which brought next morning the word 
of Sampson's being off Puerto Rico. Unable 
now to go to San Juan without meeting the 
American fleet, a council of war was called, and 
on its decision Cervera shaped his course for 
Cura9ao in search of coal, leaving the destroyer 
Terror, whose boilers had given out, at Marti- 
nique. Leaving Cura9ao in the evening of May 
15th, he entered the harbor of Santiago de Cuba 
at dawn on May 19th. 

Sampson was now, as mentioned, standing at 
full speed for Key West. It is very remarkable 
that he had the same instinct as to Cervera's 
second destination as to his first; as in a tele- 
gram to the scout Harvard (the New York of the 
American line of steamers) he mentioned Santi- 
ago or San Juan as the ports likely to be entered. 
The peremptory orders from Washington left no 
freedom of action, however, and on May i8th 
Key West was reached. There were found the 



264 The American Navy 

ships of the Flying Squadron, the Brooklyn, 
Massachusetts, and Texas, just arrived from 
Hampton Roads and coaHng. 

On May nth, the day before Sampson's at- 
tack at San Juan, there were two affairs of great 
gallantry: the one the cable-cutting at Cien- 
fuegos; the other an action at Cardenas. The 
former was carried out by two sailing launches 
for lifting and cutting the cables and two steam 
launches carrying marines to "stand off" the 
Spaniards. The Marhlehead and Nashville kept 
up a fire against the forces entrenched on the 
edge of the low bluff which finally had to be 
approached within 150 feet before the work was 
accomplished. Grappling for the cables was 
long and tedious, and the operation of sawing 
through each took nearly half an hour. To per- 
form such work under a constant fire from the 
Spaniards in trenches not more than 200 yards 
away showed a cool courage of which Americans 
can be proud. The boats were back to their 
ships in a little over three hours, with two killed 
and seven wounded, one of the latter being 
Lieutenant Winslow in command. 

The action on the same day at Cardenas on 
the north side of Cuba, but seventy-five miles 
from Cienfuegos by land, but 500 by sea, was 



The American Navy 265 

between the Wilmington, the Machias, the 
revenue cutter Hudson, and the torpedo boat 
Winslow against three Spanish gunboats which 
lay well within the harbor in water which could 
not be entered by our heavier draft vessels. 
The torpedo boat, which of course was never 
intended for such service, ventured in too far 
and was severely handled. Ensign Bagley 
and four of the men were killed, and three, 
one being Lieutenant Bernadou in command, 
were wounded. The JVinslozv, wholly disabled, 
was towed out of her dangerous position by the 
intrepid handling of the Hudson. 

We return to Key West, where all was move- 
ment to take measures to intercept Cervera. 

The Navy Department had become convinced 
from information received that Cervera had 
imperative orders to go either to Cienfuegos or 
Havana to land material necessary for the de- 
fence of Havana, and urged the utmost dispatch 
in blockading both ports. Thus next morning, 
May 19th, Commodore Schley sailed with the 
three ships of his squadron mentioned, to be 
followed next day by the lozva, our newest bat- 
tleship of the time, and which reached Cienfue- 
gos only seven hours after Commodore Schley. 
There followed the torpedo boat Dupont, the 



266 The American Navy 

collier Merrimac, the cruisers Marblehead, Cas- 
tine, and two auxiliary vessels; an ample force, 
should Cervera be met. 

Events were now following one another with 
the utmost rapidity. To deal with these in 
detail is quite beyond our scope. One must look 
to the larger histories of the war for the full 
account of the happenings of this stirring time.* 
One can give here but a running mention of the 
reception on the late afternoon of May 19th of 
the news by the way of Havana of Cervera's 
arrival that morning at Santiago de Cuba; the 
repetition of this news with an expression of 
doubt in the telegram from Washington to 
Sampson during that night; its verification next 
day, the 20th; the dispatch of the news to Schley 
with orders, if convinced that Cervera was not 
in Cienfuegos Bay,t to go to Santiago and 
blockade; Sampson's movement 300 miles east 
with the rest of the fleet available into the nar- 
row waters of Nicholas Channel, to intercept 
Cervera should he leave Santiago and attempt 
to reach Havana; the delay of Schley at Cien- 

*See Long, "Our New Navy," Chadwick, "Relations of the 
United States and Spain," I, "Diplomacy," II and III. "The 
Spanish War." 

fBy standing close in and going aloft, the usual anchorage in 
the bay is visible. (Commander Dayton's report, "Report of 
Bureau of Navigation," 1898, 219.) 



The American Navy 267 

fuegos, not being satisfied that Cervera was not 
there; the final assurance that Cervera was not 
at Cienfuegos received from insurgents on May 
24th, and the departure that evening of Com- 
modore Schley's squadron for Santiago; his 
arrival twenty-two miles south of the entrance 
on May 26th; Cervera's intention (but given 
up through vacillation) to leave Santiago that 
evening at almost the same moment when 
Schley started with intention to return to Key 
West on the plea of inability to coal his 
ships; his change of mind on May 28th and 
arrival that evening off Santiago; the arrival of 
the Oregon at Key West on May 26th, complet- 
ing her remarkable journey of 14,000 miles from 
the west coast; Sampson's finally determining 
to go to Santiago on account of Schley's dispatch 
that he could not blockade for want of coal; the 
recognition of the Colon in the harbor entrance 
on May 29th; the ineffectual attack on the 
Colon on May 30th; the arrival of Sampson on 
June 1st with the New York, Oregon, Mayflower, 
and torpedo boat Porter; the establishment of a 
close blockade; the sinking of the Merrimac in 
the entrance channel; the stationing every 
evening of a battleship with searchhghts upon 
the harbor entrance; the occupancy of Guanta- 



268 The American Navy 

namo Bay; the driving off, by the battalion of 
marines estabhshed there in camp, of the Span- 
ish troops in the vicinity; the frequent bom- 
bardment of the Spanish batteries at Santiago 
entrance; the arrival on June 20th of the army 
under General Shafter; its debarkation and 
movement against Santiago; the attack of July 
1st on El Caney and San Juan Hill; the sortie 
of Cervera's squadron; its destruction: these 
are but the chief events of the many vv^hich hap- 
pened between May i8th and July 3d. On the 
forenoon of Sunday, this latter date, was decided 
the fate of Spain in America. 

More than half the crews of the Spanish ships 
had been used ashore on July ist in the defence 
of Santiago, and the commander of these. Cap- 
tain Bustamante, Cervera's chief-of-stafF, had, 
to the great grief of all who knew him both in 
the Spanish and American services, been mor- 
tally wounded. Cervera had, after the battle 
of July 1st, received orders to leave the harbor 
and endeavor to save his squadron. He and his 
captains accepted the situation with calm cour- 
age and prepared to leave the evening of July 
2d. The slow work of returning the crews 
aboard ship caused delay until the next morning. 

At 9:30 the crews of the American ships were 



The American Navy 269 

just falling in for the usual Sunday "inspec- 
tion." The admiral had started a little before 
nine in the New York under easy steam to ar- 
range with General Shafter a plan of combined 
attack. The New York had gone about five 
miles when a shot was heard from the battery 
at the entrance and a ship almost immediately 
after seen coming out. The New York at once 
turned. 

In accord with the admiral's standing order, 
all the ships immediately started to close in 
on the entrance. The flagship Infanta Maria 
Teresa, which was the ship first sighted, was 
naturally exposed for some Httle time to the 
fire of all, and was quickly a mass of flames and 
heading in for the land. She was run ashore 
about six miles west of the harbor entrance; 
the Oquendo, though she was the last of the 
large ships to come out, was beached, also burn- 
ing, soon after the Maria Teresa, about a quarter 
of a mile west of the latter; the Vizcaya, afire, 
went on to the reef fifteen miles west of San- 
tiago about 1 1 130, shortly after which her for- 
ward magazine exploded. The destroyer Furor 
had been sunk, and the Pluton was ashore 
destroyed, having made only three miles to the 
west. The Colon only was left, in full flight 



270 The American Navy 

and practically uninjured, pursued by the Ore- 
goUy Brooklyn, New York, and Texas. At 1:15 
she turned ashore, the 13-inch shell of the Ore- 
gon, fired at 9,000 yards, going over her. Her 
sea-valves had been opened, and though she 
was pushed on to the beach stern foremost by the 
New York, her bow overhung into deep water 
and as she filled she turned on her side. She was 
never raised. The heroic efforts of the Amer- 
ican crews in saving life from the burning ships 
are deserving every praise. 

The Spanish loss may be taken as about 264 
killed and drowned and 151 wounded; the 
prisoners, including officers, numbered 1,813. 
The Americans lost i killed, i wounded, both 
in the Brooklyn. 

The Spanish could not have expected to es- 
cape, nor did they. They went to their death 
like heroes. There has been nothing finer than 
the calm bravery of their exit from the narrow 
harbor entrance without accident or delay on 
the part of any ship. We had against them six 
heavy ships to four; fourteen 12-inch and 13- 
inch guns against six ii-inch; thirty 8-inch 
against none of that calibre; forty-four 6, 5, and 
4 inch against thirty-six 5.5 and 4.7 inch, and 
ninety-six 6-pounders against thirty-eight Span- 



The American Navy 271 

ish. We had a hke superiority in armor. In 
one point, speed, the Spanish were, nominally 
at least, decidedly superior, all their ships 
being of twenty knots. Only two of the 
Americans: the New York and BrooklyUy had 
such. 

There remained now only the question of 
reducing the city of Santiago, in which the navy 
took an active part in bombardment of the city 
from the sea. On July 17th it surrendered. 

The success of the navy at Santiago was due 
to the circular blockade instituted by Admiral 
Sampson on his arrival, and to the lighting up 
the harbor entrance nightly with the search- 
lights of the battleships, which were relieved 
every two hours. Escape at night was thus, by 
Cervera's own report, made impossible. The 
circular form of Sampson's blockade during the 
day and night left no such chance of finding an 
extensive unguarded space, such as existed in 
steaming in column to and fro across the en- 
trance. The whole is summed up in the report 
of Captain (now Rear-Admiral) Clark of the 
Oregon to Admiral Sampson: "We went ahead 
at full speed with the determination of carrying 
out to the utmost your order: 'If the enemy 
tries to escape, the ships must close and engage 



272 The American Navy 

as soon as possible and endeavor to sink his ves- 
sels or force them to run ashore.' " 



With their only battle fleet destroyed, the 
preservation by the Spanish of communication 
with Cuba was now impossible and the fall of 
the island certain. Thus an expedition under 
the command of Admiral Camara left Cadiz on 
June 17th for the PhiHppines. It reached Port 
Said on June 25th. A strong force was detailed 
from Admiral Sampson's fleet to go to the Phil- 
ippines under Commodore Watson, to be ac- 
companied through the Mediterranean by the 
rest of the available ships of the fleet under 
Sampson himself. The news of the 3d of July, 
and also of the preparation of this fleet, caused 
Spain to recall Camara's force before it had left 
the vicinity of Suez. Meanwhile a large num- 
ber of ships had taken a prominent part in the 
convoying of part of General Miles's force to 
Puerto Rico and in the seizure of the south 
coast of that island. 

Spain, with full recognition of the meaning of 
her loss, opened negotiations for peace, and on 
August 12, 1898, the protocol was signed by 
which she relinquished all sovereignty over 
Cuba, ceded to the United States Puerto Rico 



The American Navy 273 

and an island in the Ladrones to be selected, 
and agreed to our occupancy of the city of 
Manila pending the conclusion of a treaty of 
peace which would determine the future of the 
Philippines. 

At the moment of the signing of the protocol 
our fleet and troops were preparing for the as- 
sault at Manila. By noon the city had sur- 
rendered and was in our possession. The date 
at Manila, owing to difference in time, was 
August 13th. Thus there were but a few hours 
between the surrender and the signing, but the 
latter had preceded the surrender and Manila 
could not be claimed as ours by right of con- 
quest. Although the claim was put forward, it 
was soon withdrawn, and we now possess the 
archipelago by right of purchase, though indeed 
it must be said that the sale by Spain was an 
enforced one. The war thus ended with Puerto 
Rico and Guam as possessions by conquest, 
with the Hawaiian Islands a United States 
territory by annexation, with Cuba a protec- 
torate, and the Philippines a purchased posses- 
sion. We had gone far afield and had incurred 
heavy responsibiUties which stretched eight 
thousand miles westward from California, and 
had taken up a naval base adjacent to what is 



274 The American Navy- 

sure to be one of the great fields of future world 
action — Eastern Asia. 

It is difficult to leave the subject of the Phil- 
ippines without a word as to the continuation 
of naval action among the islands and the share 
taken by the navy in the release of Spaniards 
held by the natives, in frequent punitive ex- 
peditions, and in the general pacification of the 
region. For several years our ships were active 
equally with the army in this work. In Febru- 
ary, 1899, the important point of Ilo-Ilo was 
bombarded and captured by the small cruiser 
Petrel. Constant work of patrol and block- 
ade was carried out, not always without loss. 
Throughout there was active cooperation with 
the army in transporting troops and in attack 
and defence, with for some years separate ex- 
peditions by the marines of great hardship and 
courage. 



CHAPTER XXIV 

The losses of the navy in the war with Spain 
were extraordinarily small. There were but 
sixteen killed and sixty-eight wounded, of 
whom two died later. But even more remark- 
able, and it reflects the highest praise upon the 
service, was the state of health of the 26,102 
men during this war of 114 days (April 21st to 
August 1 2th, inclusive). There were but fifty- 
six deaths in this period from disease, or at the 
rate of 6.85 per thousand a year. There were 
but thirteen cases of typhoid fever, and no death 
aboard ship from this disease and but one in 
hospital. There were but eighteen cases of 
dysentery. The marine battalion at Guanta- 
namo numbered 588—21 officers and 567 men. 
There was no death from disease; only nineteen 
cases of malaria and no typhoid. 

The whole was a very remarkable showing; 
one never equalled elsewhere. And it should be 
remembered that it was in a climate, and in- 
deed very largely in the same region, where, a 
27s 



276 The American Navy 

century and a half before, the crews of some 
British ships were so swept by disease that they 
had in some cases to be renewed three times in 
but a moderate period of service. The health 
conditions of the American fleet showed an en- 
hghtened care which reflects honor upon all 
concerned. 

The situation left us by the Spanish War is one 
which can be maintained only by a powerful 
fleet, though our acquisitions in themselves 
scarcely add to the necessity of such a fleet, for 
meanwhile we have built the Panama Canal. 
And while the canal has lightened our strategic 
diflB;culties in that our battle fleet can now reach 
San Francisco from the Caribbean in a fourth of 
the time it took the Oregon to make her cele- 
brated passage from San Francisco to Key West, 
there is upon us the heavy burden of the defence 
of the isthmus, its position being in efi^ect insu- 
lar. It can only remain in our hands by our 
controlling the sea. Fortifications assist in its 
defence for the time being, but should we go to 
war it must finally go into the hands of the 
power with a superior navy. And being thus 
isolated and having this insular character, the 
canal and its fortifications should be in naval 



The American Navy 277 

control in order that there should be complete 
unanimity of effort in its defence. 

It is safe to say that however anti-imperialist 
one may be, there is no American who would see 
the canal go into foreign control with equanim- 
ity. The most pronounced would halt at such 
a danger. Thus whatever one's attitude may 
be toward the Monroe Doctrine, there are few 
who would not uphold the contention that we 
shall not permit any further extension of foreign 
influence in the Caribbean or in any part of the 
neighboring Pacific littoral, or in neighboring 
islands such as the Galapagos. This is not 
a question of extension of influence, but of 
safety. 

A word must be said as to the navy's diplo- 
matic work. International law is mostly both 
made and administered by navies. The navy 
is thus a great and constant school of diplomacy, 
the right hand of the Department of State. We 
have had a notable instance, almost as I write, in 
the events in Mexico, and from none have naval 
officers received higher praise for their work 
than from the late lamented Secretary of State, 
John Hay. It is duty such as this which gives 
the naval profession its breadth and importance 
in peace, as great in its way, as in war. And 



278 The American Navy 

the diplomacy of naval officers is always in the 
direction of peace, though it may sometimes be 
peace with a strong hand, as in Admiral Ben- 
ham's most admirable handling of the situation 
in the harbor of Rio de Janeiro during the revolt 
of 1895. He brought instantaneous peace be- 
tween the revolutionary forces and the Govern- 
ment; he upheld international law, stood by 
the rights of our merchant captains, and ren- 
dered a service beyond price to Brazil. 

Such international uses of the navy accentu- 
ate the value of the Marine Corps, now a naval 
army of 10,267 men and officers. Little has 
been said heretofore in this book of this valuable, 
indeed invaluable, force, as its duties are merged 
largely in the general duties of the navy. It 
differs from the army proper in its mobility and 
ever-readiness for foreign service. Its mobility 
is that of the navy itself; its transport is ever 
ready; its supply train is the fleet. 

It is an international understanding that sea- 
men or marines may be landed in any part of 
the world for the protection of life and property, 
and that such action may even extend to the use 
of force without being regarded as an act of war. 
There is no need to expand the value of such a 
convention which gives the navy such an ex- 



The American Navy 279 

tension of its field of forceful, and at the same 
time peaceable, action. 

We speak much of our development into a 
world power through the war of 1898. We were 
such a power potentially as soon as we had a 
navy of a strength to enable us to say to another 
power, "I forbid." And we can only remain a 
world power through a navy which can com- 
mand safety and peace. Linked to such power 
there must be political good sense and just 
dealing. Long habit in obedience and in com- 
mand, a life-long study of international rela- 
tions, a knowledge of the races of men such as 
no other great profession can offer, an ideal 
which puts duty as its first law; these enable 
the navy to furnish its just quota of both the 
high qualifications mentioned. To it the coun- 
try can securely trust its honor and safety. It 
will ever do its duty. 



A SHORT BIBLIOGRAPHY 

It would take a great many pages to give a 
complete bibliography of the subject of the 
American navy. I must content myself with 
mentioning only a few of the more prominent 
works. 

There were two navies: that of the Revolution, 
which disappeared wholly in 1785; and that of 
to-day, which had its origin in 1794. The two 
most complete works regarding the former are 
those of Gardner W. Allen, "A Naval History 
of the Revolution," 2 vols., Boston and New 
York, Houghton Mifflin Company, 191 3, and 
Oscar Charles Paullin, "The Navy of the Ameri- 
can Revolution: Its Administration, Its Policy, 
and Its Achievements," Cleveland, The Burrows 
Brothers Company, 1906. This latter deals 
chiefly with the legislative action respecting the 
navy and its administration; it is the only one of 
its class. To these two authors, Dr. Allen and 
Dr. Paullin, I desire to express my special ob- 
ligations. 

280 



The American Navy 281 

The naval classic, J. Fenimore Cooper, "The 
Navy of the United St..ces of America," a book 
which fascinated the author of the present 
volume as a boy, carries one from 1775 through 
the War of 1812 only. 

The publications of the Naval History So- 
ciety, Vol. I, being the logs of the Serapis, 
Alliance, and Ariel under the command of John 
Paul Jones, ed. by John S. Barnes, 191 1. Vol. 
2 is 'Tanning's Narrative," also edited by Mr. 
Barnes, 1912. Fanning's account of the cap- 
ture of the Serapis by the Bonhomme Richard 
is the best existent. There are other volumes, 
all of much interest. 

Robert Beatson, "Naval and Military 
Memoirs of Great Britain from 1727 to 1783," 
by far the best work of its period on the subject. 

Wm. Laird Clowes, "The Royal Navy," a 
monumental work in which Admiral Mahan, 
U. S. N., and Colonel Theodore Roosevelt had 
part, covers in vols. 3-6 our Revolution and the 
War of 1812. It is a work of the highest value. 

The same should be said of Admiral Mahan's 
books, "The Influence of Sea Power upon 
History," and "Sea Power in its Relations to 
the War of 1812," Boston, Little, Brown & 
Company, 1905. All his works are important. 



282 The American Navy 

G. Lacour-Gayet, "La Marine Militaire 
de la France sous le Regne de Louis XVI," Paris, 
Honore Champion, 9 Quai Voltaire, 1905, is the 
best French history of the naval events of the 
time. 

Henri Doniol, "Histoire de la Participation 
de la France a I'Etablissement des Etats- 
Unis d'Amerique," 6 vols., Paris, Imprimerie 
Nationale, 1892. This monumental work was 
prepared for the universal exhibition of 1889 
and is of highest value to the student. 

Charlemagne Tower, "The Marquis de la 
Fayette in the American Revolution." A valu- 
able work. 

Henry Adams, "The History of the United 
States, 1800-1817," 9 vols.. New York, C. 
Scribner's Sons, 1891. A book of the first rank 
and importance. 

Edgar Stanton Maclay, "A History of the 
United States Navy," from 1775 to 1902, 3 vols., 
New York, D. Appleton & Company, 1902. 
One of our best and completest histories on the 
subject. 

Gardner W. Allen, "Our Navy and the Bar- 
bary Corsairs," New York, etc., Houghton 
Mifflin Company, 1905. An excellent book 
and a complete account. 



The American Navy 283 

E. Dupuy, "Americains et Barbaresques," 
Paris, R. Roger et F. Chernoviz, 99 Boulevard 
Raspail, 1910. A book very highly to be praised. 

Robert W. Neeser, "Statistical and Chrono- 
logical History of the United States Navy," 
New York, the Macmillan Company, 1909, 2 
vols, folio. An invaluable work for the student. 

Robert W. Neeser, "Our Many Sided Navy," 
Yale University Press, 1914. Well done. 

Theodore Roosevelt, "The Naval War of 
1812," New York, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1882. 
A good and fair book. 

The Hterature of the Civil War is so vast that 
barest mention can be made of a few works 
only. 

Loyall Farragut, "Life and Letters of Ad- 
miral D. G. Farragut," New York, D. Appleton 
& Company, 1891. 

A. T. Mahan, "Admiral Farragut," New 
York, D. Appleton & Company, 1903. 

James Russel Soley, "Admiral Porter," New 
York, D. Appleton & Company. 

John Randolph Spears, "David G. Farragut," 
Philadelphia, Geo. W. Jacobs & Company, 1905. 

James Russel Soley, "The Blockade and the 
Cruisers," New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 
1890. 



284 The American Navy 

A. T. Mahan, "The Gulf and Inland Waters," 
New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1883. 

Daniel Ammen (Rear-Admiral), "The At- 
lantic Coast," New York, Charles Scribner's 
Sons, 1883. 

"Battles and Leaders of the Civil War," 
New York, The Century Company, 1888. 

All these are very interesting and valuable. 

For the Spanish War, John D. Long (ex- 
Secretary of the Navy), "The New American 
Navy," 2 vols.. New York, The Outlook Com- 
pany, 1903. 

F. E. Chadwick, "The Relations of the 
United States and Spain," vols. 2 and 3 being 
"The Spanish War," New York, Charles Scrib- 
ner's Sons, 191 1. 

There are admirable bibliographies in the 
works of Dr. Paullin and Dr. Allen covering 
the periods of which their books treat. The 
reader is referred to these and other general 
bibliographies for more complete information 
than can be given here. 



A WORD ABOUT 
THE AMERICAN BOOKS 



The American Books 

A Library of Good Citizenship 

TO vote regularly and conscientiously and 
never to have been arrested for disorder 
is not the be-all and end-all of good citi- 
zenship. The good citizen is he or she who bears 
an active hand in cleansing and making merry 
the black spots of the neighborhood; who cher- 
ishes a home however small; who takes an 
increasingly intelligent interest in all that con- 
tributes to the country's welfare, and feels a 
keenly patriotic hope for the future of the nation. 

For such citizens the American books are 
designed — a series of small volumes on current 
American problems. The keynote of the series 
will be the discussion of distinctively American 
movements and questions connected with the 
future prosperity of the United States. 

The series was planned long before the great 
war, but it has derived added importance from 
the position which that great struggle has given 
America on the face of the globe. The United 
States, standing aloof from the suicidal blood- 
shed of the Old World, has necessarily become 
the peaceful arbiter of the earth's destinies and 
the flywheel to keep the world's industry re- 
volving. 



An inquiry into the meaning and tendency of 
American civilization to-day is thus not only a 
matter of interest but of patriotic duty. The 
publishers wish the American books to be a 
series of brief, authoritative manuals which will 
attempt to lay bare some of the problems that 
confront us to-day ; written in popular terms that 
will inspire rather than discourage the casual 
reader. The series should prove not only of 
great interest to all American citizens who wish 
to aid in solving their country's pressing prob- 
lems, but to every foreigner visiting this country 
who seeks an interpretation of the American 
point of view. 

The publishers wish the American books to 
be written by the' best men, and to this end they 
seek the widest publicity for the plan. They 
will be glad to receive suggestions as to appro- 
priate titles for inclusion in the series and will 
welcome authoritative MSS submitted from any 
quarter. In particular they submit the plan to 
the consideration of the American colleges where 
the problems of the country are being studied. 
In science, literature, business, politics, in the 
arts of war and the arts of peace, the publishers 
will seek writers who have stood for fearless 
achievement or equally fearless failure, who will 
build up A Library of Good Citizenship. 

{For complete list of volumes in 
this series see opposite title page.) 




THE COUNTRY LIFE PRESS 
GARDEN CITY, N. Y. 



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